MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT C. SCHENCK, U. S. V.
BREVET MAJOR-GEN. JOHN W. GEARY, U. S. V.
GENERAL JOHN POPE, U. S. A. photograph taken early in the war.
also wrote McDowell the situation and directed him to call back to Gainesville any part of his force which had moved in the direction of Manassas Junction, and march upon Centreville along the Warrenton pike with the whole force under his command to intercept the retreat of Jackson toward Thoroughfare Gap. With King’s division in advance, McDowell, marching toward Centreville, encountered late in the afternoon the advance of Jackson’s corps retreating toward Thoroughfare Gap. Late in the afternoon, also, Kearny drove the rear-guard of Jackson out of Centreville and occupied that place with his advance beyond it toward Gainesville. A very severe engagement occurred between King’s division and Jackson’s forces near the village of Groveton on the Warren-ton pike, which was terminated by the darkness, both parties maintaining their ground. . . .
The engagement of King’s division was reported to me about 10 o’clock at night near Centreville. I felt sure then, and so stated, that there was no escape for Jackson. On the west of him were McDowell’s corps, Sigel’s corps, and Reynolds’s division, all under command of McDowell. On
MAJOR From a
the main body of Lee’s army. It was possible, however, to mass his whole force at Manassas Junction and assail our right (Hooker’s division), which had fought a severe battle that afternoon, and was almost out of ammunition. Jackson, with A.
P. Hill’s division, retired through Centreville. Thinking it al- ■ together within the probabilities that he might adopt the other
alternative, I sent the orders above mentioned to General Porter. . . .
At 9 o’clock on the night of the 27th, satisfied of Jackson’s position, I sent orders to General McDowell at Gainesville to push forward at the earliest dawn of day upon Manassas Junction, resting his right on the Manassas Gap Railroad and extending his left to the east. I directed General Reno at the same time to march from Greenwich, also direct on Manassas Junction, and Kearny to move from the same place upon Bristoe Station. This move of Kearny was to strengthen my right at Bristoe and unite the two divisions of Heintzel-man’s corps.
Jackson began to evacuate Manassas Junction during the night (the 27th) and marched toward Centreville and other points of the Warrenton pike west of that place, and by 11 o’clock next morning was at and beyond Centreville and north of the Warrenton pike. I arrived at Manassas Junction shortly after the last of Jackson’s force had moved off, and immediately pushed forward Hooker, Kearny, and Reno upon Centreville, and sent orders to Porter to come forward to Manassas Junction. I
The railroad had been torn up and the bridges burned in several places just west of Bristoe Station. I therefore directed General Banks, who had reached Warrenton Junction, to cover the railroad trains at that place until General Porter marched, and then to run back the trains toward Manassas as far as he could and rebuild the railroad bridges. Captain Merrill of the Engineers was also directed to repair the railroad track and bridges toward Bristoe. This work was done by that accomplished officer as far east as Kettle Run on the 27th, and the trains were run back to that point next morning.
At dark on the 27th Hooker informed me that his ammunition was nearly exhausted, only five rounds to the man being on hand. Before this time it had become apparent that Jackson, with his whole force, was south of the Warrenton pike and in the immediate neighborhood of Manassas Junction.
McDowell reached his position at Gainesville during the night of the 27th, and Kearny and Reno theirs at Greenwich. It was clear on that night that we had completely interposed between Jack-son and the enemy’s main body, which was still west of the Bull Run range, and in the vicinity of White Plains.
In consequence of Hooker’s report, and the weakness of the small division which he commanded, and to strengthen my right wing moving in the direction of Manassas, I sent orders to Porter at dark, which reached him at 9 p. m., to move forward from Warrenton Junction at 1 A. M. night, and to report to me at Bristoe Station by daylight next morning (August 28th).
There were but two courses left to Jackson by this sudden movement of the army. He could not retrace his steps through Gainesville, as that place was occupied by McDowell with a force equal if not superior to his own. To retreat through Centreville would carry him still farther away from
In the mean time heavy forces of the enemy still confronted us at Waterloo Bridge, while his main body continued its march toward our right, following the course of Hedgman’s River (the Upper Rappahannock). I accordingly sent orders, early on the 27th of August, to General McDowell to move rapidly on Gainesville by the Warrenton pike with his own corps, reinforced by Reynolds’s division and Sigel’s corps. I directed Reno, followed by Kearny’s division of Heintzelman’s corps, to move on Greenwich, so as to reach there that night, to report thence at once to General McDowell, and to support him in operations against the enemy which were expected near Gainesville. With Hooker’s division of Heintzelman’s corps I moved along the railroad toward Manassas Junction, to reopen our communications and to be in position to cooperate with the forces along the Warrenton pike.
On the afternoon of that day a severe engagement took place between Hooker’s division and Ewell’s division of Jackson’s corps, near Bristoe Station, on the railroad. Ewell was driven back along the railroad, but at dark still confronted Hooker along the banks of Broad Run. The loss in this action was about three hundred killed and wounded on each side. Ewell left his dead, many of his wounded, and some of his baggage on the field.
I had not seen Hooker for many years, and I remembered him as a very handsome young man, with florid complexion and fair hair, and with a figure agile and graceful. As I saw him that afternoon on his white horse riding in rear of his line of battle, and close up to it, with the excitement of battle in his eyes, and that gallant and chivalric appearance which he always presented under fire, I was struck with admiration. As a corps commander, with his whole force operating under his own eye, it is much to be doubted whether Hooker had a superior in the army.
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