POSITION OP MENDENHALL’S FIFTY-EIGHT GUNS (AS SEEN FROM THE EAST BANK ABOVE THE FORD) WHICH REPELLED THE CHARGE OF BRECKINRIDGE, JANUARY 2, 1863.
GENERAL SAMUEL BEATTY’S BRIGADE (VAN CLEVE’S DIVISION) ADVANCING TO SUSTAIN THE UNION EIGHT NEAR THE NASHVILLE PIKE.
gade was enveloped by Hardee’s left, which, sweeping toward his rear, made withdrawal a necessity. Sill had been killed in the first assault. Schaefer’s Union brigade was brought forward to the support of the front line. The dying order from General Sill to charge was gallantly obeyed, and Loomis was driven back to his first position. Manigault advanced at about 8 o’clock, and attacked directly in his front, but, meeting with the same reception, was compelled to retire. A second attack resulted like the first. .	.	.
Eosecrans, having arranged his plan of battle, had risen early to superintend its execution. Crittenden, whose headquarters were a few paces distant, mounted at 6 A. M., and with his staff rode to an eminence, where Eosecrans, surrounded by his staff-officers, was listening to the opening guns on the right. The plan of Bragg was instantly divined, but no apprehension of danger was felt. Suddenly the woods on the right in the rear of Negley appeared to be alive with men wandering aimlessly in the direction of the rear. The roar of artillery grew more distinct, mingled with the continuous volleys of musketry. The rear of a line of battle always presents the pitiable spectacle of a horde of skulkers, men who, when tried in the fierce flame of battle, find, often to their own disgust, that they are lacking in the element of courage. But the spectacle of whole regiments of soldiers flying in panic to the rear was a sight never seen by the Army of the Cumberland except on that occasion. Captain Otis, from his position on the extreme right, despatched a messenger, who arrived breathless, to inform General Eosecrans that the right wing was in rapid retreat. The as-
of the assault. Far to the right, overlapping E. W. Johnson, the Confederate line came sweeping on like the resistless tide, driving artillerists from their guns and infantry from their encampments. Slowly the extreme right fell back, at first contesting every inch of ground. In Kirk’s brigade 500 men were killed or wounded in a few minutes. Willich lost nearly as many. Goodspee’s battery, on Willich’s right, lost three guns. The swing of Bragg’s left flank toward the right brought Mc-Cown’s brigades upon the right of Davis’s division. Leaving the detachments in E. W. Johnson’s division to the attention of two of his brigades and Wheeler’s cavalry, MeCown turned McNair to the right, where Cleburne was already heavily engaged. Driving Davis’s skirmishers before him, Cleburne advanced with difficulty in line of battle, bearing to the right over rough ground cut up with numerous fences and thickets, and came upon the main line at a distance of three-fourths of a mile from his place of bivouac. It was not yet daylight when he began his march, and he struck the Union line at six o’clock. General Davis now changed the front of Colonel Post’s brigade nearly perpendicular to the rear. .	.	.
In front of Post, the Confederates under Mc-Cown, in command of McNair’s brigade of his own division, and Liddell of Cleburne’s division, received a decided repulse; and Cleburne was for a time equally unsuccessful in pushing back the main Union line.
Three successive assaults were made upon this position. In the second, Vaughan’s and Maney’s brigades of Cheatham’s division relieved Loomis’s and Manigault’s. In the third attack Post’s bri-162
ers, in succession to the right flank, the move to be made by a constant wheel to the right, on Polk’s right flank as a pivot. The object of General Bragg was by an early and impetuous attack to force the Union army back upon Stone’s Eiver, and, if practicable, by the aid of the cavalry, cut it off from its base of operations and supplies by the Nashville pike.
As has been shown, the Union and Confederate lines were much nearer together on the Union right than on the left. In point of fact the distance to be marched by Van Cleve to strike Breckinridge on Bragg’s right, crossing Stone’s Eiver by the lower ford, was a mile and a half. To carry out the order of General Bragg to charge upon Bosecrans's right, the Confederate left wing, doubled, with MeCown in the first line and Cleburne in support, had only to follow at double-quick the advance of the skirmish line a few hundred paces, to find themselves in close conflict with McCook.
The Confederate movement began at daybreak. General Hardee moved his two divisions with the precision that characterized that able commander. MeCown, deflecting to the west, as he advanced to the attack, left an opening between his right and Withers’s left, into which Cleburne’s division fell, and together the two divisions charged upon E. W. Johnson and Davis, while yet the men of those divisions were preparing breakfast. There was no surprise. The first movement in their front was observed by the Union skirmish line, but that first movement was a rush as of a tornado. The skirmishers fell back steadily, fighting, upon the main line, but the main line was overborne by the fury
intended to dislodge Breckinridge, and to gain the high ground east of Stone’s Eiver, so that Wood’s batteries could enfilade the heavy body of troops massed in front of Negley and Palmer. The center and left, using Negley’s right as a pivot, were to swing round through Murfreesboro’ and take the force confronting McCook in rear, driving it into the country toward Salem. The successful execution of General Eosecrans’s design depended not more upon the spirit and gallantry of the assaulting column than upon the courage and obstinacy with which the position held by the right wing should be maintained. Having explained this fact to General McCook, the commanding general asked him if, with a full knowledge of the ground, he could if attacked, hold his position three hours, —again alluding to his dissatisfaction with the direction which his line had assumed, but, as before, leaving that to the corps commander, — to which McCook replied, “ I think I can.”
Swift witnesses had borne to the ears of General Bragg the movements of General Eosecrans. He had in his army about the same proportion of raw troops to veterans as General Eosecrans, and the armies were equally well armed. By a singular coincidence Bragg had formed a plan identical with that of his antagonist. If both could have been carried out simultaneously the spectacle would have been presented of two large armies turning upon an axis from left to right. Lieutenant-General Hardee was put in command of the Confederate left wing, consisting of McCown’s and Cleburne’s divisions, and received orders to attack at daylight. Hardee’s attack was to be taken up by Polk with the divisions of Cheatham and With-