hasten the final result as to revive the flagging spirits of the men, to carry on simultaneously against Battery Wagner two distinct kinds of attack: First, to silence the work by an overpowering bombardment with siege and Coehorn mortars, so that our sappers would have only the James Island batteries to annoy them; and, second, to breach the bomb-proof shelter with our heavy rifles, and thus force a surrender. During the daytime the New Ironsides, Captain S. C. Rowan, was to cooperate with her eight-gun broadsides. These operations were actively begun at break of day on the 5th of September. .	.	.
The garrison soon sought safety in the bombproof shelter, and the fort showed but little sign of life. . . . Early on the night of September 6th our sap was pushed forward entirely beyond the south front of the work, and between the sea front and the water, crowning the crest of the counterscarp at the north or farthest end of that front, and completely masking all the guns of the work. An order was issued to carry the place the next morning by assault on the north front at the time of low tide, when the width of beach would be the greatest. . . . During the night the fort was evacuated with such celerity that only two boat-loads of men were captured.
These operations left the whole of Morris Island in our possession, and Fort Sumter in ruins and destitute of guns. A powerful armament was mounted on the north end of the island, to cooperate with the monitors when they should move in, and to prevent the remounting of guns on Fort Sumter. Early on the morning following the capture of Battery Wagner, the admiral, under a flag of truce, demanded the surrender of Fort Sumter. It was refused.
On the night of the 8th a naval assault was made on the work about midnight, and repulsed with considerable loss. . . .
Some time before this the enemy began to remove the armament of Fort Sumter by night, and many of its guns were soon mounted in other parts of the harbor.
During the progress of the operations thus briefly outlined, the navy had most cordially cooperated whenever and wherever their aid could best be rendered. The service of the monitors was notably efficient in subduing the fire of Battery Wagner, which at times not only seriously retarded the labors of the sappers, but threatened the destruction of some of the most advanced of the breeching guns. While the breaching of Fort Sumter was still in progress, active work was resumed on the approaches to Battery Wagner by pushing the full sap from the left of the third parallel. Meanwhile, the spring-tides had come with easterly winds, flooding the trenches to the depth of two feet and wushing down the parapets. The progress of the sap was hotly contested with both artillery and sharp-shooters. The latter had taken possession of a ridge about 240 yards in advance of the main work, where they had placed themselves under such cover that they could not be dislodged by our fire or the flank fire of the fleet, while that from their own guns in rear passed harmlessly over their heads. An attempt to capture this ridge having failed, a fourth parallel was established on the night of August 21st, about five hundred yards in advance of the third. From this point the ridge was carried [by the 24th Massachusetts] at the point of the bayonet on the 26th, under the direction of Brigadier-General Terry, and the fifth parallel was established thereon. The resistance to our advance now assumed a most obstinate and determined character, being evidently under skilful and intelligent direction, while the firing from the James Island batteries became more steady and accurate. . . .
In this emergency it was determined, as well to
THE BOAT ATTACK ON FORT SUMTER, NIGHT OF SEPT. 8, 1863.
the left and rear of the first parallel. Those in the second parallel were perilously near to Battery Wagner, the most advanced piece being only 820 yards distant from the guns of that work. One of the batteries was efficiently commanded by Commander Foxhall A. Parker, U. S. N. On the night of August 9th the position selected for the third parallel was reached by the flying sap, 330 yards in advance of the right of the second parallel. It was deemed inexpedient to push the approaches beyond this point until after the breeching batteries should open on Fort Sumter.
From this time forward the fire from the enemy’s guns in our front and on our extreme left was severe and almost uninterrupted. . . . Finally some of the breeching batteries opened fire on the 17th of August, and by the 19th all were in successful operation. The result was soon clearly foreshadowed. Nothing, indeed, but the destruction of our guns, either by the enemy’s shot or through their own inherent weakness, would long delay it. About 450 projectiles struck the fort daily, every one of which inflicted an incurable wound. Large masses of the brick walls and parapets were rapidly loosened and thrown down. The bulk of our fire was directed against the gorge and southeast face, which presented themselves diagonally to us. They were soon pierced through and through, and cut down on top to the casemate arches. The shot that went over them took the north and northwest faces in reverse.
The seven days’ service of the breeching batteries, ending August 23d, left Fort Sumter in the condition of a mere infantry outpost, without the power to fire a gun heavier than a musket, alike incapable of annoying our approaches to Battery Wagner, or of inflicting injury upon the fleet. In this condition it remained for about six weeks. A desultory fire was kept up to prevent repairs, and on the 30th of August another severe cannonade was opened and continued for two days at the request of the admiral commanding, who contemplated entering the inner harbor on the 31st.
THE NIGHT ASSAULT ON BATTERY WAGNER, JULY 18, 1863
that descent and in the daring assault that followed, was fatally wounded. . . . Colonel John S. Chatfield was mortally wounded; Colonel Hal-dimand S. Putnam and Colonel Robert G. Shaw were killed; and Brigadier-General Truman Seymour and several regimental commanders were wounded. . . .
To meet the contingency brought on by the failure it was determined to change Slightly the prearranged order of operations by attempting the demolition of Fort Sumter with our heavy rifles, at a distance of two miles and upward, by firing over Battery Wagner and its garrison from ground already in our possession. . . .
The first parallel was established, July 19th, on the line occupied the day before by our batteries against Battery Wagner, and the second parallel on the night of the 23d by the flying sap, about six hundred yards in advance of the first. Eleven of the breeching guns against Fort Sumter were located in these two parallels, and the other seven to
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