strong. We lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the en-emy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Port Wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the day.
The advantage was greatly on our side now׳, and if I could only have been assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have rested more easy. But we were doing the best we could for him and the cause. . . .
At 2 o’clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out from the North Chiekamauga with his 116 boats, each loaded with 30 brave and well-armed men. The boats, with their precious freight, dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chiekamauga. Here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket-guard known to be at that point. The guard was surprised, and twenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. The work of ferrying over Sherman’s command from the north side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose. A steamer was also brought up from the tow'n to assist. The rest of M. L. Smith’s division came first, then the division of John E. Smith. The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position. By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built.
The work of laying the bridge on which to cross the artillery and cavalry was now begun. The ferrying over of the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South Chiekamauga, connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the Tennessee.
Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. By 1 o’clock he started, with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of Chiekamauga River; J. E. Smith next, to the right and a little in the rear; then Ewing, still farther to the right, and also a little to the rear of J. E. Smith’s command, in column ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish line preceded each of these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. By half-past 3 Sherman was in possession of the height, without having sustained much loss. A brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. The enemy did not seem to have been aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of
THE BATTLE OP LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.
oi the cliff, General Bragg, with a wave of the liana, alluded to "the fine view”; whereupon Major Robert W. Wooley, who had little faith in the military outlook, exclaimed to a brother officer, but so that all could hear: “Yes, it’s a tine view, but a----bad prospect.”
that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from Port Wood and other points on the line. The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. This movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. During the following night they were made
From a painting lent by Captain W. L. Stork. The picture shows the Union troops fighting in the woods near the cliffs of Point Lookout.
Early in October, 1863, Jefferson Davis visited Lookout Mountain with General Bragg. As they approached the edge
manding, to the foot of Port Wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade■—Sheridan on the right, Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek. Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth Corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest. Ho supported Sheridan with one division, Baird’s, while his other division, under [R. W.] Johnson, remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point. Howard’s corps was moved in rear of the center. The picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At 2 o’clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all
town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south side. His crossing was in full view both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy, of course, supposed these troops to be Sherman’s. This enabled Sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery.
On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage,—rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown’s Perry, and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville; of Willeox being threatened by a force from the east,—a letter was received from Bragg which contained these words:
“As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.”
Of course I understood that this was a device intended to deceive ; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving our front, and on that day Buckner’s division was sent to reinforce Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to follow, but was recalled. The object of Bragg’s letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to Chattanooga.
During the night-of the 21st the rest of the pontoon-boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North Chicka-mauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the Tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest.
Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in Washington on his account,
I could no longer defer operations for his relief. I determined therefore to do on the 23d, with the Army of the Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.
The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made very strong for defense during the months it had been besieged. The line was about a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a small stream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chiekamauga, on the left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. The important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament. Among the elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named Fort Wood. It owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. Port Wood had in it twenty-two pieees of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy’s line. On the morning of the 23d, Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger’s corps of two divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood com-