GENERAL MCCLELLAN RIDING THE LINE OF BATTLE AT ANTIETAM.
General McClellan rode liis black liorse, “ Daniel Webster,” which, on account, of the difficulty of keeping pace witli him, was better known to the staff as “ that devil Dan.”
GENERAL VIEW OF THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM.
column of smoke is from the burning house and barn of S. Mumma, who gave the ground on which the Dunker Church stands, and after whom, in the Confederate reports, the church is frequently called 11 St. Mumma’s.” On the right is the East Wood, the scene of the conflict between Mansfield and J acltson.
This sketch was made on the hill behind McClellan’s headquarters, which is seen in the hollow on the left. Sumner’s corps is seen in line of battle in the middle ground, and Franklin’s is advancing in column to his support. The smoke in the left background is from a bursting Confederate caisson. The
Government. Had the Army of the Potomac been permitted to remain on the line of the James, I would have crossed to the south bank of that river, and while engaging Lee’s attention in front of Malvern, would have made a rapid movement in force on Petersburg, having gained which, I would have operated against Richmond and its communications from the west, having already gained those from the south.
Subsequent events proved that Lee did not move northward from Richmond with his army until assured that the Army of the Potomac was actually on its way to Port Monroe ; and they also proved that so long as the Army of the Potomac was on the James, Washington and Maryland would have been entirely safe under the protection of the fortifications and a comparatively small part of the troops then in that vicinity; so that Burnside’s troops and a large part of the Union Army of Virginia might, with entire propriety, have been sent by water to join the army under my command, which — with detachments from the West — could easily have been brought up to more than 100,000 men disposable on the actual field of battle.
In spite of my most pressing and oft-repeated entreaties, the order was insisted upon for the abandonment of the Peninsula line and the return of the Army of the Potomac to Washington in order to support General Pope, who was in no danger so long as the Army of the Potomac remained on the James. With a heavy heart I relinquished the position gained at the cost of so much time and blood.
As an evidence of my good faith in opposing this movement it should be mentioned that General Halleck had assured me, verbally and in writ-
Monroe having slightly more than made good the losses in battle and by disease. But among these 89,000 for duty on the 10th of July were included all the extra duty men employed as teamsters, and in the various administrative services, and, with the further deductions necessary for camp guards, guards of communications, depots and trains, flank detachments, etc., reduced the numbers actually available for offensive battle to not more than [60,000].
A few days sufficed to give the men the necessary rest, and to renew the supplies exhausted on the march across the Peninsula; the army was once more in condition to undertake any operation justified by its numbers, and was in an excellent position to advance by either bank of the James. [End of finished draft.]
It was at last upon its true line of operations, which I had been unable to adopt at an earlier day in consequence of the Secretary of War’s peremptory order of the 18th of May, requiring the right wing to be extended to the north of Richmond in order to establish communication with General McDowell. General McDowell was then under orders to advance from Fredericksburg, but never came, because, in spite of his earnest protest, these orders were countermanded from Washington, and he was sent upon a fruitless expedition toward the Shenandoah instead of being permitted to join me, as he could have done, at the time of the affair of Hanover Goui’t House.
I urged in vain that the Army of the Potomac should remain on the line of the James, and that it should resume the offensive as soon as reinforced to the full extent of the means in possession of the
which it had striven with such transcendent heroism. Exhausted, depleted in numbers, bleeding at every pore, but still proud and defiant, and strong in the consciousness of a great feat of arms heroically accomplished, it stood ready to renew the struggle with undiminished ardor whenever its commander should give the word. It was one of those magnificent episodes which dignify a nation’s history, and are fit subjects for the grandest efforts of the poet and the painter.
At the close of such a series of battles and marches the returns of the killed, wounded, and missing by no means fully measure the temporary decrease of strength ; there were also many thousands unfitted for duty for some days by illness, demoralization, and fatigue. The first thing to be done was to issue supplies from the vessels already sent to the James, and to allow the men some little time to rest and recover their strength after the great fatigue and nervous tension they had undergone.
In order to permit a small number to watch over the safety of the whole army, and at the same time to prepare the way for ulterior operations, so that when the army advanced again upon Richmond by either bank of the James its base of supplies might be secure with a small guard, the position was rapidly intrenched, the work being completed about the 10th of July.
Prior to thelOth of July two brigades of Shields’s division, numbering about 5300 men, had joined the army, bringing its numbers for duty up to 89,549, officers and men, about the same strength as that with which it entered upon the siege of Yorktown, the reinforcements received in the shape of the divisions of Franklin and McCall, the brigades of Shields, and a few regiments from Fort
FROM THE PENINSULA TO ANTIETAM — THE UNION SIDE.
POSTHUMOUS NOTES BY GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. Commander of tlie Army of the Potomac at Antietam.
IT is not proposed to give in this article a detailed account of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, but simply a sketch of the general operations of the Maryland campaign of 1862 intended for general readers, especially for those whose memory does not extend back to those exciting days, and whose kn owledge is derived from the meager accounts in so-called histories, too often intended to mislead and pander to party prejudices rather than to seek and record the truth.
A great battle can never be regarded as a “ solitaire,” a jewel to be admired or condemned for itself alone, and without reference to surrounding objects and circumstances. A battle is always one link in a long chain of events; the culmination of one series of manosuvers, and the starting-point of another series — therefore it can never be fully understood without reference to preceding and subsequent events.
Restricted as this narrative is intended to be, it is nevertheless necessary to preface it by a brief story of the antecedent circumstances.
In an article already published, I have narrated the events of the Peninsular campaign up to the time when, at the close of the Seven Days’ battles, the Army of the Potomac was firmly established on its proper line of operations, the James River.
So long as life lasts the survivors of those glorious days will remember with quickened pulse the attitude of that army when it reached the goal for