Ш THE VAN. chances to change in his favor, hoping that Early would either detach troops or take some less defensible position. His caution was fortunate at this time, and his fearlessness and hardihood were sufficiently displayed thereafter. In the light of criticisms, then, it is curious that the world is now inclined to call Sheridan reckless and foolhardy. At 2 a. m. of September 19th Sheridan’s army was astir under orders to attack Early in front of Winchester. ... At daylight Wilson advanced [Several other engagements took place between the troops of General Sheridan and General Early, leaving Sheridan master of the situation.] On the 12th of September Sheridan had telegraphed Grant to the effect that it was exceedingly difficult to attack Early in his position behind the Opequon, which constituted a formidable barrier ; that the crossings, though numerous, were deep, and the banks abrupt and difficult for an attacking force ; and, in general, that he was waiting for the mettle of his new adversary, was aggressive, and at once maneuvered with a bold front, seemingly anxious for a battle. The movements of the first few days showed, however, that Early was not disposed to give battle unless he could do so on his own conditions. On the morning of the 10th of August, Sheridan, who had massed his army at Halltown, in front of Harper’s Ferry, marched toward the enemy’s communications, his object being to occupy Early’s line of retreat and force him to fight before reinforcements could reach him. The march of my cavalry toward the Millwood-Winehester road brought us in contact with the enemy’s cavalry on that road, and it was driven toward Kernstown. At the same time a brigade under Custer, making a reeonnois-sance on the Berryville-Winehester road, came on the enemy holding a defile of the highway, while “his trains and infantry were marching toward Strasburg.” As soon as the retreat of the enemy was known to General Sheridan the cavalry was ordered to pursue and harass him. Near White Post, Devin came upon a strongly posted force, which, after a sharp fight, he drove from the field, and the division took position on the Winchester-Front Royal pike. The same day my division had a severe affair with infantry near Newtown, in which the loss to my second brigade was considerable. On the 12th of August, the enemy having retired the night before, the cavalrypursuedtoCedar Creek, when it came up with Early’s rear-guard and continued skirmishing until the arrival of the head of the infantry column. The day following, the re-connoissance of a brigade of cavalry discovered the enemy strongly posted at Fisher’s Hill. About this time Early received his expected reinforcements. General Sheridan, being duly informed of this, made preparations to retire to a position better suited for defense and adapted to the changed conditions of the strength of the two armies. . . . About 2 p. M. on the 16th an attack was made . . . which resulted in the battle of Cedarville. . . . The Confederates were thrown into confusion and retreated, leaving 300 prisoners, together with two stand of colors. . . . carried out by another, and how well this was accomplished it is my purpose to recount. Hunter’s failure to capture Lynchburg in the spring of 1864, and his retreat by a circuitous line opened the valley to General Early, who had gone to the relief of Lynchburg. Marching down the valley and taking possession of it without serious opposition, Early turned Harper’s Ferry, which was held by a Union force under Sigel, and crossed into Maryland at Shepherdstown. The governors of New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts were called on for hundred-days men to repel the invasion, and later the Army of the Potomac supplied its quota of veterans as a nucleus around which the new levies could rally. General Early marched on Washington, and on the 11th of July was in front of the gates of the capital. The following day, after a severe engagement in which the guns of Fort Stevens took part, he withdrew his forces through Rockville and Poolesville, and, crossing the Potomac above Leesburg, entered the Valley of Virginia through Snicker’s Gap. Afterward, crossing the Shenandoah at the ferry of the same name, he moved to Berryville, and there awaited developments. After the immediate danger to Washington had passed it became a question with General Grant and the authorities in Washington to select an officer who, commanding in the valley, would prevent further danger from invasion. After various suggestions, Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was selected temporarily for this command. His permanent occupation of the position was opposed by Secretary Stanton on the ground that he was too young for such important responsibility. On the 7th of August, 1864, Sheridan assumed command of the Middle Military Division, and of the army for the protection of the valley, afterward known as the “Army of the Shenandoah.” Naturally, on assuming command, Sheridan moved with caution. He was incited to this by his instructions, and inclined to it by his unfamiliarity with the country, with the command, and with the enemy he had to deal with. On the other hand, Early, who had nothing of these to learn, save the ״׳/ ־>«