CONFEDERATE DEAD AT THE CROSS-ROADS BY WISE’S HOUSE AT FOX’S GAP. From a sketch made the day after the battle.
ammunition and supplies to meet the retreating troops. In a very short time I had made all the requisite preparations and was about to start to the front in person to assume command as far out as possible, when a message came to me from General Halleck informing me that it was the President’s order that I should not assume command until the troops had reached the immediate vicinity of the fortifications. I therefore waited until the afternoon, when I rode out to Upton’s Hill, the most advanced of the detached works covering the capital.
Soon after arriving there the head of Hatch’s command of infantry arrived, immediately followed by Generals Pope and McDowell escorted by a regiment, or part of a regiment, of cavalry. I obtained what information I could from General Pope and despatched the few remaining aides with me to meet the troops on the roads leading in on the left, with final orders to them, when quite a heavy distant artillery firing broke out in the direction of the Chantilly and Vienna road. Asking General Pope what that was, he replied it was probably an attack on Sumner, who commanded the rear-guard in that direction; in reply to another question he said that he thought it probably a serious affair. He and McDowell then asked if I had any objection to their proceeding to Washington. I said that they might do so, but that I was going to the firing. They then proceeded on with their escort while, with a single aide (Colonel Colburn) and three orderlies, I struck across country to intercept the column on our right by the shortest line. It was a little after dark when I reached the column.
I leave to others who were present the description of what then occurred : the frantic cheers of welcome that extended for miles along the column ; the breaking of ranks and the wild appeals of the men that I should then and there take them back on the line of retreat and let them snatch victory out of defeat. Let it suffice to say that before the day broke the troops were all in position to repulse attack, and that Washington was safe.
On the 3d it was clear that the enemy intended an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania by crossing the Upper Potomac; I therefore moved the Second, Ninth, and Twelfth Corps to the Maryland side of the Potomac in position to meet any attack upon the city on that side.
As soon as this was done I reported the fact to
so that on the 30th of August, in reply to a telegram from him, I telegraphed General Halleck from Alexandria, “I have no sharp-shooters except the guard around my camp. I have sent off every man but those, and will now send them with the train as you direct. I will also send my only remaining squadron of cavalry with General Sumner. I can do no more. You now have every man of the Army of the Potomac who is within my reach.” I had already sent■ off even my headquarters wagons — so far as landed —with ammunition to the front. . . .
On the 1st of September I met General Halleck at his office in Washington, who by verbal order directed me to take charge of Washington and its defenses, but expressly prohibited me from exercising any control over the active troops under General Pope.
At this interview I informed General Halleck that from information received through one of my aides I was satisfied that affairs were not progressing favorably at the front, and urged him to go out in person to ascertain the exact state of the case. He declined doing this, but finally sent Colonel Kelton, his adjutant-general.
Next morning while at breakfast at an early hour I received a call from the President, accompanied by General Halleck.
The President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned and represented the condition of affairs as much worse than I had stated to Halleck on the previous day; that there were thirty thousand stragglers on the roads; that the army was entirely defeated and falling back to Washington in confusion. He then said that he regarded Washington as lost, and asked me if I would, under the circumstances, consent to accept command of all the forces. Without one moment’s hesitation and without making any conditions whatever, I at once said that I would accept the command and would stake my life that I would save the city. Both the President and Plalleek again asserted that it was impossible to save the city, and I repeated my firm conviction that I eould and would save it. They then left, the President verbally placing me in entire command of the city and of the troops falling back upon it from the front.
I at once sent for my staff-officers and despatched them on various duties; some to the front with orders for the disposition of such corps as they met, others to see to the prompt forwarding of
GENERAL MCCLELLAN AND PRESIDENT LINCOLN AT ANTIETAM.
said to liim that I thought a few experiments with those who acted before they were ready would probably convince him that in the end I consumed less time than they did.”
After the President’s return to Washington, October 5th, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan under date of October 6tli: “ The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south,” etc.
On October 7th McClellan, in “General Orders No. 163,”referred to the Proclamation of Emancipation. He warned the army of the danger to military discipline of heated political discussions, and reminded them that the “ remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls.” On October 5th General McClellan had said, in a letter to his wife [see “McClellan’s Own Story,” page 655], “Mr. Aspinwall [W. H., of New York] is decidedly of the opinion that it is my duty to submit to the President’s proclamation and quietly continue doing mydutj־׳ as a soldier. I presume he is right, and am at least sure that he is honest in his opinion. I shall surely give his views full consideration.”
As the different divisions of the Army of the Potomac reached Aquia Creek and the vicinity of Washington they were removed from my command, even to my personal escort and camp guard,
Note.—The Proclamation of Emancipation was published September 22d, three days after the withdrawal of Lee to Virginia, and was communicated to the army officially on September 24th.
On October 1st President Lincoln visited the army to see for himself if it was in no condition to pursue Lee into Virginia. General McClellan says in his general report: “His Excellency the President honored the Army of the Potomac with a visit, and remained several days, during which he went through the different encampments,reviewed the troops, and went over the battle-fields of South Mountain and Antie-tam. I had the opportunity during this visit to describe to him the operations of the army since the time it left Washington, and gave him my reasons for not following the enemy after he crossed the Potomac.” In “ McClellan’s Own Story” he says that the President “more than once assured me that he was fully satisfied with my whole course from the beginning; that the only fault he could possibly find was that I was too prone to be sure that everything was ready before acting, but that my actions were all right when I started. I
ing, that I was to command all the troops in front of Washington, including those of Generals Burnside and Pope — a promise that was not carried into effect.
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