ABANDONING THE WINTER CAMP AT FALMOUTH. From a war-time sketch.
THE GRAND REVIEW AT FALMOUTH DURING PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S VISIT.
From a war-time sketch.
THE CONFEDERATE SIDE.
THE DEFENSE OF MARYE’S HEIGHTS AND THE STONE WALL.
BY LAFAYETTE McLAWS, MAJOR-GENERAL,
C. S. A.
Commander of McLaws’s Division at Fredericksburg.
0■
after, by direction of General Longstreet, I occupied the city with one of my brigades, and picketed the river with strong detachments from the dam at Falmouth to a quarter of a mile below Deep Bun creek, the enemy's pickets being just across the river, within a stone’s throw of mine. Detachments were immediately set at work digging rifle-pits close to the edge of the bank, so close that our men, when in them, could command the river and the shores on each side. The cellars of the houses near the river were made available for the use of riflemen, and zigzags were constructed to enable the men to get in and out of the rifle-pits under cover. All this was done at night, and so secretly and quietly that I do not believe the enemy had any conception of the minute and careful preparations that had been made to defeat any attempt to cross the river in my front. No provision was made for the use of artillery, as the enemy had an enormous array of their batteries on the heights above the town, and could have demolished ours in five minutes.
Two or three evenings previous to the Federal attempt to cross, I was with General Barksdale, and we were attracted by one or more of the enemy’s bands playing at their end of the railroad bridge. A number of their officers and a crowd of their men were about the band cheering their national airs, the “Star Spangled Banner,” “Hail Columbia,” and others, once so dear to us all. It seemed as if they expected some response from us, but none was given until, finally, they struck up “Dixie,” and then both sides cheered, with much
surprised; I think the superior officers did not regard him competent for the task. He had fine qualities as an officer, but not the weight of character to take״charge of that army. Nevertheless, under his administration the army assumed wonderful vigor. I have never known men to change from a condition of the lowest depression to that of a healthy fighting state in so short a time. Presi -dent Lincoln, with his wife, came down to spend a few days with General Hooker, and to see the different officers and talk with them. To further that General Hooker gave a dinner party, at which all the corps commanders were present, and also Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Lincoln would talk to the officers on the subject that was uppermost in our minds •—how we were to get the better of the enemy on the opposite hills. Before he went away he sent for Hooker and for me, I being second in command, and almost his last injunction was, “ Gentlemen, in your next battle put in all your men.” Yet that is exactly what we did not do at Ghancellors-ville.
We had a grand review of the army in honor of the President. The Second Corps paraded w׳ith Howard’s Eleventh Corps, I think; for after I had saluted at the head of my corps I rode to the side of the President, who was on horseback, and while near him General Schurz approached at the head of his division. I said, “Mr. Lincoln, that is General Schurz,” pronouncing it Shun, after the American fashion. Mr. Lincoln turned to me and said, “Not Shura, General Couch, but Shoortz,” But he did it very pleasantly, and I was just a little surprised that our Western President should have the advantage of me. It was a beautiful day, and the review was a stirring sight. Mr. Lincoln, sitting there with his hat off, head bent, and seemingly meditating, suddenly turned to me and said, “General Couch, what do you suppose will become of all these men when the war is over?” And it struck me as very pleasant that somebody had an idea that the war would some time end.
said: “I understand that Burnside has given out that he intends to lead seventeen regiments to the attack.” He urged me strongly to dissuade him if possible, as it would be a perfect slaughter of men.
At the council Hooker expressed himself as against the movement of retreat, saying, “We must fight those people. We are over there and we must fight them.” But, as I remember, he did not advocate the plan of holding Fredericksburg if we were not to renew the fight. I urged that the army was not in a condition, after our repulse, to renew the assault, but that we ought to hold Fredericksburg at all hazards. I had an argument with General Burnside upon that point, telling him that I was willing to have him throw all the responsibility upon me; that if we held the town we should have a little something to show for the sacrifice of the day before ; that the people would feel we had not failed utterly. It was agreed that Fredericksburg should be held. Then Burnside dismissed us, and sent Hooker and myself to Fredericksburg to arrange for the defense. We held a council at the corner of Hanover street.
It was decided that Hooker’s troops should hold the town. The question was how many men would he leave for that purpose, opinions varying from ten to eighteen thousand. My limit was ten thousand men. General Tyler turned to me and said : “Make it higher, General.” We compromised on twelve thousand. We remained in the town on the 14th, and that evening my corps and the Ninth Corps recrossed the river. Next morning w7e found that Fredericksburg had been evacuated. When Willeox and I left, we thought, of course, it would be held. The talk was that during the night Hooker prevailed upon Burnside to evacuate the town. . . . After the battle Burnside tried to regain the confidence of the army, and there is no doubt that Sumner did a good deal to help him. . . .
When Hooker, on January 25th, was placed in command of the army, many of us were very much
they stiffened in the wintry air, and on the front line were rolled forward for protection to the living. Frozen men were placed for dumb sentries.
My corps again bivouacked in the town, and they were not allowed fires lest they should draw the fire of the enemy’s artillery.
At 2 o’clock in the morning Burnside came to my headquarters near the center of the town. I was lying down at the time. He asked me to tell him about the battle, and we talked for about an hour. I told him everything that had occurred. “ And now,” I said, “ General Burnside, you must know that everything that could be done by troops was done by the Second Corps.” He said, “Couch, I know that; I am perfectly satisfied that you did your best.” He gave no intimation of his plans for the next day. He was cheerful in his tone, and did not seem greatly oppressed, but it was plain that he felt he had led us to a great disaster, and one knowing him so long and well as myself could see that he wished his body was also lying in front of Marye’s Heights. I never felt so badly for a man in my life.
The next day, Sunday, the 14th, our men began digging trenches along the edge of the town. We were on the alert, for there was some fear of an assault. Of course there is no need of denying that after the battle the men became strained. The pressure of a fight carries you through, but after it is all over and you have been whipped, you do not feel very pugnacious. The men, knowing that they had been unsuccessful, were in a nervous state, and officers suffered also from the reaction, the worst of it being that the mass of the army had lost confidence in its commander.
About midday of the 14th Burnside called a council of war, in which it was decided to fall back, but to hold Fredericksburg. No attack was made by us that day, though Burnside had said that he should renew the assault on Marye’s Hill, with his old Ninth Corps, and that he would place himself at its head. General Getty of that corps, a very gallant officer, touched me as I passed him and