Stuart
CUMBIHV. f.*lO N׳A.V.V-K.-Y :
manag* the c< to jo L was,
orders to clear out the Union troops under Milroy at Winchester and under Tyler at Martinsburg.
Hooker started toward Washington. Ewell gained possession of Winchester and Martinsburg, but not of Harper’s Ferry.
There is a rocky and thickly wooded range of heights called the Bull Run Mountains, running from Leesburg south. As Hooker had not occupied them, but was farther to the east, Lee desired to do so, for it would give him a very strong position on Hooker’s flank and bring him (Lee) very near to Washington. He therefore directed his cavalry to reconnoiter in that direction.
BATTLE OF ALDIE, JUNE 17TH.
Stuart’s reconnoitering* party met the Union cavalry at Aldie, and, after a hard battle, retreated.
A series of cavalry combats ensued, ending in the retreat of Stuart’s cavalry behind the Blue Ridge.
LEE ENTERS PENNSYLVANIA.
Hooker was strongly posted east of the Bull Run range and could not be attacked with much chance of success. As Lee could not well remain inactive or retreat, he resolved to invade Pennsylvania. This was a hazardous enterprise, for Hooker might intervene between him and Richmond. Stuart’s cavalry was left to prevent this catastrophe by guarding the passes in the Blue Ridge. Stuart was also directed to harass Hooker and attack his rear should he attempt to cross the Potomac in pursuit of Lee.
Lee reached Chambersburg with Longstreet’s and Hill’s corps. Ewell’s corps was in advance at Carlisle and York, preceded by Jenkins’s and by White’s cavalry, threatening to cross the Susquehanna and take Harrisburg.
In the mean time Stuart’s cavalry had crossed the Potomac near Seneca Creek above Washington, reached Rockville, near Washington, on its way north. Two of his brigades under Jones and Robertson were holding the gaps in the Blue Ridge without any enemy in front of them. Hooker’s army was still at and near Frederick, Maryland.
A CHANGE OF UNION COMMANDERS.
On June 28th, Hooker determined to send Slocum’s corps and the garrison of Harper’s Ferry —the latter about 10,000 strong — to operate against Lee’s rear. This was an excellent plan, but Hooker’s superior, General Halleck, refused to allow him to remove the troops from Harper’s Ferry; and Hooker said if he could not manage the campaign in his own way, he preferred to give up the command of the army. Halleck gladly relieved him, and Major-General George G. Meade, commander of the Fifth Corps, was assigned to the command in his place.
On June 28th, Lee learned from a scout that the Union army was in his rear and that his communication with Richmond was seriously endangered.
In this emergency he concluded to threaten Baltimore.
As a preliminary measure he directed u'־• —^— army to move on Gettysburg.
as intercepted at Hanover by ck’s division of cavalry, but id to disengage himself from ntest and continue his journey in Ewell at York. The latter however, on his way to Get-•urg, and Stuart . . . rode night 1 day to join Lee there. When finally reached the field in the fternoon of the 2d, his horses were in bad condition from overwork, and his men were utterly exhausted.
General Reynolds commanded the left wing of the Union army, composed of the First, Eleventh, and Third corps. The advance of Hill’s corps on the morning of July 1st struck Buford’s division of Union cavalry a short distance to the west of Gettysburg.
AT CLOSE QUARTERS ON THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG.
NARRATIVE NOTES.	BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION, JUNE 9TH.
Pleasonton, wlio was at Warrenton Junction, !jacked by two infantry brigades, slipped quietly down to the Rappahannock and bivouacked there without fire or light. At dawn the next morning he crossed the stream, completely surprised Stuart’s cavalry, and very nearly captured his artillery. Unfortunately Colonel Benjamin F. Davis, who led the advance, was killed, and there was no officer at hand to take his place. This caused some delay and confusion, which gave the enemy time to rally and form line of battle.
After fighting ail day against Stuart’s cavalry, the enemy’s infantry came up and Pleasonton retired. He reported to Hooker that two-thirds of the enemy were at Culpeper preparing to move on Washington.
Hooker sent troops up the Rappahannock to prevent Lee from crossing by the direct route.
Lee sent Ewell’s corps to the Shenandoah valley with
HOOKER SUSPECTS.
Hooker, seeing a great diminution of tents in his front, suspected that the Confederates were leaving Fredericksburg. He said to Sedgwick,—a life-long friend and classmate,— “John, go over there and see if the enemy have gone. They may have left merely their empty tents to deceive us.”
So, on the 6th of June, Sedgwick threw bridges out, under cover of his artillery, and crossed the Rappahannock. He sent back word to Hooker, “ There is a pretty stiff opposition; I think their main body must be still here.” Hooker directed Pleasonton to take all the cavalry that could be spared and go to Culpeper, to ascertain if anything unusual was going on there. All of Stuart's cavalry and two-thirds of the Confederate army were in that vicinity.
RELIEF MAP OF THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.
From a photograph of the original cast made by A. E. Lehman for the Cumberland Valley Railroad Company.
make a battle there. I made this suggestion in order to bring about a discussion which I thought would give Ewell a better idea of the plan of operations. My remark had the desired effect, and we talked over the possibilities of a battle south of the Potomac. The enemy would be on our right flank while we were moving north. Ewell’s corps was to move in advance to Culpeper Court House, mine to follow, and the cavalry was to move along on our right flank to the east of us. Thus, by threatening his rear, we could draw Hooker from his position on Stafford Heights opposite Fredericksburg. Our movements at the beginning of the campaign were necessarily slow in order that we might be sure of having the proper effect on Hooker.
Ewell was started off to the valley of Virginia to cross the mountains and move in the direction of Winchester, which was occupied by considerable forces under Milroj’. I was moving at thé same time east of the Blue Ridge with Stuart’s cavalry on my right so as to occupy the gaps from Ashby on to Harper’s Ferry. Ewell, moving on through the valley, captured troops and supplies at Winchester, and passed through Martinsburg and Williamsport into Maryland. As I moved along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge we heard from day to day of the movements of Hooker’s army, and that he had finally abandoned his position on Stafford Heights, and was moving up the Potomac in the direction of Washington. Upon receipt of that information, A. P. Hill was ordered to draw off from Fredericksburg and follow the movements of General Ewell, but to cross the Potomac at Shep-herdstown. When Hill with his troops and well-supplied trains had passed my rear, I was ordered to withdraw from the Blue Ridge, pass over to the west of the Shenandoah, and follow the movements of the other troops, only to cross the Potomac at Williamsport. I ordered General Stuart, whom I considered under my command, to occupy the gaps with a part of his cavalry and to follow with his main force on my right, to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and move on my right flank. Upon giving him this order, he informed me that he had authority from General Lee to occupy the gaps with a part of his cavah’y, and to follow the Federal army with the remainder. At the same time he expressed his purpose of crossing the river east of the Blue Ridge and trying to make way around the right of the Federal arir moved my troops indepenc the cavalry, and, followii orders, crossed at Williams came up with A. P. Hil Maryland, and moved on the! to Chambersburg. . . . T1 two armies were then nea each other, the Confederates being north and west of Gettysburg, and the Fed■ erals south and southeast. . . . On the 30th of June we turned our faces toward our enemy and marched upon Gettysburg.
The Third Corps, under Hill, moved out first and my command followed.
190