THE PONTOON-BRIDGES AT FRANKLIN’S CROSSING.
The hills occupied by Stonewall Jackson’s command are seen in the distance.
great spirit for a short time, when Meade’s column was vigorously assailed by the enemy’s masked force, and, after a severe contest, forced back. Two regiments of Berry’s brigade, Birney’s division, arrived about this time, and were immediately thrown into the wood on Gibbon’s left, to the support of the line; but they, too. were soon overpowered, and the whole line retired from the wood, Meade’s in some confusion, and, after an ineffectual effort by General Meade and myself to rally them under the enemy’s fire, that of the artillery having resumed almost its original intensity, I directed General Meade to re-form his division across the Bowling Green road, and ordered the remainder of Berry’s brigade, which had come up, to the support of the batteries.
“The enemy, showing himself in strong force in the wood, seemed disposed to follow our retiring troops, but the arrival of the other brigades of Birney’s division on the ground at this critical moment, to occupy our line of battle materially aided in saving Hall’s battery, which was now seriously threatened by the enemy, and, together with our artillery fire, soon drove him to his sheltered positions and cover, from which his infantry did not again appear.
“ General Gibbon’s division was assailed in turn in the same manner, and compelled to retire from the wood soon after Meade’s.”
General Conrad Feger Jackson, commanding the Third Brigade of Meade’s division, was killed within the enemy’s lines. General Jackson was a native of Pennsylvania, and was appointed colonel of the 9th Pennsylvania Reserves in 1861. He commanded a brigade in Porter’s Corps (fifth) in the Peninsula.
GENERAL REYNOLDS’S ACCOUNT OF THE ENGAGEMENT AT HAMILTON’S CROSSING.
The report of General John F. Reynolds, commanding the First Corps, contains the following account of the engagement of his troops at Hamilton’s Crossing: “ About 8: 30 a. m. Meade’s division advanced across the Smithfield ravine, formed in column of two brigades, with the artillery between them, the Third Brigade marching by the flank on the left and rear. It moved down the river some 500 or 600 yards, when it turned sharp to the right and crossed the Bowling Green road. The enemy’s artillery opened fire from the crest and the angle of the Bowling Green road. I directed General Meade to put his column directly for the nearest point of wood, and, having gained the crest, to extend his attack along it to the extreme point of the heights, where most of the enemy’s artillery was posted. As the column crossed the Bowling Green road the artillery of his division was ordered into position on the rise of the ground between this road and the railroad; Cooper’s and Ransom’s batteries, to the front, soon joined by Amsden’s to oppose those of the enemy on the crest, while Simpson’s had to be thrown to the left, to oppose that on the Bowling Green road, which was taking the column in flank. Hall’s battery was at the same time thrown to the front, on the left of Gibbon’s division, which was advancing in line on Meade’s right. The artillery combat here raged furiously for some time, until that of the enemy was silenced, when all of our batteries were directed to shell the wood, where his infantry was supposed to be posted. This was continued some half-hour, when the column of Meade, advancing in fine order and with gallant determination, was directed into the point of wood which extended this side of the railroad, with instructions, when they carried the crest and road which ran along it in their front, to move the First Brigade along the road, the Second Brigade to advance and hold the road, while the Third moved across the open field, to support the First in carrying the extreme point of the ridge. At this time I sent orders to General Gibbon to advance, in connection with General Meade, and carry the wood in his front. The advance was made under the fire of the enemy’s batteries on his right and front, to which Gibbon’s batteries replied, while those of Smith joined in on the right.
“ Meade’s division successfully carried the wood in front, crossed the railroad, charged up the slope of the hill, and gained the road and edge of the wood, driving the enemy from his strong positions in the ditches and railroad cut, capturingrthe flags of two regiments and sending about 200 prisoners to the rear. At the same time Gibbon’s division had crossed the railroad and entered the wood, driving back the first line of the enemy and capturing a number of prisoners; but, from the dense character of the wood, the connection between his division and Meade’s was broken. The infantry. combat was here kept up with
by fifteen pieces of artillery placed at our right, did terrible execution as the poor fellows emerged from a slight railroad cut in front of a part of our line. [See the narrative by General Reynolds following.]
On the morning of the 13th General Jack-son rode down his lines dressed in a new suit, presented to him, as we understood, by General Stuart. Some of our men facetiously remarked that they preferred seeing him with his rusty old cap on, as they feared he would n’t get down to work. He inspected all of his positions, riding alone. After halting near the extreme right, the artillery fire was begun, and here I had an excellent opportunity to see him under fire. I watched him closely and was unable to detect the slightest change in his demeanor. In a few minutes he rode off in the direction of Lee’s headquarters.
A very general impression prevails, and it is in a great measure confirmed by writers on Fredericksburg. that Jackson’s lines were strongly fortified. This is not correct: we had no time to construct anything like fortifications. D. H. Hill’s division had been at Port Royal, eighteen miles below Fredericksburg, to prevent the Federals from crossing at that point; he left Port Royal after the enemy had abandoned the project of crossing there, and did not reach the position assigned him until about daylight of the morning of the battle.
The next morning the scenes of carnage were heart-sickening. To intensify the horrible picture, the dead and the mortally wounded were in many instances burned in the sedge-grass, which was set on fire by bursting shells.
straighten that fence! Jubal’s boys are always getting Hill out o’ trouble!”
A desperate encounter followed. The Federals fought manfully, but the artillery on our right, together with the small-arms, literally mowed them down. Officers and men lost courage at the sight of their lessening ranks, and in the utmost confusion they again sought the shelter of the railroad. Archer’s brigade, of Jackson’s corps, was on the extreme right of A. P. Hill’s front line, composed of the following regiments, posted in the order named: 19th Georgia, 14th Tennessee, 7th Tennessee, 1st Tennessee, and extended from the interval or space left unoccupied by Gregg’s brigade to the railroad curve near Hamilton’s Crossing. We occupied ground slightly higher than the level of the plain over which the Federals had to pass. In our immediate rear and left was an irregular growth of timber of varied size, which obstructed the view in the direction of the Gregg interval.
As the battle opened in the morning, the enemy was plainly in our view, and we could distinctly see their approach to the railroad in our front and to the left, where in every attempt to advance they halted. Now and then they would make an effort to advance from the railroad to our lines. We who were on the right had no trouble to repulse those in our front, and, in fact, we successfully met every assault made on the right, and that, too, with little or no loss. We regarded the efforts of the Fed-erals, so far as the right was concerned, as futile in the extreme. In fact, their assaults on this part of the line appeared like the marching of men to certain defeat and slaughter. Our infantry fire aided
MAJOR-GENERAL W. B. FRANKLIN, U. S. V.
COranmnding the left grand division at Fredericksburg. (From a photograph taken
about 1884.)
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