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VIEW OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN FROM THE HILL TO THE NORTH, WHICH WAS GENERAL HOOKER’S POSITION DURING THE BATTLE ON
THE MOUNTAIN, NOVEMBER 24, 1863.
Tile military road winding over the north slope oi Lookout was huilt after Hooker captured the mountain. (From a war-time photograph.)
The next day after Sherman’s arrival I took Mm, with Generals Thomas and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river and showed them the round over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. I, as well as the authorities in Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside’s safety. Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety. Nothing could he done for him, however, until Sherman’s troops were up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I believe, from Kelley’s Perry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time.
His march was conducted with as rnueh expedition as the roads and season would admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown’s Perry with head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division, Ewing’s, was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that Lookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. News had been received that the battle had been commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communication. The President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, but more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve the situation. It was impossible to get Sherman’s troops up for the next day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that date. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and 21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place. . . .
Meantime Sherman continued his crossing, without intermission, as fast as his troops could be got up. The crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hills on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain or Missionary Kidge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. But when Sherman’s advance reached a point opposite the
there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside’s suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. . . .
Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th. That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a position threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman reached Bridgeport in person, and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day. . . .
ington despatches as best I could, urge Sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he would be relieved. All of Burnside’s despatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition should hold out. He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base, and to make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon; but from
Sherman’s force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single-track road from Nashville. All indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying Burnside’s command, in East Tennessee, 25,000 more, by the same road. A single track could not do this. I therefore gave an order to Sherman to halt General G.
M. Dodge’s command of eight thousand men at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur, north toward Nashville, and to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. All the bridges over these had been destroyed and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. All the locomotives and ears not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew liow to destroy them. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the army. Prom Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road. . . .
General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was 182, many of them over deep and wide chasms. The length of road repaired was 182 miles. . . .
On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about 15,000 troops, besides Wheeler’s cavalry, 5000 more, to go against Burnside. The situation seemed desperate, and was more, exasperating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up. The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside’s army, and plied me with despatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered General Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy’s right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him to take mules, officers’ horses, or animals wherever he could get them, to move the necessary artillery. But he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done but to answer Wash-
GENERAL HOOKER AND STAFF ON THE HILL NORTH OF LOOKOUT CREEK, FROM WHICH
HE DIRECTED THE BATTLE.
From a war-time photograph.
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