IN THE WAKE OP BATTLE.
RALLYING BEHIND THE TURNPIKE FENCE AT ANTIETAM.
opposite. Simultaneously Walker appeared upon Loudoun Heights, south of the Potomac and east of the Shenandoah, thus completing the combination against the Federal garrison. The surrender of the Ferry, and the twelve thousand Federal troops there, was a matter of only a short time.
If the Confederates had been able to stop with that, they might have been well contented with their month’s campaign. They had had a series of successes and no defeats; but the division of the army to make this attack on Harper’s Ferry was a fatal error, as the subsequent events showed.
While a part of the army had gone toward Harper’s Ferry I had moved up to Hagerstown. In the mean time Pope had been relieved and McClellan was in command of the army, and with ninety thousand refreshed troops was marching forth to avenge the Second Manassas. The situation was a very serious one for us. McClellan was close upon us. As we moved out of Frederick he came on and occupied that place, and there he came across a lost copy of the order assigning position to the several commands in the Harper’s Ferry move.
This “Lost Order” has been the subject of much severe comment by Virginians who have written of the war. It was addressed to D. H. Hill, and they charged that its loss was due to him, and that the failure of the campaign was the result of the lost order. As General Hill has proved that he never received the order at his headquarters it must have been lost by some one else. . . .
McClellan, after finding the order, moved with more confidence on toward South Mountain, where D. H. Hill was stationed as a Confederate rearguard with five thousand men under his command. As I have stated, my command was at Hagerstown, thirteen miles farther on. General Lee was with me, and on the night of the 13th we received information that McClellan was at the foot of South Mountain with his great army. General Lee ordered me to march back to the mountain early the next morning.
We marched as hurriedly as we could over a hot and dusty road, and reached the mountain about 3
hours, of any movement we might make. The Federal army, though beaten at the Second Manassas, was not disorganized, and it would certainly come out to look for us, and we should guard against being caught in such a condition. Our army consisted of a superior quality of soldiers, but it was in no condition to divide in the enemy’s country. I urged that we should keep it well in hand, recruit our strength, and get up supplies, and then we could do anything we pleased. General Lee made no reply to this, and I supposed the Harper’s Ferry scheme was abandoned. A day or two after we had reached Frederick City, I went up to General Lee’s tent and found the front walls closed. I inquired for the general, and he, recognizing my voice, asked me to come in. I went in, and found Jackson there. The two were discussing the move against Harper’s Ferry, both heartily approving it. They had gone so far that it seemed useless for me to offer any further opposition, and I only suggested that Lee should use his entire army in the move instead of sending off a large portion of it to Hagerstown as he intended to do. General Lee so far changed the wording of his order as to require me to halt at Boonsboro’ with General D. H. Hill; Jackson being ordered to Harper’s Ferry via Bolivar Heights, on the south side; McLaws by the Maryland Heights on the north, and Walker, via Loudoun Heights, from the southeast. This was afterward changed, and I was sent on to Hagerstown, leaving D. H. Hill alone at South Mountain.
The movement against Harper’s Ferry began on the 10th. Jackson made a wide, sweeping march around the Ferry, passing the Potomac at Williamsport, and moving from there on toward Mar-tinsburg, and turning thence upon Harper’s Ferry to make his attack by Bolivar Heights. McLaws made a hurried march to reach Maryland Heights before Jackson could get in position, and succeeded in doing so. With Maryland Heights in our possession the Federals could not hold their position there. McLaws put 200 or 300 men to each piece of his artillery and carried it up the heights, and was in position when Jackson came on the heights
LEE’S INVASION OF MARYLAND AND THE BATTLE
OF ANTIETAM.
N ARE AT I YE OF EVENTS.
Campaign ”) reached General McClellan’s hands late on the 13th of September. The Army of the Potomac was at that time approaching South Mountain from the direction of Washington. The Twelfth Corps halted at Frederick on the afternoon of the 13th, while the Ninth Corps passed on to Middletown. During the night, Pleasonton’s cavalry reconnoitered the passes of South Mountain. On the 14th the Ninth Corps, supported by the First, drove D. H. Hill’s Confederate division from Turner’s and Fox’s Gaps, and at the same time the Sixth Corps, constituting the left wing of McClellan’s army, carried Crampton’s Gap. Both passes had been occupied by Longstreet’s troops, who in the main held their positions against vigorous assault until night covered their retreat. Union loss, 2,000 men.
The next day the First, Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Twelfth Corps crossed over South Mountain at Turner’s and Fox’s Gaps and marched in pursuit of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, who retired to the west bank of Antietam Creek, there to await the return of Stonewall Jackson’s forces from the Virginia side of the Potomac. The Sixth Corps, passing through Crampton’s Gap, halted at the western base of the mountain, in order to guard the main flank of the Union army from an attack on the south by the Confederates around Harper’s Ferry. On the 17th it marched to the Antietam battle-field.
Immediately after the collision of the armies of Lee and Pope at Chantilly, Va., Sept. 1, 1862, Lee set his columns in motion to invade the North. At that time the forces under Pope, and those previously commanded by McClellan, were encamped around Alexandria, Va. McClellan had been assigned to the command of the defenses of Washington. On September 3 he moved three corps to the Maryland side of the Potomac to guard Washington from an attack on the Northwest. Lee’s advance reached Frederick, Md., September 5, and on the 8th a proclamation to the people of Maryland was issued by the Confederate leader. By the 7th the remainder of the Union army assigned to active service against Lee had crossed into Maryland, and on the 9th began the march to meet the enemy. That day Lee issued the famous “ Special Orders No. 191,” dividing his forces with a view to invading Pennsylvania. Jackson was to recross into Virginia and capture the fortified posts of Harper’s Ferry and Martinsburg, while Long-street, passing over South Mountain, was to take a position in Western Maryland and guard that region against attack on the north and east. These movements were to be followed by a reunion of Lee’s forces in Maryland and the prosecution of the march northward.
The “Lost Order” of General Lee (No. 191, as above; see General Longstreet’s account of “Beginning the
BEGINNING THE CAMPAIGN - FROM THE CONFEDERATE SIDE.
BY JAMES LONGSTREET, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A.
Commanding a wing of Lee’s army in Maryland.
the year so long as the fields were loaded with “roasting ears.” Finally he determined to go on, and accordingly crossed the river and went to Frederick City. On the 6th of September some of our cavalry, moving toward Harper’s Ferry, became engaged with some of the Federal artillery near there. General Lee proposed that I should organize a force, and surround the garrison and capture it. I objected, and urged that our troops were worn with marching and were on short rations, and that it would be a bad idea to divide our forces while we were in the enemy’s country, where he eould get information, in six or eight
WHEN the Second Bull Bun campaign closed we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack. With such a splendid victory behind us, and such bright prospects ahead, the question arose as to whether or not we should go into Maryland. General Lee, on account of our short supplies, hesitated a little, but I reminded him of my experience in Mexico, where sometimes we were obliged to live two or three days on green corn. I told him we could not starve at that season of
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