WILLIAM N. PENDLETON,
BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A., LEE'S CHIEF OF ARTILLERY.
short distance to our left, were sixty-three guns of A. P. Hill’s corps, under Colonel B. L. Walker. As their distance was a little too great for effective howitzer fire, General Pendleton offered me the use of nine howitzers belonging to that corps. I accepted them, intending to take them into the charge with Pickett, so I put them in a hollow behind a bit of wood, with no orders but to wait there until I sent for them. About 11, some of Hill’s skirmishers and the enemy’s began fighting over a barn between the lines, and gradually his artillery and the enemy’s took part, until over a hundred guns were engaged, and a tremendous roar was kept up for quite a time. But it gradually died out, and the whole field became as silent as a churchyard about 1 o’clock. The enemy aware of the strength of his position, simply sat still and waited for us. It had been arranged that when the infantry column was ready, General Longstreet should order two guns fired by the Washington Artillery. On that signal all our guns were to open on Cemetery Hill and the ridge extending toward Bound Top, which was covered with batteries. I was to observe the fire and give Pickett the order to charge. I accordingly took position, about 12, at the most favorable point, just on the left of the line of guns, and with one of Pickett’s couriers with me. Soon after I received the following note from Longstreet:
“ Colonel : If the artillery fire floes not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our efforts pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise General Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your good judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let General Pickett know when the moment offers. ”
This note rather startled me. If that assault was to be made on General Lee’s judgment it was all right, but I did not want it made on mine. I wrote back to General Longstreet to the following effect:
“ General : I will only be able to judge of the effect of our fire on the enemy by his return fire, for his infantry Is but little exposed to view, and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer from your note, there is any alternative to this attack, it should be care-
make them sorry they had stayed so long. Everything was in a rush. The ground was generally good, and pieces and caissons went at a gallop, some cannoneers mounted, and some running by the sides — not in regular line, but a general race and scramble to get there first.
But we only had a moderately good time with Sickles’s retreating corps after all. They fell back upon fresh troops in what seemed a strong position, extending along the ridge north of Bound Top. Hood’s troopsunder Law gained the slope of Little Bound Top, but were driven back to its base. Our infantry lines had become disjointed in the advance, and the fighting became a number of isolated combats between brigades. The artillery took part wherever it could, firing at everything in sight, and a sort of pell-mell fighting lasted until darkness covered the field, and the fuses of the flying shells looked like little meteors in the air. But then both musketry and artillery slackened off, and by 9 o’clock the field was silent. It was evident that we had not finished the job, and would have to make a fresh effort in the morning. The firing had hardly ceased when my faithful little darky, Charley, came up hunting for me with a fresh horse, affectionate congratulations on my safety, and, what was equally acceptable, something to eat. Negro servants hunting for their masters were a feature of the landscape that night. I then found General Longstreet, learned what I could of the fortunes of the day on other parts of the field, and got orders for the morning. They were in brief that our present position was to be held, and the attack renewed as soon as Pickett arrived, and he was expeeted early. . . .
Early in the morning General Lee came around, and I was then told that we were to assault Cemetery Hill, which lay rather to our left. This necessitated a good many changes of our positions, which the enemy did not altogether approve of, and they took occasional shots at us, though we shifted about, as inoffensively as possible, and carefully avoided getting into bunches. But we stood it all meekly, and by 10 o’clock, Dearing having come up, we had seventy-five guns in what was virtually one battery, so disposed as to fire on Cemetery Hill and the batteries south of it, which would have a fire on our advancing infantry. Pickett’s division had arrived, and his men were resting and eating. Along Seminary Bidge, a
awaited the development of Hood’s attack, ready to assault the Peach Orchard. Henry’s battalion moved out wfith Hood and was speedily and heavily engaged; Cabell wa.s ready to support him, and at once went into action near Snyder’s house, about seven hundred yards from the Peach Orchard.
The Federal artillery was ready for us, and in their usual full force and good practice. The ground at Cabell’s position gave little protection, and he suffered rapidly in both men and horses. To help him, I ran up Huger, with 18 guns of my own 26, to Warfield’s house, within 500 yards of the Peach Orchard, and opened upon it. This made 54 guns in action, and I hoped they would crush that part of the enemy’s line in a very short time, but the fight was longer and hotter than I expected. So accurate was the enemy’s fire, that two of my guns were fairly dismounted, and the loss of men was so great that I had to ask General Barksdale, whose brigade was lying down close behind in the wood, for help to handle the heavy 24-pounder howitzers of Moody’s battery. He gave me permission to call for volunteers, and in a minute I had eight good fellows, of whom, alas! we buried two that night, and sent to the hospital three others mortally or severely wounded. At last I sent for my other two batteries, but before they arrived McLaws’s division charged past our guns, and the enemy deserted their line in confusion. Then I believed that Providence was indeed “ taking the proper view,” and that the war was very nearly over. Ever}' battery wras limbered to the front, and the two batteries from the rear coming up, all six charged in line across the plain and went into action again at the position the enemy had deserted. I can recall no more splendid sight, on a small scale,— and certainly no more inspiriting moment during the war,■—than that of the charge of these six batteries. An artillerist’s heaven is to follow the routed enemy, after a tough resistance, and throw shells and canister into his disorganized and fleeing masses. Then the explosions of the guns sound louder and more powerful, and the very shouts of the gunners, ordering “Fire!” in rapid succession, thrill one’s very soul. There is no excitement on earth like it. It is far prettier shooting than at a compact, narrow line of battle, or at another battery. Now we saw our heaven just in front, and were already breathing the very air of victory. Now we would have our revenge, and
HENRY J. HUNT,
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A., CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
street, and, riding forward, found him with General Lee on Seminary Bidge. Opposite, about a mile away, on Cemetery Bidge, overlooking the town, lay the enemy, their batteries making considerable display, but their infantry, behind stone walls and ridges, scarcely visible. In between us were only gentle rolling slopes of pasture and wheat-fields, with a considerable body of woods to the right and front. The two Bound Tops looked over everything, and a signal-flag was visible on the highest. Instinctively the idea arose, “ If we could only take position here, and have them attack us through this open ground!” But I soon learned that we were in no such luck — the boot, in fact, being upon the other foot.
It was explained to me that our corps was to assault the enemy’s left flank, and I was directed to reeonnoiter it and then to take charge of all the artillery of the corps and direct it in the attack, leaving my own battalion to the command of Major Huger. I was particularly cautioned, in moving the artillery, to keep it out of sight of the signal station upon Bound Top.
I immediately started on my reconnoissance, and in about three hours had a good idea of all the ground, and had Cabell’s, Henry’s, and my own battalions parked near where our infantry lines were to be formed and the attack begun. Hearing’s battalion with Pickett’s infantry was not yet up, and the Washington Artillery was left in reserve.
Through some blunder, part of our infantry had been marched on a road that brought them in sight of Bound Top, and, instead of taking to the fields and hollows, they had been halted for an hour, and then had been countermarched and sent around by a circuitous road, via Black Horse Tavern, about five miles out of the way, thereby losing at least two hours.
We waited quite a time for the infantry, and I think it was about 4 o’clock when at last the word was given for Hood’s division to move out and endeavor to turn the enemy’s left, while McLaws