THE EIGHT WING OF HOOKER’S ARMY CROSSING THE RAPPAHANNOCK AT KELLY’S FORD.
HOOKER’S HEADQUARTERS AT CH ANCELLORSVII.LE, SATURDAY MORNING, MAY 2.
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.
THE UNION SIDE.
BY ALFRED PLEASONTON, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.
Commander of the Cavalry oil tile Field at Cliancellorsvllle.
should become deeply engaged a force from Spotsylvania would take him in the rear and flank, he withdrew the army and placed it in position at Chancellorsville.
From that time the whole situation was changed. Without striking a blow, the army was placed on the defensive. The golden moment had been lost, and it never appeared again to the same extent afterward—an illustration that soldiers’ legs have as much to do with winning victories as their arms.
General Lee knew that General Hooker had taken his army back to its position at Chancellorsville. The Third Corps had already been taken from General Sedgwick at Fredericksburg, and at 2 o’clock on the morning of May 2d the First Corps was also ordered up to Chancellorsville, leaving Sedgwick with the Sixth Corps. These movements did not escape the attention of General Lee, so he decided to assume the offensive and put in operation the plan which had been suggested by Generals Jack-son, A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Stuart, at their council of war in the first week in March. He left a sufficient force at Fredericksburg to watch Sedgwick, while with the bulk of his army he moved on Chancellorsville, sending a force under Generals Jack-son, A. P. Hill, and Stuart, to make a turning movement and to attack the Union forces in the rear and right flank, and roll them up. Lee himself, in the mean time, with the remainder of his forces, occupied the attention of the left and center of Hooker’s army, to prevent any interference with the flank movement. General Lee’s strategy was the same that Hooker had carried out so successfully until he stopped at Chancellorsville. Lee was equally successful in his movements, and we will now investigate the causes of his failure to give the Army of the Potomac a crushing blow.
On the 2d day of May the right of the Army of the Potomac was the Eleventh Corps, in the woods
had concentrated in force near Chancellorsville, inquiring why he had not been kept advised, and saying that he wished to see McLaws as soon as possible at headquarters. At 2 o’clock p. M., one hour later, I reported to General Hooker at Chancellorsville, and submitted to him the diary and General Lee’s despatch, both of which he retained, and I suggested that we had evidently surprised General Lee by our rapid movements across the river, and, as Lee had prepared for a battle at Chancellorsville, we had better anticipate him by moving on toward Fredericksburg. A march of three or four miles would take us out of the woods into a more open country, where we could form our line of battle, and where our artillery could be used to advantage; we would then be prepared to move on Fredericksburg in the morning. Besides, such a movement would enable us to uncover Banks’s Ford, which would shorten our communication with General Sedgwick over 5 miles, and bring us within 31-miles of Falmouth by that Ford. . . .
[General Pleasonton’s cavalry on the evening of the 30th developed the presence of Stuart’s Confederates on the right rear of IIooker’8 army, masking Stonewall Jackson’s movements. The narrative proceeds with the events in the Union lines after that information reached General Hooker. ]
To move the army down on Fredericksburg with an unknown force on its rear and flank was a hazardous experiment. What could have been done with safety the day before now became doubtful, and it was this uncertainty that paralyzed the vigor and action of General Hooker throughout the 1st of May. Although he started the Second, Fifth, Twelfth, and Third corps in the direction of Tabernacle Church on the way to Fredericksburg, the movement was not of such a character as to bring success. Upon meeting a stubborn resistance from General Jackson’s forces, and fearing that if he
under the command of General Stoneman to make a raid in rear of Lee’s army, and destroy his railroads and his communications with Richmond. .. .
The right wing of the army crossed Kelly’s Ford on the morning of the 29th, and the Eleventh and Twelfth corps reached Germanna Ford that evening. I had the advance of this column with two regiments of cavalry and a battery of horse artillery ; the third regiment of the cavalry brigade I sent with the Fifth Corps to Ely’s Ford. In the afternoon, at Germanna Ford, I surprised and captured a picket of some fifty of Stuart’s cavalry soldiers. With them was an engineer officer belonging to Stuart’s staff. On searching the party, as is done with all prisoners, I found on this engineer officer a very bulky volume, which proved to be a diary that he had been keeping throughout the war.
I spent the greater part of the night in reading it, in hopes of finding something that would be of advantage to us; nor was I disappointed. This diary stated that in the first week in March a council of war had been held at General Stuart’s headquarters, which had been attended by Generals Jackson, A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Stuart. They were in conference over five hours, and came to the decision that the next battle would be at or near Chancellorsville, and that that position must be prepared. The next day, the 30th of April, I moved on toward Chancellorsville, and at 1 o’clock in the day I captured a courier or orderly from General Lee, who had a despatch from Lee, dated at Fredericksburg, noon of that day, and addressed to Major-General McLaws, stating that he had just been informed that the enemy
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IN the latter part of April, 1863, General Hooker decided to undertake an offensive campaign with the Army of the union cavalry-man’s hat. Potomac against the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Lee. At this time the two armies faced each other: Lee’s, numbering about 60,000 men, being at Fredericksburg, and the Army of the Potomac, numbering about 130,-000 men, at Falmouth, on the north side of the Rappahannock River opposite Fredericksburg. Hooker directed three corps of the army, the First, the Third, and the Sixth, comprising 59,000 men, under the command of General Sedgwick, to cross the Rappahannock River below Fredericksburg and hold Lee’s army in that position, while he himself moved secretly and with celerity three corps, the Fifth, the Eleventh, and the Twelfth, numbei-ing 42,000 men, up the river, crossing it and concentrating them at Chancellorsville, ten miles west of Fredericksburg, with the purpose of moving down upon General Lee’s army to take it in rear and flank—two divisions of the Second Corps being placed to cover Banks’s Ford, the third division being left at Falmouth, while a brigade and battery were stationed at United ,States Ford to facilitate the crossing. The Cavalry Corps, with the exception of one small brigade of three regiments and a battery of horse artillery, which was left under my command with the army, was ordered