sacks and wagons, we marched, on the 22d of October, upon all the roads leading from Gadsden in the direction of Guntersville, on the Tennessee River, and bivouacked that night in the vicinity of Bennettsville. . . .
. . . The Confederate army rested upon the banks of the Tennessee one month after its departure from Palmetto. It had been almost continuously in motion during the interim ; by rapid moves and manoeuvers, and with only a small loss, it had drawn Sherman as far north as he stood in the early spring. The killed and wounded at Al-latoona had been replaced by absentees who "returned to ranks, and, as usual in such operations, the number of desertions became of no consequence.
Notwithstanding my request as early as the 9th of October that the railroad to Decatur be repaired, nothing had been done on the 1st of November toward the accomplishment of this" important object. I had expected upon my arrival at Tuseum-bia to find additional supplies, and to cross the river a,t once. Unfortunately, I was constrained to await repairs upon the railroad before a sufficient amount of supplies could be received to sustain the army till it was able to reach middle Tennessee.
General Beauregard remained two weeks at Tus-cumbia and in its vicinity, during which interval the inaugurated campaign was discussed anew at great length. General Sherman was still in the neighborhood of Rome, and the question arose as to whether we should take trains and return to Georgia to oppose his movements south, or endeavor to execute the projected operations into Tennessee and Kentucky. I adhered to the conviction I had held at Lafayette and Gadsden, and a second time desired General Beauregard to consult the corps commanders, together with other officers, in regard to the effect a return to Georgia would produce upon the army. I also urged the
armies, to march upon Washington or turn upon and annihilate Sherman. Such is the plan which, during the 15th and 16th, as we lay in bivouac near Lafayette, I maturely considered, and determined to carry out.
On the 17th the army resumed its line of march, and that night camped three miles from the forks of the Alpine, Gaylesville, and Summerville roads; thence it proceeded toward Gadsden. I proposed to move directly on to Guntersville and to take into Tennessee about one-half of Wheeler’s cavalry (leaving the remainder to look after Sherman) and to have a depot of supplies at Tuscumbia in the event that I should meet with defeat in Tennessee.
Shortly after my arrival at Gadsden, General Beauregard reached the same point; I at once unfolded to him my plan, and requested that he confer apart with the corps commanders, Lieutenant-Generals Lee and Stewart and Major-General Cheatham. If after calm deliberation he deemed it expedient we should remain upon the Alabama line and attack Sherman, or take position, intrench, and finally follow on his rear when he should move south, I would of course acquiesce, albeit with reluctance. If, contrariwise, he should agree to my proposed plan to cross into Tennessee, I would move immediately to Guntersville, thence to Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Nashville.
This important question at issue was discussed during the greater part of one night, with maps before us. General Beauregard at length took the ground that, if I should engage in the projected campaign, it would be necessary to leave in Georgia all the cavalry at present with the army, in order to watch and harass Sherman in case he should move south, and to instruct Forrest to join me as soon as I should cross the Tennessee River. To this proposition I acceded. After he had held a separate conference with the corps commanders, we again debated several hours over the eourse of action to be pursued; and, during the interview, I discovered that he had gone to work in earnest to ascertain, in person, the true condition of the army; that he had sought information not only from the corps commanders, but from a number of officers, and had reached the same conclusion I had formed at Lafayette : that we were not competent to offer pitched battle to Sherman, nor could we follow him south without causing our retrograde movement to be construed by the troops into a recurrence of retreat, which would entail desertions and render the army of little or no use in its opposition to the enemy’s march through Georgia. After two days’ deliberation General Beauregard authorized me, on the evening of the 21st of October, to proceed to the execution of my plan of operations into Tennessee.
General Beauregard’s approval of aforward movement into Tennessee was soon made known to the army. The prospect of again entering that State created great enthusiasm, and from the different encampments arose at intervals that genuine Confederate shout so familiar to every Southern soldier, and which then betokened an improved state of feeling among the troops.
With twenty days’ rations in the liaver-
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL EMERSON OPDYCKE, U. S. V.
DEFENDING AN EMBRASURE.
HOOD’S INVASION OF TENNESSEE
AND THE BATTLES OF FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE.
afterward march northeast, pass the Cumberland Biver at some crossing where the gun-boats, if too formidable at other points, were unable to interfere, then move into Kentucky, and take position with our left at or near Richmond, and our right extending toward Hazel Green, with Pound and Stony gaps in the Cumberland Mountains at our rear.
In this position I could threaten Cincinnati, and recruit the army from Kentucky and Tennessee; the former State was reported, at this juncture, to be more aroused and embittered against the Fédérais than at any other period of the war. While Sherman was debating between the alternatives of following our army or marching through Georgia) I hoped, by rapid movements, to achieve these results.
If Sherman should cut loose and move south — as I then believed he would do after I left his front without previously worsting him in battle—I would occupy at Richmond, Kentucky, a position of superior advantage, as Sherman, upon his arrival at the sea-coast, would be forced to go on board ship, and, after a long détour by water and land, repair to the defense of Kentucky and Ohio or march direct to the support of Grant. If he should return to confront my forces, or follow me directly from Georgia into Tennessee and Kentucky, I hoped then to be in condition to offer battle ; and, if blessed with victory, to send reinforcements to General Lee, in Virginia, or to march through the gaps in the Cumberland Mountains and attack Grant in rear. This latter course I would pursue in the event of defeat or of inability to offer battle to Sherman. If, on the other hand, he should march to join Grant, I could pass through the Cumberland gaps to Petersburg, and attack Grant in rear at least two weeks before he, Sherman, could render him assistance.
This move, I believed, would defeat Grant, and allow General Lee, in command of our combined
THE INVASION.*
BY J. B. HOOD, GENERAL, C. S. A.
Commanding the invading army.
... I remained two days at Cross Roads in serious thought and perplexity. I could not offer battle while the officers were unanimous in their opposition. Neither could I take an intrenched position with likelihood of advantageous results, since Sherman could do the same, repair the railroad, amass a large army, place Thomas in my front in command of the forces he afterward assembled at Nashville, and then, himself, move southward; or, as previously suggested, he could send Thomas into Alabama, whilst he marched through Georgia, and left me to follow in his rear. This last movement upon our part would be construed by the troops into a retreat, and could but result in disaster. In this dilemma I conceived the plan of marching into Tennessee with the hope to establish our line eventually in Kentucky, and determined to make the campaign which followed, unless withheld by General Beauregard or the authorities at Richmond. I decided to make provision for twenty days’ supply of rations in the haversacks and wagons; to order a heavy reserve of artillery to accompany the army, in order to overcome any serious opposition by the Federal gun-boats; to cross the Tennessee at or near Guntersville, and again destroy Sherman’s communications at Stevenson and Bridgeport; to move upon Thomas and Schofield, and to attempt to rout and capture their army before it could reach Nashville. I intended then to march upon that city, where I would supply the army and reinforce it, if possible, by accessions from Tennessee. I was imbued with the belief that I could accomplish this feat,
4 Taken by permission (and condensed) from General Hood’s work, “Advance and Retreat,” published by General G. T. Beauregard for the Hood Orphan Memorial Fund: New Orleans, 1880.
276