MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. E. STUART, C. S. A.
with their artillery upon the first intimation of attack, hut their force was too small; their cannon were taken at the point of the bayonet, and without the loss of a man killed, and with but fifteen
his offer was readily accepted; but “to increase the prospect of success,” Stuart, with a portion of his cavalry, was ordered to cooperate with him. The enemy were not taken by surprise, and opened
Naturally our destination was supposed to be Waterloo Bridge, there to force the passage of the river; but the road leading to Waterloo ■was passed, and the northward march continued. The Rappahannock (locally the Hedgeman) is here confined in narrow limits by bold hills and rocky cliffs, and some miles above the bridge there is a road through these crossing the river at Hinson’s Mills. The picturesque surroundings of the ford at this place and the eool bath into which the men plunged were not the less enjoyed because of the unexpected absence of opposition by the enemy; and after the inevitable delay which accompanies any crossing of a water-course by an army, Jackson’s corps stood on the same side of the river with the entire Federal army.
After crossing, Colonel Thomas T. Munford’s 2d Virginia Cavalry picketed the roads leading in the direction of the enemy, whose whole force, now confronting Longstreet alone, was massed within lines drawn from Warrenton and Waterloo on the north to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad (now called the Midland) on the south. But Jackson’s course was not directed toward the enemy. We were marching toward the lower Valley of Virginia, with our destination shrouded in mystery.
From the crossing at Hinson’s Mills, Jackson’s course still took the same direction — through the little village of Orlean, along the base of a small mountain which crops up in Fauquier County, and on to the little town of Salem, where his “foot cavalry,” after a march of over twenty-six miles on a midsummer’s day, rested for the night. At dawn on the 26th the route was resumed—this day at right angles with the direction of that of the preceding, and now, with faces set to the sunrise, the troops advanced toward the Bull Run Mountains, which loomed up across the pathway. . . .
At Gainesville, on the Warrenton and Alexandria turnpike, we were overtaken by Stuart, who, with Fitz Lee’s and Robertson’s brigades, had crossed the Rappahannoekthat morning and pursued nearly the same route with Jackson; and our subsequent movements were greatly aided and influenced by the admirable manner in which the cavalry was employed and managed by Stuart and his accomplished officers. . . .
Wearied as they were, with a march of over. thirty miles, Jackson determined, nevertheless, to tax still further the powers of endurance of his men. At Manassas Junction was established a vast depot of quartermaster’s, commissary, and ordnance stores; and it was also a “city of refuge ” for many runaway negroes of all ages and of both sexes. The extent of the defenses, and of the force detailed for its protection, could not be known; but as it was far in the rear of the Federal army, not very distant from Alexandria, and directly on the line of communication and reinforcement, it was not probable that any large force had been detached for its protection. General Stonewall Jackson’s habit in the valley had been to make enforced requisitions upon the Federal commissaries for his subsistence supplies; and the t empting opportunity of continuing this policy and rationing his hungry command, as well as inflicting almost irreparable loss upon the enemy, was not to be neglected. General Trimble volunteered to execute the enterprise with five hundred men, and
ROUTE STEP.
JACKSON’S RAID AROUND POPE.
BY W. B. TALIAFERRO, MAJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A. Commander of Stonewall Jackson’s own Division.
ON the morning of the 25th of August, 1862, Stonewall Jackson, with Ewell’s and A. P. Hill’s divisions, and his own old division under my command, marched northward from Jeffer-sonton, Virginia, to cut Pope’s communications and destroy his supplies. Quartermasters and commissaries, with their forage and subsistence stores, were left behind, their white tilted wagons parked conspicuously. The impedimenta which usually embarrass and delay a marching column had been reduced to a few ambulances and a limited ordnance train; three days’ meager rations had been cooked and stowed away in haversacks and pockets; and tin cans and an occasional frying-pan constituted the entire camp-equipage. The men had rested and dried off, and as they marched out they exulted with the inspiration of the balmy summer atmosphere, and the refreshing breezes which swept down from the Blue Mountains.
No man save one in that corps, whatever may have been his rank, knew our destination. The men said of Jackson that his piety expressed itself in obeying the injunction, “Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth.” No intelligence of intended Confederate movements ever reached the enemy by any slip of his. The orders to his division chiefs were like this : “March to a crossroad; a staff-officer there will inform you which fork to take; and so to the next fork, where you will find a courier with a sealed direction pointing out the road.”
This extreme reticence was very uncomfortable and annoying to his subordinate commanders, and was sometimes carried too far; but it was the real secret of the reputation for ubiquity which he acquired, and which was so well expressed by General McClellan in one of his despatches: “I am afraid of Jackson; he will turn up where least expected.”
9*