safety. Wrigbt’s infantry, which was farther removed from the point of attack, fared somewhat better, but did not offer more than a spasmodic resistance. The cavalry on the right was on the alert. The rule that in the immediate presence of the enemy the cavalry must be early prepared for attack resulted in the whole First Division being up with breakfast partly finished, at the time the attack commenced. A brigade sent on reconnois-sance to the right had opened with its guns some minutes before the main attack on the left, for it had met the cavalry sent by Early to make a demonstration on our right.
The disintegration of Crook’s command did not occupy many minutes. With a force of the enemy passing through its camp of sleeping men, and another powerful column well to their rear, it was not wonderful that the men as fast as they were awakened by the noise of battle thought first and only of saving themselves from destruction. The advance of Gordon deflected this fleeing throng from the main road to the rear, and they passed over to the right of the army and fled along the back road. Emory made an attempt to form line facing along the main road, but the wave of Gordon’s advance on his left, and the thunders of the attack along the road from Strasburg, rendered the position untenable, and he was soon obliged to withdraw to save his lines from capture.
At this time there were hundreds of stragglers moving off by the right to the rear, and all efforts to stop them proved of no avail. A line of cavalry was stretched across the fields on the right, which halted and formed a respectable force of men, so far as numbers were concerned, but these fled and disappeared to the rear as soon as the force wdiich held them was withdrawn. By degrees the strength of the battle died away. The infantry of the Sixth Corps made itself felt on the advance of the enemy, and a sort of confidence among the troops which had not fled from the field was being restored. A brigade of cavalry was ordered to the left to intercept the enemy’s advance to Winchester. Taylor’s battery of artillery, belonging to the cavalry, moved to the south, and, taking position with the infantry which was retiring, opened on the enemy. The artillery with the cavalry was the only artillery left to the army. The other guns had either been captured or sent to the rear. This battery remained on the infantry lines, and did much toward impeding the enemy’s advance until the cavalry changed position to the Winchester-Strasburg road. This change took place by direction of General Torbert about 10 o’clock. In making it the cavalry marched through the broken masses of infantry direct to a point on the main road northeast of Middletown. The enemy’s artillery fire was terrific. Not a man of the cavalry left the ranks unless he was wounded, and everything was done with the precision and quietness of troops on parade. General Merritt informed Colonel Warner of Getty’s division, near which the cavalry passed, and which was at that time following the general retreat of the army, of the point where the cavalry would take position and fight, and Warner promised to notify General Getty, and no doubt did so, for that division of the Sixth Corps advanced to the position on the cavalry’s right. Then Devin and Lowell charged
of the people, for this, besides being contemplated by orders, resulted of necessity from the fact that, while the work was done hurriedly, the citizens had ample time to secrete supplies, and did so.
On the return of the army after the pursuit of the scattered remnants of Early’s force, General Sheridan placed it in position on Cedar Creek north of the Shenandoah, Crook on the left, Emory in the center, and Wright in reserve. The cavalry was placed on the flanks. The occupation of Cedar Creek was not intended to be permanent; there were many serious objections to it as a position for defense. The approaches from all points of the enemy’s stronghold at Fisher’s Hill were through wooded ravines in which the growth and undulations concealed the movement of troops, and for this reason and its proximity to Fisher’s Hill the pickets protecting its front could not be thrown, without dangerof capture,sufficientlyfarto the front to give ample warning of the advance of the enemy. We have already seen how Sheridan took advantage of like conditions at Fisher’s Hill. Early was now contemplating the surprise of his antagonist. . . .
On the 15th General Sheridan, taking with him Torbert with part of the cavalry, started for Washington, the design being to send the cavalry on a raid to Gordonsville and vicinity. The first camp was made near Front Royal, from which point the cavalry was returned to the army, it being considered safer to do so in consequence of a despatch intercepted by our signal officers from the enemy’s station on Three Top Mountain, and forwarded to General Sheridan by General Wright. This despatch was as follows:
“ To Lieutenant-Gekeral Early : Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan.— Longstiieet, Lieutenant-General.”
In sending back the cavalry General Sheridan wrote to General Wright, directing caution on his part, so that he might be duly prepared to resist the attack in case the above despatch was genuine. Sheridan continued to Washington, and the cavalry resumed its station in the line of defense at Cedar Creek. At this time everything was quiet— suspiciously so.
On the 16th Custer made a reeonnoissance in his front on the back road, but found no enemy outside the lines at Fisher’s Hill. ... On the 18th reconnoissances on both flanks discovered no sign of a movement by the enemy.
The result of the destruction of supplies in the Valley was now being felt by Early’s troops. About this time he writes: “I was now compelled to move back for want of provisions and forage, or attack the enemy in his position with the hope of driving him from it; and I determined to attack.” From reports made by General Gordon and a staff-officer who ascended Three Top Mountain to recon-noiter the Union position, and the result of a reeonnoissance made at the same time by General Fegram toward the right flank of the Union army, General Early concluded to attack by secretly moving a force to turn Sheridan’s left flank at Cedar Creek.
The plan of this attack was carefully made; the routes the troops were to pursue, even after the battle had commenced, were carefully designated. The attack was made at early dawn. The surprise was complete. Crook’s camp,and afterward Emory’s, was
VIEW ON THE VALLEY TURNPIKE WHERE SHERIDAN JOINED THE ARMY AT CEDAR CREEK.
From a photograph taken iu 1885.
THE SURPRISE AT CEDAR CREEK.
From a war-time sketch.
The right of the picture shows the Confederate flanking column attacking the left of the ־Nineteenth Corps from the rear. The Union troops, after a determined resistance, took position on the outer side of their rifle-pits.
artillery, in conjunction with that of the enemy, was turned on them, and long before it was light enough for their eyes, unaccustomed to the dim light, to distinguish friend from foe, they were hurrying to our right and rear intent only on their
attacked in flank and rear, and the men and officers driven from their beds, many of them not having the time to hurry into their clothes, except as they retreated half awake and terror-stricken from the overpowering numbers of the enemy. Their own

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