VIEW OF CULP’S HILL FROM THE POSITION OF THE BATTERIES NEAR THE CEMETERY GATE.
1. Position of Stevens’s 5th Maine Battery which enfiladed Early’s division in the charge upon East Cemetery Hill. 2. Left of the line of field-works on Culp’s Hill. 3. Position of the 33d Massachusetts behind the fence of a lane where the left of the Confederate charge was repulsed.
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL E. SICKLES, U. S. A. Commanding the Third Army Corps at Gettysburg.
the direction of the 3d and 7th regiments was changed to the left, so as to occupy the stony hill and wood. After passing the buildings at Bose’s, the charge of the left wing was no longer visible from my position; but the movement was reported to have been magnificently conducted until the cannoneers had left their guns and the caissons were moving off, when the order was given to “move by the right flank," by some unauthorized person, and was immediately obeyed by the men. The Federal» returned to their guns and opened on these doomed regiments a raking fire of grape and canister, at short distance, which proved most disastrous, and for a time destroyed their usefulness. Hundreds of the bravest and best men of Carolina fell, victims of this fatal blunder. While this tragedy was being enacted, the 3d and 7th regiments were conducted rapidly to the stony hill. In consequence of the obstructions in the way, the 7th Begiment had lapped the 3d a few paces, and when they reached the cover of the stony hill I halted the line at the edge of the wood for a moment, and ordered the 7th to move by the right flank to uncover the 3d Begiment, which was promptly done. It was, no doubt, this movement, observed by some one from the left, that led to the terrible mistake which cost so dearly.
The moment the line was rectified the 7th and
was seen. In rear of the wheat-field, and between that and the mountain, there was a heavy force of Federals, posted in line behind a stone wall. Under my instructions I determined to move upon the stony hill, so as to strike it with my center, and thus attack the orchard on its left rear. About 4 o’clock I received the order to move, at a signal from Cabell’s artillery.
They were to fire for some minutes, then pause, and then fire three guns in rapid succession.
At this I was to move without further orders. I communicated these instructions to the commanders of each of the regiments in my command, directing them to convey them to the company officers. They were told, at the signal, to order the men to leap the wall without further orders, and to align the troops in front of it. Accordingly, at the signal, the men leaped over the wall and were promptly aligned; the word was given, and the brigade moved off at the word, with great steadiness and precision, followed by Semmes with equal promptness. General Longstreet accompanied mo in this advance on foot, as far as the Emmitsburg road. All the field and staff officers were dismounted on account of the many obstacles in the way. When we were about the Emmitsburg road, I heard Barksdale’s drums beat the assembly, and knew then that I should have no immediate support on my left, about to be squarely presented to the heavy force of infantry and artillery at, and in rear of, the Peach Orchard. The 2d and 8th South Carolina regiments and James’s (Third) battalion constituted the left wing of the brigade, and were then moving majestically across the fields to the left of the lane leading to Rose’s, with the steadiness of troops on parade. They were ordered to change direction to the left, and attack the batteries in rear of the Peach Orchard, and accordingly moved rapidly on that point. In order to aid this attack,
In the mean time General Hood’s division was moving in our rear to the right, to gain the enemy’s left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack as soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the Peach Orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood on my right, and cooperating with him. It was understood that he was to sweep down the Federal lines in a direction perpendicular to our line of battle. I was informed that Barksdale would move with me and conform to my movement; that Semmes would follow me, and Wofford follow Barksdale. These instructions I received in sundry messages from General Longstreet and General MeLaws, and in part by personal communication with him. In my center-front was a stone farm-house [supposed to be Bose’s], with a bam also of stone. These buildings were about five hundred yards from our position, and on a line with the crest of the Peach Orchard hill.
The Federal infantry was posted along the front of the orchard, and also on the face looking toward Bose’s. Six of their batteries were in position, three at the orchard near the crest of the hill, and the others about two hundred yards in rear, extending in the direction of Little Bound Top. Behind Bose’s was a morass, and, on the right of that, a stone wall running parallel with our line, some two hundred yards from Bose’s. Beyond the morass was a stony hill, covered with heavy timber and thick undergrowth interspersed with boulders and large fragments of rock, extending some distance toward the Federal main line, and in the direction of Bound Top, and to our left and in rear of the orchard and the batteries posted there. Beyond the stone wall last mentioned, and to the right of the. stony hill, was a dense forest extending far to the right. From the morass a small stream ran into this wood and along the base of the mountain. Between the stony hill and the forest was an interval of about one hundred yards, only sparsely covered with a scrubby undergrowth, through which a narrow road led in the direction of the mountain. Looking down this road from Bose’s a large wheat-field
and Barksdale’s brigades, the division of Major-General Lafayette MeLaws, and that, with the divisions of Pickett and Hood, formed the First Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, known as Longstreet’s. ... At 3 p. M. the head of my column emerged from the woods, and came into the open field in front of the stone wall which extends along by Flaherty’s farm, and to the east past Snyder’s. Here we were in full view of the Federal position. Their main line appeared to extend from little Bound Top, where their signal flags were flying, until it was lost to sight far away to the left. An advanced line occupied the Peach Orchard, heavily supported by artillery, and extended from that point toward our left along the Emmitsburg road. The intervening ground was occupied by open fields, interspersed and divided by stone walls. The position just here seemed almost impregnable. I immediately formed line of battle along the stone wall just mentioned, my left resting about Flaherty’s house, and my right near Snyder’s. This was done under cover of my skirmishers, who engaged those of the enemy near the Emmitsburg road. In the mean time I examined the position of the Federals with some care. I found them in superior force, strongly posted in the Peach Orchard, which bristled with artillery, with a main line of battle in their rear, apparently intrenched, and extending to, if not upon, Little Bound Top, far beyond the point at which their left had been supposed to rest. To carry out my instructions would have been, if successful in driving the enemy from the Peach Orchard, to present my own right flank and rear to a large portion of the enemy’s main line of battle. I therefore placed my command in position under the cover of the stone wall, and communicated the condition of matters to Major-General MeLaws. The division was then formed on this line, Semmes’s brigade two hundred yards in rear and supporting Kershaw’s ; Barksdale’s on the left of Kershaw’s, with Wofford’s in Barksdale’s rear supporting him. Cabell’s battalion of artillery was placed along the wall to Kershaw’s right, and the 15th South Carolina regiment, Colonel de Saussure, was thrown to their right to support them on that flank.
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