THE “DEEP CUT.!
From a sketch made in 1884.
would include the Union monument seen in the picture below.
STONES NEAR THE “DEEP CUT.”
The ridge which bounded the valley of Dawkins’s Branch on the west, and on which were the Hampton Cole and Monroe houses, offered from the Monroe house a full view of the field of battle from right to left, and the Monroe house being on the crest of the ridge overlooked and completely commanded the approach to Jackson’s right by the Warrenton turnpike. To the result of the battle this ridge was of the last importance, and, if seized and held by noon, would absolutely have prevented any reinforcement of Jackson’s right from the direction of Gainesville. The northern slope of this ridge was held by our troops near the Douglass house, near which, also, the right of Jackson’s line rested. The advance of Porter’s corps at Dawkins’s Branch was less than a mile and a half from the Monroe house, and the road in his front was one of several which converged on that point.
The whole field was free from obstacles to movement of troops and nearly so to maneuvers, with only a few eminences, and these of a nature to have been seized and easily held by our troops even against very superior numbers. The ground was gently undulating and the water-courses insignificant, while the intersecting system of roads and lanes afforded easy communication with all parts of the field. It would be difficult to find anywhere in Virginia a more perfect field of battle than that on which the second battle of Bull Bun was fought.
About daylight, therefore, on the 29th of August, almost immediately after I received information of the withdrawal of King’s division toward Manassas
STARKE’S BRIGADE FIGHTING WITH
nolds, and an immediate change was necessary in the disposition of the troops under my command. Sigel and Beynolds were near Groveton, almost in contact with Jackson; Bicketts had fallen back toward Bristoe from Thoroughfare Gap, after offering (as might have been expected) ineffectual resistance to the passage of the Bull Bun range by very superior forces ; King had fallen back to Manassas Junction; Porter was at Manassas Junction or near there; Beno and Hooker near Centreville; Kearny at Centreville and beyond toward Grove-ton ; Jackson near Groveton with his whole corps; Lee with the main army of the enemy, except three brigades of Longstreet which had passed Hopewell Gap, north of Thoroughfare Gap.
The field of battle was practically limited to the
space between the old railroad grade from Sudley to Gainesville if prolonged across the Warrenton pike and the Sudley Springs road east of it. The railroad grade indicates almost exactly the line occupied by Jackson’s force, our own line confronting it from left to right.
uation for us was certainly as favorable as the most sanguine person could desire, and the prospect of crushing Jackson, sandwiched between such forces, were certainly excellent. There is no doubt, had General McDowell been with his command when King’s division of his corps became engaged with the enemy, he would have brought forward to its support both Sigel and Beynolds, and the result would have been to hold the ground west of Jackson at least until morning brought against him also the forces moving from the direction of Centreville.
To my great disappointment and surprise, however, I learned toward daylight the next morning (the 29t,h) that King’s division had fallen back toward Manassas Junction, and that neither Sigel nor Beynoldshadbeen engaged or had gone to the support of King. The route toward Thoroughfare Gap had thus been left open by the wholly unexpected retreat of King’s division, due to the fact that he was not supported by Sigel and Bey-
If this picture were extended a little to the left it
the east of him, and with the advance of Kearny nearly in contact with him on the Warrenton pike, were the corps of Beno and Heintzelman. Porter was supposed to be at Manassas Junction, where he ought to have been on that afternoon.
I sent orders to McDowell (supposing him to be with his command), and also direct to General King, several times during that night and once by his own staff-officer, to hold his ground at all hazards, to prevent the retreat of Jackson toward Lee, and that at daylight our whole force from Centreville and Manassas would assail him from the east, and he would be crushed between us. I sent orders also to General Kearny at Centreville to move forward cautiously that night along the Warrenton pike; to drive in the pickets of the enemy, and to keep as closely as possible in contact with him during the night, resting his left on the Warrenton pike and throwing his right to the north, if practicable, as far as the Little Biver pike, and at daylight next morning to assault vigorously with his right advance, and that Hooker and Beno would certainly be with him shortly after daylight. I sent orders to General Porter, who I supposed was at Manassas Junction, to move upon Centreville at dawn, stating to him the position of our forces, and that a severe battle would be fought that morning (the 29th).
With Jackson at and near Groveton, with McDowell on the west, and the rest of the army on the east of him, while Lee, with the mass of his army, was still west of Thoroughfare Gap, the sit-
THE UNION MONUMENT NEAK TIIE “DEEP CUT.’ From a sketch made in 1884.