dered "by a fruitful country filled with supplies, it offered a tempting highway for an army bent on a flanking march on Washington or the invasion of Maryland or Pennsylvania. For the Union armies, while it was an equally practicable highway, it led away from the objective, Richmond, and was exposed to flank attacks through the gaps from vantage-ground and perfect cover.
It was not long after General Grant completed his first campaign in Virginia, and while he was in front of Petersburg, that his attention was called to this famous seat of side issues between Union and Confederate armies. With quick military instinct he saw that the valley was not useful to the Government for aggressive operations. He decided that it must be made untenable for either army. In doing this he reasoned that the advantage would be with us, who did not wantit as a source of supplies, nor as a place of arms, and against the Confederates, who wanted it for both. Accordingly,instructionswere drawn up for carrying on a plan of devastating the valley in a way least injurious to the people. These instructions, which were intended for Hunter, were destined to be
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE A. CUSTER, U. S. V. From a photograph.
The rapid marching, and the losses at Harper’s Ferry,
Maryland Heights, and Mo-nocacy, had reduced my infantry to about 8000 muskets.
Of these a very large number were greatly exhausted by the last two days’ marching, some having fallen by sunstroke, and not more than one-third of my force could have been carried into action. I had about forty pieces of artillery, of which the largest were 12-pounder Napoleons, besides a few pieces of horse-artillery with the cavalry. McCaus-land reported the works on the Georgetown pike too strongly manned for him to assault. After dark on the 11th I held a consultation with Major-Generals Breckinridge, Rodes, Gordon, and Ramseur, in which I stated to them the necessity of doing something immediately, as the passes of South Mountain and the fords of the Upper Potomac would soon be elosed against us. After interchanging views with them, I determined to make an assault on the enemy’s works at daylight next morning. But during the night a despatch was received from General Bradley T. Johnson from near Baltimore, that two corps had arrived from General Grant’s army, and that his whole army was probably in motion. As soon as it was light enough to see, I rode to the front, and found the parapet lined with troops. I had, therefore, reluctantly to give up all hopes of capturing Washington, after I had arrived in sight of the dome of the Capitol, and given the Federal authorities a terrible fright.
Some of the Northern papers stated that, between Saturday and Monday, I could have entered the city; but on Saturday I was fighting at Mon-oeaey, thirty-five miles from Washington, a force which I could not leave in my rear; and after disposing of that force and moving as rapidly as it was possible for me to move, I did not arrive in front of the fortifications until after noon on Monday, and then my troops were exhausted, and it required time to bring them up into line. I had then made a march, over the circuitous route by Charlottesville, Lynchburg, and Salem, down the valley and through the passes of the South Mountain, which, notwithstanding the delays in dealing with Hunter’s, Sigel’s, and Wallace’s forces, is, for its length and rapidity, I believe, without a parallel in this or any other modern war. My small force had been thrown up to the very walls of the Federal capital, north of a river which could not be forded at any point within forty miles, and with a heavy force and the South Mountain in my rear —
RODES’S DIVISION ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 19, 1864.
by Rodes’s division with but slight loss to us.
About dark we commenced retiring, and did so without molestation. Passing through Rockville and Poolesville, we crossed the Potomac at White’s Ford, above Leesburg, in Loudoun County, on the morning of the 14th, bringing off the prisoners captured at Monocacy, and our captured beef cattle and horses, and everything else, in safety.
SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.
BY WESLEY MERRITT, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V., BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. A. Commanding tlie First Division of Cavalry.
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tunate place either for battle or for strategy. A glance at the map will go far toward explaining this. The valley has a general direction from southwest to northeast. The Blue Ridge Mountains, forming its eastern barrier, are well defined from the James River above Lynchburg to Harper’s Ferry on the Potomac. Many passes (in Virginia called “gaps”) made it easy of access from the Confederate base of operations; and, bor-
THE BATTLE OF WINCHESTER—RICKETTS’S ADVANCE AGAINS
the passes through which mountain could be held by a small number of troops. A glance at the map, when it is recollected that the Potomac is a wide river, and navigable to Washington for the largest vessels, will cause the intelligent reader to wonder, not why I failed to take Washington, but why I had the audacity to approach it as I did, with the small force under my command. It was supposed by some, who were not informed of the facts, that I delayed in the lower valley longer than was necessary ; but an examination of the foregoing narrative will show that not one moment was spent in idleness. I could not move across the Potomac and through the passes of the South Mountain, with any safety, until Sigel was driven from, or safely housed in, the fortifications at Maryland Heights.
After abandoning the idea of capturing Washington I determined to remain in front of the fortifications during the 12th, and retire at night. Johnson had burned the bridges over the Gunpowder, on the Harrisburg and Philadelphia roads, threatened Baltimore, and started for Point Lookout ; but the attempt to release the prisoners was not made, as the enemy had received notice of it in some way. On the afternoon of the 12th a heavy reconnoitering force was sent out by the enemy, which, after severe skirmishing, was driven back