THE RETREAT OYER THE STONE BRIDGE, SATURDAY EVENING, AUGUST 30TH.
Junction, I sent orders to General Sigel, in tlie vicinity of Groveton, to attack the enemy vigorously at daylight and bring him to a stand if possible.
He was to be supported by Reynolds’s division. I instructed Heintzelman to push forward fromCen-treville toward Gainesville on the Warrenton pike at the earliest dawn with the divisions of Kearny and Hooker, and gave orders also to Reno with his corps to follow closely in their rear.
They were directed to use all speed, and as soon as they came up with the enemy to establish communication with Sigel, and to attack vigorously and promptly. I also sent orders to General Porter at Manassas Junction to move forward rapidly with his own corps and King’s division, of McDowell’s corps, which was there also, upon Gainesville by the direct route from Manassas Junction to that place. I urged him to make all possible speed, with the purpose that he should come up with the enemy or connect himself with the left of our line near where the Warrenton pike is crossed by the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville.
Shortly after sending this order I received a note from General McDowell, whom I had not been able to find during the night of the 28th, dated Manassas Junction, requesting that King’s division be not taken from his command. I immediately sent a joint order, addressed to Generals McDowell and Porter, repeating the instructions to move forward with their commands toward Gainesville, and informing them of the position and movements of Sigel and Heintzelman.
Sigel attacked the enemy at daylight on the morning of the 29th about a mile east of Groveton, where he was joined by the divisions of Hooker and Kearny. Jackson fell back, but was so closely pressed by these forces that he was obliged to make a stand. He accordingly took up his position along and behind the old railroad embankment extending along his entire front, with his left near Sudley Springs and his right just south of the Warrenton pike. His batteries, some of them of heavy caliber, were posted behind the ridges in the open ground, while the mass of his troops were sheltered by woods and the railroad embankment.
generally the condition of things on the field in front of me. At 5:30 o’clock, when General Porter should have been going into action in compliance with this order, I directed Heintzelman and Reno to attack the enemy’s left. The attack was made promptly and with vigor and persistence, and the left of the enemy was doubled back toward his center. After a severe and bloody action of an hour Kearny forced the position on the left of the enemy and occupied the field of battle there.
By this time General McDowell had arrived on the field, and I pushed his corps, supported by Reynolds, forward at once into action along the Warrenton pike toward the enemy’s right, then said to be falling back. This attack along the pike was made by King’s division near sunset; but, as Porter made no movement whatever toward the field, Longstreet, who was pushing to the front, was able to extend his lines beyond King’s left with impunity, and King’s attack did not accomplish what was expected, in view of the anticipated attack which Porter was ordered to make, and should have been making at the same time.
From 5 o’clock in the day until some time after dark the fighting all along our lines was severe and bloody, and our losses were very heavy. . . .
When the battle ceased on the 29th of August, we were in possession of the field on our right, and occupied on our left the position held early in the day, and had every right to claim a decided success. What that success might have been, if a corps of twelve thousand men who had not been in battle that day had been thrown against Long-street’s right while engaged in the severe fight that afternoon, I need not indicate. To say that General Porter’s non-action during that whole day was wholly unexpected and disappointing, and that it provoked severe comment on all hands, is to state the facts mildly. *
* Porter was courtmartialed and cashiered. In 1878 a board of officers retried tlie case, and an entirely new light was thrown upon the circumstances. It was shown that Porter’s action “saved the Union army from disaster on the 29th of August.” Eventually, by act of Congress, Porter once more received a commission in the army of the United States, and on August 7, 1886, was placed on the retired list.
and gave the same information to Heintzelman and Reno. . . .
The troops were permitted to rest for a time, and to resupply themselves with ammunition. From 1:30 to 4 o’clock p. M. very severe conflicts occurred repeatedly all along the line, and there was a continuous roar of artillery and small-arms, with scarcely an intermission. About two o’clock in the afternoon three discharges of artillery were heard on the extreme left of our line or right of the enemy’s, and I for the moment, and naturally, believed that Porter and McDowell had reached their positions and were engaged with the enemy. I heard only three shots, and as nothing followed I was at a loss to know what had become of these corps, or what was delaying them, as before this hour they should have been, even with ordinary marching, well up on our left. Shortly afterward I received information that McDowell’s corps was advancing to join the left of our line by the Sudley Springs road, and would probably be up within two hours [that is, about 4 p. M.] At 4:30 o’clock I sent a peremptory order to General Porter, who was at or near Dawkins’s Branch, about four or five miles distant from my headquarters, to push forward at once into action on the enemy’s right, and if possible on his rear, stating to him
I arrived on the field from Centreville about noon, and found the opposing forces confronting each other, both considerably cut up by the severe action in which they had been engaged since daylight. Heintzelman’s corps (the divisions of Hooker and Kearny) occupied the right of our line toward Sudley Springs. Sigel was on his left, with his line extending a short distance south of the Warrenton pike, the division of Sclienck occupying the high ground to the left (south) of the pike. The extreme left was held by Reynolds. Reno’s corps had reached the field and the most of it had been pushed forward into action, leaving four regiments in reserve behind the center of the line of battle. Immediately after I reached the ground, General Sigel reported to me that his line was weak, that the divisions of Schurz and Stein-wehr were much cut up and ought to be drawn back from the front. I informed him that this was impossible, as there were no troops to replace them, and that he must hold his ground; that I would not immediately push his troops again into action, as the corps of McDowell and Porter were moving forward on the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville, and must very soon be in position to fall upon the enemy’s right flank and possibly on his rear. I rode along the front of our line