COLLISION ON THURSDAY, AUGUST 28TH, BETWEEN REYNOLDS’S DIVISION AND JACKSON’S RIGHT WING.
THE BATTLE OF GROVETON, AUGUST 29TH, AS SEEN FROM CENTREVILLE.
through Jackson’s lines. In a moment a heavy fire of shot and shell was being poured into the thick columns of the enemy, and in ten minutes their stubborn masses began to waver and give back. For a moment there was chaos; then order returned and they re-formed, apparently to renew the attack. Meanwhile my other eight pieces reported to me, and from the crest of the little hill the fire of twelve guns cut them down. As the cannon thundered the ranks broke, only to be formed again with dogged determination. A third time the batteries tore the Federáis to pieces, and as they fell baek under this terrible fire, I sprung everything to the charge. My troops leaped forward with exultant yells, and all along the line we pushed forward. Farther and still farther back we pressed them, until at 10 o’clock at night we had the field; Pope was across Bull Kun, and the victorious Confederates lay down on the battleground to sleep, while all around were strewn thousands—friend and foe, sleeping the last sleep together.
The next morning the Federáis were in a strong position at Centreville. I sent a brigade across Bull Bun under General Pryor, and occupied a point over there near Centreville. As our troops proceeded to bury their dead, it began to rain, as it had done on the day after the first battle of Manassas. As soon as General Lee could make his preparations, he ordered Jackson to cross Bull Bun near Sudley’s and turn the position of the Federáis occupying Centreville; and the next day, September 1st, I followed him. But the enemy discovered our turning movement, abandoned Centreville, and put out toward Washington. On the evening of September 1st Jackson encountered a part of the Federal force at Ox Hill [or Chantilly], and, attacking it, had quite a sharp engagement. I came up just before night and found his men retiring in a good deal of confusion. I asked Jackson
dently Pope supposed that I was gone, as he was ignoring me entirely. His whole army seemed to surge up against Jackson as if to crush him with an overwhelming mass. At the critical moment I happened to be riding to the front of my line to find a place where I might get in for my share of the battle. I reached a point a few rods in front of my line on the left of the pike where I could plainly see the Federals as they rushed in heavy masses against the obstinate ranks of the Confederate left. It was a grand display of well-organized attack, thoroughly concentrated and operating cleverly. So terrible was the onslaught that Jackson sent to me and begged for reinforcements. About the same time I received an order from General Lee to the same effect. To retire from my advanced position in front of the Federals and get to Jackson would have taken an hour and a half. I had discovered a prominent position that commanded a view of the great struggle, and realizing the opportunity, I quickly ordered out three batteries, making twelve guns. Lieut. Wm. H. Chapman’s Dixie Battery [Virginia] of four guns was the first to report, and was placed in position to rake the Federal ranks that seemed determined to break
MONUMENT TO THE UNION SOLDIERS WHO FELL AT GROVETON AUGUST 28, 29, AND 30, 1862.
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our forces were ordered back to their original positions. The gun which we had captured was ordered to be cut down, spiked, and left on the ground.
When Saturday, the 30th, broke, we were a little apprehensive that Pope was going to get away from us, and Pope was afraid that we were going to get away from him. He telegraphed to Washington that I was in full retreat and he was preparing to follow, while we, thinking he was trying to escape, were making arrangements for moving by our left across Bull Bun, so as to get over on the Little Biver pike and move down parallel to his lines and try to interpose between him and Washington. We had about completed our arrangements, and took it for granted that Pope would move out that night by the Warrenton and Centreville pike, and that we could move parallel with him along the Little Biver pike. General Lee was still anxious to give Pope battle on Manassas plains, but had given up the idea of attacking him in his strong position.
Shortly before nine on the 30th, Pope’s artillery began to play a little, and not long afterward some of his infantry force was seen in motion. We did not understand that as an offer of battle, but merely as a display to cover his movements to the rear. Later a considerable force moved out and began to attack us on our left, extending and engaging the whole of Jackson’s line. Evi-
of heavy forces from the direction of Manassas Junction against my right. It proved to be McDowell and Porter. I called over three brigades, under Wilcox, and prepared to receive the attack. Battle was not offered, and I reported to General Lee some time afterward that I did not think the force on my right was strong enough to attack us. General Lee urged me to go in, and of course I was anxious to meet his wishes. At the same time I wanted, more than anything else, to know that my troops had a chance to accomplish what they might undertake. The ground before me was greatly to the advantage of the Federals, but if the attack had come from them it would have been a favorable opportunity for me. After a short while, McDowell moved toward the Federal right, leaving Porter in front of my right with nine thousand men. My estimate of his force, at the time, was ten thousand. General Lee, finding that attack was not likely, again became anxious to bring on the battle by attacking down the Gro veton pike. I suggested that, the day being far spent, it might be as well to advance just before night upon a forced reconnoissance, get our troops into the most favorable positions, and have all things ready for battle at daylight the next morning. To this he reluctantly gave consent, and our plans were laid accordingly. Wilcox returned to position on the left of the turnpike. Orders were given for an advance, to be pursued under cover of night until the main position could be carefully examined. It so happened that■ an order to advance was issued on the other side at the same time, so that the encounter was something of a surprise on both sides. A very spirited engagement was the result, we being successful, so far at least as to carry our point, capturing a piece of artillery and making our reconnoissance before midnight. As none of the reports received of the Federal positions favored attack, I so explained to General Lee, and