FOX’S GAP. THE APPROACH TO WISE’S FIELD —WISE’S FIELD AS SEEN FROM THE PASTURE NORTH OF THE ROAD.
about sunset and desiring to know why his troops (Sturgis’s division) did not go forward to the summit, went to the skirmish lino to examine for himself. He was shot down by the enemy posted among the rocks and trees. The firing on that part of the battle-field continued until late in the evening. The house is Wise’s, at the crossing of the ridge and Old Sharpsburg roads. The Confederates here were posted behind a stone wall. The well at Wise’s house was filled with the Confederate dead.
The Old Sharpsburg or Braddoek road lies between the stone wall and the rail fence. The left distance shows the Middle-town valley and the Catoctin range, from which the Ninth Corps, temporarily commanded by General Jesse L. Reno, approached to the attack on South Mountain, September 14. The stump in the middle of the field beyond the wall is near where Reno fell. Part of the struggle was for the wooded crest on the left of the field. General Reno reached the scene
Urbana to New Market. We were then in. condition to act according to the development of the enemy’s plans, and to concentrate rapidly in any position. If Lee threatened our left flank by moving down the river road, or by crossing the Potomac at any of the fords from Coon’s Perry upward, there were enough troops on the river road to hold him in check until the rest of the army could move over to support them; if Lee took up a position behind the Seneca near Frederick the whole army could be rapidly concentrated in that direction to attack him in force ; if he moved upon Baltimore the entire army could rapidly be thrown in his rear and his retreat would be cut off; if he moved by Gettysburg or Chambersburg upon York or Carlisle we were equally in position to throw ourselves in his rear.
The first requisite was to gain accurate information as to Lee’s movements, and the second, to push the work of supply and reorganization as rapidly as possible.
General Lee and I knew each other well. In the days before the war we served together in Mexico, and we had commanded against each other in the Peninsula. I had the highest respect for his ability as a commander, and knew that he was a general not to be trifled with or carelessly afforded an opportunity of striking a fatal blow. Each of us naturally regarded his own army as the better, but each entertained the highest respect for the endurance, courage, and fighting qualities of the opposing army; and this feeling extended to the officers and men. It was perfectly natural xmder these circumstances that both of ns should exercise a certain amount of caution — I in my endeavors to ascertain Lee’s strength, positions, and intentions before I struck the fatal blow; he to abstain from any extended movements of invasion, and to hold his army well in hand until he could be satisfied as to the condition of the Army of the Potomac after its Second Bull Bun campaign, and as to the intentions of its commander. . . .
Had General Lee remained in front of Washington it would have been the part of wisdom to hold our own army quiet until its pressing wants were fully supplied, its organization was restored, and its ranks were filled with recruits — in brief, until it was prepared for a campaign. But as the enemy maintained the offensive and crossed the Upper Potomac to threaten or invade Pennsylvania, it became necessary to meet him at any cost notwithstanding the condition of the troops, to put a stop to the invasion, save Baltimore and Washington, and throw him back across the Potomac. Nothing but sheer necessity justified the advance of the Army of the Potomac to South Mountain and Antietam in its then condition, and it is to the eternal honor of the brave men who composed it that under such adverse circumstances they gained those victories. The work of supply and reorganization was continued as best we might while on the march, and even after the close of the battles [September 14th-17th] so much remained to be done to place the army in condition for a campaign, that the delay which ensued was absolutely unavoidable, and the army could not have entered upon a new campaign one day earlier than it did. It must then be borne constantly in mind that the purpose of advancing from Washington was simply to meet the necessities of the moment by frustrating Lee’s invasion of the Northern States, and, when that was accomplished, to push with the utmost rapidity the work of reorganization and supply so that a new campaign might be promptly inaugurated with the army in condition to prosecute it to a successful termination without intermission.
The advance from Washington was covered by the cavalry, under General Pleasonton, which was pushed as far to the front as possible, and was soon in constant contact with the enemy’s cavalry, with whom several well-conducted and successful affairs occurred.
Partly in order to move men freely and rapidly,
roads: that part near the Potomac by Offutt’s Cross-roads and the mouth of the Seneca; that by Bockville to Frederick, and that by Brookville and
partly in consequence of the lack of accurate information as to the exact position and intention of Lee’s army, the troops advanced by three main
VIEW FROM TURNER’S GAP, LOOKING SOUTHEAST. From a pliotograpli taken ill 1886.
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