formidable obstacle, and every possible approach was raked by artillery. On the right was Bock Creek, running through a deep ravine which had been rendered impassable by the felling of the timber on each side, and beyond were the works on the Georgetown pike, which had been reported to be the strongest of all. On the left, as far as the eye eould reach, the works appeared to be of the same impregnable character.* This recon-noissance consumed the balance of the day.
*General Barnard, in his “Defences of Washington,” thus describes the works :
“Every prominent point, at intervals of eight hundred to one thousand yards, was occupied by an inclosed field-fort; every important approach or depression of ground, unseen from the forts, swept by a battery for field-guns; and the whole connected by rifle-trenches which were in fact lines of infantry parapets, furnishing emplacement for two ranks of men, and affording covered communication along the line, while roads were opened wherever necessary, so that troops and artillery could be moved rapidly from one point of the immense periphery to another, or under cover, from point to point along the line. The counterscarps were surrounded by abatis; bomb-proofs were provided in nearly all the forts; all guns not solely intended for distant fire placed in embrasures and well traversed. All commanding points on which an enemy woidd he likely to concentrate artillery to overpower that of one or two of our forts or batteries were subjected not only to the fire, direct and cross, of many points along the lino, but also from heavy rifled guns from distant points unattainable by the enemy’s field-guns. With all these developments, the lines certainly approximated to the maximum degree of strength which can he attained from unrevetted earthworks. Inadequately manned as they were, the fortifications compelled at least a concentration and an arraying of force on the part of the assailants, and thus gave time for the arrival of succor.”
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, C. S. A. From a photograph.
not possible to occupy the town of Harper’s Ferry, except with skirmishers, as it -was thoroughly commanded by the heavy guns on Maryland Heights; and the 5th was spent by Rodes’s and Ramseur’s divisions in demonstrating at that place. . . .
On the 10th the march was resumed at daylight, and we bivouacked four miles from Rockville, on the Georgetown pike, having marched twenty miles. McCausland, moving in front, drove a body of the enemy’s cavalry before him, and had a brisk engagement at Rockville, where lie encamped after defeating and driving off the enemy.
We moved at daylight on the 11th, McCausland on the Georgetown pike, while the infantry, preceded by Imboden’s cavalry under Colonel Smith, turned to the left at Rockville, so as to reach the 7th street pike which runs by Silver Springs into Washington. Jackson’s cavalry moved on the left flank. The previous day had been very warm, and the roads were exceedingly dusty, as there had been no rain for several weeks. The heat during the night had been very oppressive, and but little rest had been obtained. This day was an exceedingly hot one, and there was no air stirring. While marching, the men were enveloped in a suffocating cloud of dust, and many of them fell by the way from exhaustion. Our progress was therefore very much impeded, but I pushed on as rapidly as possible, hoping to get into the fortifications around Washington before they could be manned. Smith drove a small body of cavalry before him into the works on the 7tli street pike, and dismounted his men and deployed them as skirmishers. I rode ahead of the infantry, and arrived in sight of Fort Stevens on this road a short time after noon, when I discovered that the works were but feebly manned.
Bodes, whose division was in front, was immediately ordered to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, throw out skirmishers, and move into the works if he could.
My whole column was then moving by flank, which was the only practicable mode of marching on the road we were on, and before Rodes’s division could be brought up we saw a cloud of dust in the rear of the works toward Washington, and soon a column of the enemy filed into them on the right and left, and skirmishers were thrown out in front, while an artillery fire was opened on us from a number of batteries.
This defeated our hopes of getting possession of the works by surprise, and it became necessary to reconnoiter.
Rodes’s skirmishers were thrown to the front, driving those of the enemy to the cover of the works, and we proceeded to examine the fortifications in order to ascertain if it was practicable to carry them by assault. They were found to be exceedingly strong, and consisted of what appeared to be inclosed forts for heavy artillery, with a tier of lower works in front of each, pierced for an immense number of guns, the whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and strengthened by palisades and abatis. The timber had been felled within cannon range all around and left on the ground, making a
FORT STEVENS, WASHINGTON. From a war-time photograph.
VALLEY CAMPAIGN.
OF EVENTS.
Juno 8th, and Shields’s division, marching to form a junction with Fremont, was defeated at Port Republic on the 9th. Soon after these successes Jackson’s army joined Leo in front of Richmond to take part in the “Seven Days’” campaign (see p. 82 and following). The route of Lee’s army lay through the valley during the invasions of Maryland and Pennsylvania in 1862 and 1863. At the beginning of Grant’s campaign against Richmond in May, 1861, the Union troops in the valley were commanded by Sigel, the Confederates by General J. D. Imboden. Sigel attempted to advance up the valley. He was defeated at New Market on May 16th by Imboden and resigned the command to General David Hunter. Hunter moved on Lynchburg, where he was met by General Jubal Early, with a part of Lee’s army, and compelled to retreat westward across the mountains. Early then marched down the valley, on his raid to Washington. Sigel, who had been retained in command along the Potomac, retired all his forces into Maryland.
with General Breckinridge, who would cooperate with me in the attack on Hunter and the expedition into Maryland. . . .
At Lynchburg I had received a telegram from General Lee, directing me, after disposing of Hunter, either to return to his army or to carry out the original plan, as I might deem most expedient. After the pursuit had ceased I received another despatch from him, submitting it to my judgment whether the condition of my troops would permit the expedition across the Potomac to be carried out, and I determined to take the responsibility of continuing it. On the 23d the march was resumed, and we reached Buchanan that night. On the 26tli I reached Staunton in advance of the troops, and the latter came up next day, which was spent in reducing transportation andgetting provisions from Waynesboro’. . . .
During the night of the 4tli [of July] the enemy evacuated Harper’s Ferry, burning the railroad and pontoon bridges across the Potomac. It was
THE SHENANDOAH
NARRATIVE
Tlie peculiar military advantages which the Confederates enjoyed while controlling the Shenandoah Valley (also called the Valley of Virginia) were first demonstrated in the first campaign of Bull Rim (see p. 24 and following). Shortly after that event Stonewall Jackson assumed command of the Valley District. In March, 1862, Winchester was occupied hy a Union force under General James Shields, which Jackson attacked near the hamlet of Kernstown, March 23. Defeated at Kerns-town, Jackson retreated up the valley and a strong Union force under General Banks was assembled at Strasburg. In May Fremont entered tbe valley from West Virginia in support of Banks, and Jackson defeated liis advance at McDowell, May 8. On tbe 23d, 24tb, and 25tb of May Jackson attacked Banks on the flank at Port Royal, Newton, and Winchester, and compelled him to retreat across the Potomac. Fremont, marching from Franklin, attempted to cut off Jackson’s retreat up the valley, but was defeated at Cross Keys
EARLY’S MARCH TO WASHINGTON.*
BY JUBAL A. EARLY, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A.
ON the 12th of June, 1864, while the Second Corps (Ewell’s) of the Army of Northern Virginia was lying near Gaines’s Mill, in rear of Hill’s line at Cold Harbor, I received orders from General Lee to move the corps, with two of the battalions of artillery attached to it, to the Shenandoah Valley; to strike Hunter’s force in the rear and, if possible, destroy it; then to move down the valley, cross the Potomac near Leesburg, in Loudoun County, or at or above Harper’s Perry, as I might find most practicable, and threaten Washington city. I was further directed to communicate
* Condensed from General Early’s “ Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independence in the Confederate States of America.” Lynchburg: Published by Charles W. Button for the Virginia Memorial Association, 1867; here printed by permission of the author.
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