THE BOMBARDMENT OP FREDERICKSBURG, DECEMBER 11, 1862.
advance having a lively fight in the streets of Fredericksburg. Hawkins’s brigade of Will-cox’s corps occupied the lower part of the town on the same evening, and the town was not secured without desperate fighting. I went over the next morning, Friday, the 12th, with Hancock’s and French’s divisions. The remainder of Will-cox’s corps crossed and occupied the lower part of the town. There was considerable looting. I placed a provost-guard at the bridges, with orders that nobody should go back with plunder. An enormous pile of booty was collected there by evening. But there came a time when we were too busy to guard it, and I suppose it was finally carried off by another set of spoilers. The troops of the two corps bivouacked that night in the streets and were not permitted to make fires. Late on that day we had orders to be ready to cross Hazel Bun, which meant that we were to join Franklin. That was the only proper move to make, since we had done just what the enemy wanted us to do — had divided our army. The conditions were favorable for a change of position unknown to the enemy, since the night was dark and the next morning was foggy. But it would have been very difficult to make the movement. I was much worried in regard to building the necessary bridges over Hazel Bun, and the dangers attending a flank movement at night in the presence of the enemy. But the order to march never came. The orders that were given by Burnside showed that he had no fixed plan of battle. After getting in the face of the enemy, his intentions seemed to be continually changing.
Early the next morning, Saturday, the 13th, I received orders to make an assault in front. My instructions came from General Sumner, who did not cross the river during the fight, owing to a special understanding with which I had nothing to do, and which related to his supposed rashness. At Fair Oaks, Antietam, and on other battle-fields, he had shown that he was a hard fighter. He was a grand soldier, full of honor and gallantry, and a man of great determination.
As I have said, on that Saturday morning we were enveloped in a heavy fog. . . . French was at once directed to prepare his division in three
— or doubles — “grand divisions.” Under this arrangement my corps, the Second, and Will-cox’s, the Ninth, which had been Burnside’s, formed the Bight Grand Division under General Sumner. When Sumner and I arrived near Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, November 17th, we found the enemy in small force in readiness to oppose our crossing the Bappahan-noek. Everybody knew that Lee would rush right in ; we could see it. If the pontoons had been there, we might have crossed at once.
Yet we lay there nearly a month, while they were fortifying before our eyes; besides, the weather was against us.
Under date of December 7th, my diary contains this entry, “Very cold; plenty of snow. Men suffering; cold outdoors, ice indoors in my room.”
Sumner’s headquarters were at the Lacy House, while the Second Corps lay back of the brow of the hill behind Falmouth.
On the night of the 9th, two nights before the crossing, Sumner called a council to discuss what we were to do, the corps, division, and brigade commanders being present. The result was a plain, free talk all around, in which words were not minced, for the conversation soon drifted into a marked disapprobation of the manner in which Burnside contemplated meeting the enemy.
Sumner seemed to feel badly that the officers did not agree to Burnside’s mode of advance. That noble old hero was so faithful and loyal that he wanted, even against impossibilities, to carry out everything Burnside suggested. I should doubt if his judgment concurred. It was only chivalrous attachment to Burnside, or to any commander. But there were not two opinions among the subordinate officers as to the rashness of the undertaking.
Somebody told Burnside of our views, and he was irritated. He asked us to meet him the next night at the Lacy House. He said he understood, in a general way, that we were opposed to his plans. He seemed to be rather severe on Hancock—to my surprise, for I did not think that officer had said as much as myself in opposition to the plan of attack. Burnside stated that he had formed his plans, and all he wanted was the devotion of his men. Hancock made a reply in which he dis-
mated scene, because the troops were mostly hidden. The bombardment for the purpose of dislodging the sharpshooters, who under cover of the houses were delaying the bridge-making, was terrific, while the smoke settled down and veiled the scene. After the bombardment had failed to dislodge the enemy, the 7th Michigan and the 19th
and the 20th Massachusetts of Howard’s division sprang into the pontoons, and rowing themselves over drove away Barksdale’s sharpshoot e r s. This gallant action enabled the engineers to complete the bridges. Howard’s division was the first to cross by the upper bridge, his
claimed any personal discourtesy, and said he knew there was a line of fortified heights on the opposite side, and that it would be pretty difficult for us to go over there and take them. I rose after him, knowing that I was the more guilty, and expressed a desire to serve Burnside, saying, among other things, that if I had ever done anything in any battle, in this one I intended to do twice as much. French came in while I was talking. He was rather late, and in his bluff way exclaimed:
“Is this a Methodist campmeeting ? ”
The heights on the morning of the 11th, before the bridges were thrown across, did not offer a very ani-
SSSSlfsS
THE PHILLIPS HOUSE, BURNSIDE’S HEADQUARTERS. From a photograph taken while the house was burning.
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