ston’s army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage possible on their war resources. ”
The occupation of Dalton by General Bragg had been accidental. He had encamped there for a night in his retreat from Missionary Ridge, and had remained because it was ascertained next morning that the pursuit had ceased. Dalton is in a valley so broad as to give ample room for the deployment of the largest American army. Rocky-face, which bounds it on the west, terminates as an obstacle three miles north of the railroad gap, and the distance from Chattanooga to Dalton around the north end exceeds that through the railroad gap less than a mile; and a general with a large army, coming from Chattanooga to attack an inferior one near Dalton, would follow that route and find in the
OPPOSING SHERMAN’S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA.
BY JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, GENERAL, C. S. A. Commander of Confederate army during the campaign from Dalton to Atlanta.
}־)RESIDENT DAVIS transferred me from the - Department of Mississippi to the command of the Army of Tennessee by a telegram received December 18th, 1863, in the camp of Ross’s brigade of cavalry near Bolton. I assumed that command at Dalton on the 27th. ... In the inspections, which were made as soon as practicable, the appearance of the army was very far from being “ matter of much congratulation.” Instead of a reserve of muskets there was a deficiency of six thousand and as great a one of blankets, while the number of bare feet was painful to see. The artillery horses were too feeble to draw the guns in fields, or on a march, and the mules were in similar condition. . . .
The last return of the army was of December 20th, and exhibited an effective total of less than 36,000, of whom 6000 were without arms and as many without shoes. . . .
The instruction, discipline, and spirit of the army were much improved between the 1st of January and the end of April, and its numbers were increased.
The efforts for the latter object brought back to the ranks about five thousand of the men who had left them in the rout of Missionary Ridge. On the morning report of April 30th the totals were: 37,652 infantry, 2812 artillery with 112 guns, and 2392 cavalry. This is the report as corrected by Major Kinloeh Falconer, assistant adjutant-general, from official records in his office. Sherman had assembled at that time an army of 98,797 men and 254 guns; but before the armies actually met, three divisions of cavalry under Generals Stoneman, Garrard, and McCook added 10,-000 or 12,000 men to the number. The object prescribed to him by General Grant was ' ‘ to move against John-
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the Potomac which had so long and heroically fought for Richmond, every officer and soldier of which felt and saw the dawn of peace in the near approach of their comrades of the West, who, having finished their task, had come so far to lend them a helping hand if needed. I honestly believe that the grand march of the Western army from Atlanta to Savannah, and from Savannah to Raleigh, was an important factor in the final result, the overwhelming victory at A|>pomattox, and the glorious triumph of the Union cause.
Meantime Hood, whom I had left at and near Florence, 317 miles to my rear, having completely reorganized and resupplied his army, advanced against Thomas at Nashville [see p. 277], who had also made every preparation. Hood first encountered Schofield at Franklin, November 30th, 1864, attacked him boldly behind his intrenchments, and sustained a positive check, losing 6252 of his best men, including Generals Cleburne and Adams, who were killed on the very parapets, to Schofield’s loss of 2326. Nevertheless he pushed on to Nashville, which he invested. Thomas, one of the grand characters of our civil war, nothing dismayed by danger in front or rear, made all his preparations with cool and calm deliberation; and on the 15th of December sallied from his intrenchments, attacked Hood in liis chosen and intrenched position, and on the next day, December 16th, actually annihilated his army, eliminating it thenceforward from the problem of the war. Hood’s losses were 15,000 men to Thomas’s 3057. Therefore at the end of the year 1864, the conflict at the West was concluded, leaving nothing to be considered in the grand game of war but Lee’s army, held by Grant in Richmond, and the Confederate detachments at Mobile and along the sea-board north of Savannah. . . .
wrote me at Savannah from Washington under date of December 26th, 1864:
“ When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast I was anxious, if not fearful; hut feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering ‘ nothing risked, nothing gained,’ I did not interfere. Now the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours; for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce; and taking the work of General Thomas into account, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leavingenough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole, Hood’s army, it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light. But what next % I suppose it will be safer if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide.”
So liighly do I prize this testimonial that I preserve Mr. Lincoln’s letter, every word in his own handwriting, unto this day ; and if I know myself, I believe on receiving it I experienced more satisfaction in giving to his overburdened and weary soul one gleam of satisfaction and happiness, than of selfish pride in an achievement which has given me among men a larger measure of fame than any single act of my life. There is an old maxim of war that a general should not divide his forces in the presence of an enterprising enemy, and I confess that I felt more anxious for General Thomas’s success than my own, because had I left him with an insufficient force it would have been adjudged ungenerous and unmilitary in me; but the result, and Mr. Lincoln’s judgment after the event, demonstrated that my division of force was liberal, leaving ^;o Thomas “enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole, Hood’s army,” and retaining for myself enough to march to the sea, and thence north to Raleigh, in communication with the old Army of
MAJOR-GENEBAL JOHN A. LOGAN. From a photograph.
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