broken on my right, and the enemy had crowned the ridge. Assistance was promptly despatched to that point under Brigadier-General Bate, who had so successfully maintained the ground in my front, and I proceeded to the rear of the broken line to rally our retiring troops and return them to the crest to drive the enemy back. General Bate found the disaster so great that his small force could not repair it. About this time I learned that our extreme left had also given way, and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the rear, where, by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers had been formed upon which to rally. Lieutenant-General Hardee, leaving Major-General Cleburne in command on the extreme right, moved toward the left when he heard the heavy firing in that direction. He reached the right of Anderson’s division just in time to find it had nearly all fallen back, commencing on its left, where the enemy had first crowned the ridge. By a prompt and judicious movement, he threw a portion of Cheatham’s division directly across the ridge facing the enemy, who was now moving a strong force immediately on his left flank. By a decided stand here the enemy was entirely cheeked, and that portion of our force to the right remained intact. All to the left, however, except a portion of Bate’s division, was entirely routed and in rapid flight. ... A panic which I hadneverbeforewitnessedseemedtohave seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety,regardless of his duty or his character. In this distressing and alarming state of affairs General Bate was ordered to hold his position covering the road for the retreat of Breckinridge’s command, and orders were immediately sent to Generals Hardee and Breckinridge to retire their forces upon the depot at Chicka-mauga. ... No satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful conduct of our troops on the left in allowing their line to be penetrated. The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column, and wherever resistance was made the enemy fled in disorder after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the ridge did so in a condition of exhaustion from the great physical exertion in climbing which rendered them powerless, and the slightest effort would have destroyed them. Having secured much of our artillery, they soon availed themselves of our panic, and turning our guns upon us enfiladed the lines, both right and left, rendering them entirely untenable. Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence, no enemy could ever have dislodged us, and but one possible reason presents itself to my mind in explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops who never before failed in any duty assigned them, however difficult and hazardous : Thej־ had for two days confronted the enemy, marshaling his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight such a superiority in numbers as may have intimidated weak-minded and untried soldiers. But our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts when the strength of position was against us, and with perfect success, that not a doubt crossed my mind.
BAIRD’S DIVISION FIGHTING FOR THE CREST OF MISSIONARY RIDGE. From the Cyclorama.
posted on a second hill, the enemy’s rear. They made a stout resistance, but by a sudden flank movement he drove them from the heights and captured two guns and many prisoners. . . .
2. THE CONFEDERATE SIDE, BY GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG, C. S. A.
About 11 A. m. the enemy’s forces were being moved in heavy masses from Lookout and beyond to our front', while those in front extended to outright. They formed their lines with great deliberation just beyond the range of our guns and in plain view of our position. Though greatly outnumbered, such was the strength of our position that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold it, and every disposition was made for that purpose. During this time they [the enemy] had made several attempts on our extreme right, and had been handsomely repulsed with very heavy loss by Major-General Cleburne’s command, under the immediate directions of Lieutenant-General Hardee. . . . About 8 : 30 p. M. the immense force in the front of our left and center advanced in three lines, preceded by heavy skirmishers. Our batteries opened with fine effect, and much confusion was produced before they reached musket-range. In a short time the roar of musketry became very heavy, and it was soon apparent the enemy had been repulsed in my immediate front. While riding along the crest congratulating the troops, intelligence reached me that our line was 233
Sherman’s front. Bragg and Hardee were at the center, urging their men to stand firm and drive back the advancing enemy, now so near the summit—indeed, so near that the guns, which could not be sufficiently depressed to reach them, became useless. Artillerymen were lighting the fuses of shells, and bowling them by hundreds down the hill. The critical moment arrived when the summit was just within reach. At six different points, and almost simultaneously, Sheridan’s and Wood’s divisions broke over the crest,— Sheridan’s first, near Bragg’s headquarters; and in a few minutes Sheridan was beside the guns that had been fired at him, and claiming them as captures of his division. Baird’s division took the works on Wood’s left almost immediately afterward; and then Johnson came up on Sheridan’s right. The enemy’s guns were turned upon those who still remained in the works, and soon all were in flight down the eastern slope. Baird got on the ridge just in time to change front and oppose a large body of the enemy moving down from Bragg’s right to attack our left. After a sharp engagement, that lasted till dark, he drove the enemy back beyond a high point on the north, which he at once occupied.
The sun had not yet, gone down, Missionary Ridge was ours, and Bragg’s army was broken and in flight! . . .
Sheridan did not long stop to receive praise and congratulations. With two brigades he started down the Mission Mills road, and found, strongly
‘ ‘ Thomas, who ordered those men up the ridge ? ” Thomas replied, in his usual slow, quiet manner:
“ I don’t know; I did not.” Then, addressing General Gordon Granger, he said, “Did you order them up,Granger?” “No,”saidGranger; “theystarted up without orders. When those fellows get started all hell can’t stop them.” General Grant said something to the effect that somebody w-ould suffer if it did not turn out well, and then, turning, stoically watched the ridge. He gave no further orders.
As soon as Granger had replied to Thomas, he turned to me, his chief-of-staff, and said: “ Ride at once to Wood, and then to Sheridan, and ask them if they ordered their men up the ridge, and tell them, if they can take it, to push ahead.” As I was mounting, Granger added: “ It is hot over there, and you may not get through. I shall send Captain Avery to Sheridan, and other officers after both of you.” As fast as my horse could carry me,
I rode first to General Wood, and delivered the message. “I did n’t order them up,” said Wood;
“ they started up on their own account, and they are going up, too ! Tell Granger, if we are supported, we will take and hold the ridge ! ” As soon as I reached General Wood, Captain Avery got to General Sheridan, and delivered his message. “I did n’t order them up, ” said Sheridan; “but we are going to take the ridge ! ” He then asked Avery for his flask and waved it at a group of Confederate officers, standing just in front of Bragg’s headquarters, •with the salutation, “ Here’s at you ! ” At once two guns—the “ Lady Breckinridge ” and the “Lady Buckner”—in front of Bragg’s headquarters were fired at Sheridan and the group of officers about him. One shell struck so near as to throw dirt over Sheridan and Avery. ‘ ‘Ah ! ” said the general, “that is ungenerous; I shall take those guns for that! ” Before Sheridan received the message taken by Captain Avery, he had sent a staff-officer to Granger, to inquire whether “ the order given to take the rifle-pits meant the rifle-pits at the base, or those on the top of the ridge.” Granger told this officer that “ the order given was to take those at the base.” Conceiving this to be an order to fall back, the officer, on his way to Sheridan, gave it to General Wagner, commanding the Second Brigade of the division, which was then nearly half-way up the ridge. Wagner ordered his brigade back to the rifle-pits at the base, but it only remained there till Sheridan, seeing the mistake, ordered it forward. It again advanced under a terrific fire.
The men, fighting and climbing up the steep hill, sought the roads, ravines, and less rugged parts. The ground was so broken that it was impossible to keep a regular line of battle. At times their movements were in shape like the flight of migratory birds — sometimes in line, sometimes in mass, mostly in V-shaped groups, with the points toward the enemy. At these points regimental flags were flying, sometimes drooping as the bearers were shot, but never reaching the ground, for other brave hands were there to seize them. Sixty flags were advancing up the hill. Bragg was hurrying large bodies of men from his right to the center. They could be seen hastening along the ridge. Cheatham’s division was being withdrawn from
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