MAJOR-GENERAL W. H. T. WALKER, C. S. A. Killed near Atlanta, J uly 22,1864.
Hood marched back about two, and formed his corps facing to our right and rear. Being asked for an explanation, he replied that an aide-de-camp had told him that the Federal army was approaching on that road. Our whole army knew that to be impossible. It had been viewing the enemy in the opposite direction every day for two weeks. General Hood did not report his extraordinary disobedience — as he must have done had he believed the story upon which he professed to have acted. The time lost frustrated the design, for success depended on timing the attack properly. . . .
An attack, except under very unfavorable circumstances being impossible, the troops were formed in an excellent position along the ridge immediately south of Cassville, an elevated and open valley in front, and a deep one in rear of it. Its length was equal to the front of Hood’s and Polk’s and half of Hardee’s corps. They were placed in that order from right to left.
As I rode along the line while the troops were forming, Gen. Shoup, chief of artillery, pointed out to me a space of 150 or 200 yards, which he thought might be enfiladed by artillery on a hill a half mile beyond Hood’s right and in front of the prolongation of our line, if the enemy should clear away the thick	wood that covered it and establish batteries. /	־n. He was desired to point out to the
offi- /it	\ cer who might, command there
some narrow ravines very near, in which his men could be shel-
pieces freely. During the evening Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hood, the latter being spokesman, asserted that a part of the line of each would be so enfiladed next morning by the Federal batteries established on the hill above mentioned, that they would be unable to hold their ground an hour; and therefore urged me to abandon the position at once. They expressed the conviction that early the next morning batteries would open upon them from a hill then thickly covered with wood and out of range of brass field-pieces. The matter was discussed perhaps an hour, in which time I became apprehensive that as the commanders of two-thirds of the army thought the position untenable, the opinion would be adopted by their troops, which would make it so. Therefore I yielded. Lieutenant-General Hardee, whose ground was the least strong, was full of confidence. Mr. Davis says (“Rise and Fall,” Vol. II, p. 533) that General Flood asserts, in his report and in a book, that the two corps were on ground commanded and enfiladed by the enemy’s batteries. On the contrary, they were on a hill, and the enemy were in a valley where their batteries were completely commanded by ours.
The army abandoned the ground before daybreak and crossed the Etowah after noon, and encamped near the railroad. Wheeler’s cavalry was placed in observation above, and Jackson’s below our main body.
No movement of the enemy was discovered until the 22d, when General Jackson reported their army moving toward Stilesboro’, as if to cross the Etowah near that place; they crossed on the 23d. On the 24th Hardee’s and Polk’s corps encamped on the road from Stilesboro’ to Atlanta, southeast of
1.	EFFECT OF THE UNION FIRE ON THE POTTER HOUSE, ATLANTA.
2.	VIEW OF THE CONFEDERATE LINE AT THE POTTER HOUSE, LOOKING EASTWARD.
3.	VIEW OF CONFEDERATE DEFENSES OF ATLANTA, LOOKING NORTHEAST.
teredfrom such artillery fire, and to remind him that while artillery was playing upon his position no attack would be made upon it by infantry. The enemy got into position soon after our troops were formed and skirmished until dark, using their field-
Hood’s, in position for the purpose, falling upon its left flank during the deployment. Next morning, when our cavalry on that road reported the right Federal column near Kingston, General Hood was instructed to move to and follow northwardly a country road a mile east of that from Adairsville, to be in position to fall upon the flank of the Federal column when it should be engaged with Polk. An order announcing that we were about to give battle was read to each regiment, and heard with exultation. After going some three miles, General
to move forward, positive intelligence was received from General Walker that the Federal right was actually crossing the Oostenaula. This made it necessary to abandon the thought of fighting north of the river, and the orders to Lieutenant-General Hood were countermanded,but the order from corps headquarters was not sent to Stewart promptly, and consequently he made the attack unsustained, and suffered before being recalled.
The occupation of Resaca being exceedingly hazardous, I determined to abandon the place. So the army was ordered to cross the Oostenaula about midnight,— Hardee’s and Polk’s corps by the railroad and trestle bridges, and Hood’s by that above, on the pontoons. . . .
In leaving Resaca I hoped to find a favorable position near Calhoun, but there was none; and the army, after resting 18 or 20 hours near that place, early in the morning of the 17th moved on seven or eight miles to Adairsville, where we were joined by the cavalry of General Polk’s command, a division of 3700 men under General W. H. Jack-son. Our map represented the valley in which the railroad lies as narrow enough for our army formed across it to occupy the heights on each side with its flanks, and therefore I intended to await the enemy’s attack there; but the breadth of the valley far exceeded the front of our army in order of battle. So another plan was devised. Two roads lead southward from Adairsville,—one directly through Cassville; the other follows the railroad through Kingston, turns to the left there, and rejoins the other at Cassville. The interval between them is widest opposite Kingston, where it is about seven miles by the farm roads. In the expectation that a part of the Federal army would follow each road, it was arranged that Polk’s corps should engage the column on the direct road when it should arrive opposite Kingston,—
CONFEDERATE INTRENCHMENTS NEAR NEW HOPE CHURCH.
283