GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, C. S. A.
Confederate Commander at the Battle of Gettysburg. (From a photograph taken after the war.)
eral Lee sent for General Ewell to receive his orders. Iwas present at the time and remarked that if we were ever going to make an offensive battle it should be done south of the Potomac — adding that we might have an opportunity to cross the Rappahannock near Culpeper Court House and
fight and had beaten off two-thirds of the Federal army with great loss to them and slight loss to my own troops. I also called his attention to Napoleon’s instructions to Marmont at the head of an invading army.
A few days before we were ready to move Gen-
UNION CAVALRY SCOUTING IN FRONT OF THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE.
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.*
Slocum —about 82,000 in all; a heavy cavalry force — about 11,000, and 27 guns—under Pleasonton, and batteries of artillery numbering 300 guns.
Lee was on the south side of the Rappahannock at and near Fredericksburg, guarding the road to Richmond. Hooker was opposite Lee on the north side of the river, guarding the road to Washington.
Lee determined to invade the Northern States. Hill’s corps was ordered to remain at Fredericksburg, and the corps of Ewell and Longstreetto join Stuart’s cavalry at Culpeper.
days, I found his mind made up not to allow any of his troops to go west. I then accepted his proposition to make a campaign into Pennsylvania, provided it should be offensive in strategy but defensive in tactics, forcing the Federal army to give us battle when we were in strong position and ready to receive them. One mistake of the Confederacy was in pitting force against force. The only hope we had was to outgeneral the Federals. We were all hopeful and the army was in good condition, but the war had advanced far enough for us to see that a mere victory without decided fruits was a luxury we could not afford. Our numbers were less than the Federal forces, and our resources were limited while theirs were not. The time had come when it was imperative that the skill of generals and the strategy and tactics of war should take the place of muscle against muscle. Our purpose should have been to impair the morale of the Federal army and shake Northern confidence in the Federal leaders. We talked on that line from day to day, and General Lee, accepting it as a good military view, adopted it as the key-note of the campaign. I suggested that we should have all the details and purposes so well arranged and so impressed upon our minds that when the critical moment should come, we could refer to our calmer moments and know we were carrying out our original plans. I stated to General Lee that if he would allow me to handle my corps so as to receive the attack of the Federal army, I would beat it off without calling on him for help except to guard my right and left, and called his attention to the battle of Fredericksburg as an instance of defensive warfare, where we had thrown not more than five thousand troops into the
PRELIMINARY.
AT the beginning of the Gettysburg campaign, June 3, 1863, the Confederate army, under command of General Robert E. Lee, was composed of three large corps under (1) Longstreet, (2) Ewell, and (3) A. P. Hill — about 70,000, including Stuart's cavalry force (11,000, and 16 gnus), and batteries of artillery numbering 190 guns.
The Union army, then under command of General Joseph Hooker, was composed of seven small corps under (1) Reynolds, (2) Hancock, (3) Sickles, (6) Meade (succeeded by Sykes), (6) Sedgwick, (11) Howard, (12)
LEE’S INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA.
BY JAMES LONGSTREET, LIEUT.-GENERAL, C. S. A.
Commander of the First Corps of Lee’s Army at the Battle of Gettysburg.
. . . While General Lee was reorganizing his army he was also arranging the new campaign. Grant had laid siege to Vicksburg, and Johnston was concentrating at Jackson to drive him away. Rosecrans was in Tennessee and Bragg was in front of him. The force Johnston was concentrating at Jackson gave us no hope that he would have sufficient strength to make any impression upon Grant, and even if he could, Grant was in a position to reinforce rapidly and could supply his army with greater facility. Vicksburg was doomed unless we could offer relief by strategic move. I proposed to send a force through East Tennessee to join Bragg and also to have Johnston sent to join Mm, thus concentrating a large force against Rosecrans, crash out his army, and march against Cincinnati. That,I thought, was the only way wehad torelieveVicksburg. GeneralLee admitted the force of my proposition, but finally stated that he preferred to organize a campaign into Maryland and Pennsylvania, hoping thereby to draw the Federal troops from the southern points they occupied. After discussing the matter with him for several
* The narrative notes standing at the heads of the articles on Gettysburg in the pages following are condensed from a work by Brevet Major-General Abner Doubleday, U. S. A., entitled “Gettysburg Made Plain,” and published by The Century Co. General Doubleday commanded a division in the First Corps, Army of the Potomac, and during a portion of the battle he commanded the corps.