On the 14th spirited fighting was maintained by the enemy on the whole front, a very vigorous attack being made on Hindman’s division of Hood’s corps, which was handsomely repulsed. In the mean time General Wheeler was directed to ascertain the position and formation of the Federal left. His report indicating that these were not unfavorable to an attack, Lieutenant-General Hood was directed to make one with Stewart’s and Stevenson’s divisions, strengthened by four brigades from the center and left. He was instructed to make a half change of front to the left to drive the enemy from the railroad, the object of the operation being to prevent them from using it. The attack was extremely well conducted and executed, and before dark (it was begun at 6 p.m.) the enemy was driven from his ground. This encouraged me to hope for a more important success ; so General Hood was directed to renew the fight next morning. His troops were greatly elated׳ by this announcement, made to them that evening.
On riding from the right to the left after nightfall, I was informed that the extreme left of our line of skirmishers, forty or fifty men, had been driven from their ground,— an elevation near the river,— and received a report from Major-General Martin that Federal troops were crossing the Oostenaula near Lay’s Ferry on a pontoon bridge — two divisions having already crossed. In consequence of this, Walker’s division was sent to Lay’s Ferry immediately, and the order to General Hood was revoked; also, Lieutenant-Colonel S. W. Presstman, chief engineer, was directed to lay a pontoon bridge a mile above the railroad, and to have the necessary roadway made.
Sharp fighting commenced early on the 15th, and continued until night with so much vigor that many of the assailants pressed up to our intrench-ments. All these attacks were repelled, however. In General Sherman’s language, the sounds of musketry and cannon rose all day to the dignity of a battle.
Soon after noon intelligence was received from Major-General Walker, that the report that the enemy had crossed the Oostenaula was untrue. Lieutenant-General Hood was therefore again ordered to assail the enemy with the troops he had commanded the day before. When he was about
made the chances of battle altogether in its favor. It had also places of refuge in case of defeat, in the intrenched pass of Ringgold and in the fortress of Chattanooga; while we, if beaten, had none nearer than Atlanta, 100 miles off, with three rivers intervening. General Sherman’s course indicating no intention of giving battle east of Rocky-face, we prepared to fight on either side of the ridge. . . . About 10 o’clock A. M. of the 13th the Confederate army moved from Dalton and reached Resaca just as the Federal troops approaching from Snake Creek Gap were encountering Loring’s division a mile from the station. Their approach was delayed long enough by Loring’s opposition to give me time to select the ground to be occupied by our troops. And while they were taking this ground the Federal army was forming in front of them. The left of Polk’s corps occupied the west face of the intrenchment of Resaca. Hardee’s corps, also facing to the west, formed the center. Hood’s, its left division facing to the west and the two others to the northwest, was on the right, and, crossing the railroad, reached the Connasauga. The enemy skirmished briskly with the left half of our line all the afternoon.
Creek Gap to the railroad bridge at Resaca, a light intrenchment to cover 3000 or 4000 men was made there; and to make quick communication between that point and Dalton, two rough country roads were so improved as to serve that purpose.
On the 1st of May I reported to the Administration that the enemy ־was about to advance, suggesting the transfer of at least a part of General Polk’s troops to my command. Then the cavalry with convalescent horses was ordered to the front, — Martin’s division to observe the Oostenaula from Resaca to Rome, and Kelly’s little brigade to join the cavalry on the Cleveland road.
On the 4th the Federal army, including the troops from Knoxville, was at Ringgold. Next day it skirmished until dark with our advance guard of cavalry. This was repeated on the 6th. On the 7th it moved forward, driving our cavalry from Tunnel Hill, and taking a position in the afternoon in front of the railroad gap, and parallel to Rocky-face — the right a mile south of the gap, and the left near the Cleveland road.
Until that day I had regarded a battle in the broad valley in which Dalton stands as inevitable. The greatly superior strength of the Federal army
broad valley a very favorable field.
Mr. Davis descants on the advantages I had in mountains, ravines, and streams, and General Sherman claims that those features of the country were equal to the numerical difference between our forces. I would gladly have given all the mountains, ravines, rivers, and woods of Georgia for such a supply of artillery ammunition, proportionally, as he had. Thinking as he did, it is strange that he did not give himself a decided superiority of actual strength, by drawing troops from his three departments of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio, where, according to Secretary Stanton’s report of 1865, lie had 139,000 men fit for duty. The country in which the two armies operated is not rugged; there is nothing in its character that gave advantage to the Confederates. Between Dalton and Atlanta the only mountain in sight of the railroad is Rocky-face, which aided the Federáis.
The small military value of mountains is indicated by the fact that in the Federal attack on June 27th our troops on Kenesaw suffered more than those on the plain.
During the previous winter Major-General Gilmer, chief engineer, had wisely made an admirable base for our army by intrenching Atlanta.
As a road leads from Chattanooga through Snake
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. CORSE, U. S. V. Who “Held tlie Fort” at Allatoona.
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