went into bivouac on the west side of the mountain, sending a brigade under Anderson down to occupy the pass. As the Confederates neared the gap from one side, Ricketts’s division of Federals approached from the other and took possession of the east side. . . . This sudden interposition of a force at a mountain pass indicated a purpose on the part of the adversary to hold me in check, while overwhelming forces were being brought against Jackson. This placed us in a desperate strait; for we were within relieving distance, and must adopt prompt and vigorous measures that would burst through all opposition. Three miles north was Hopewell Gap, and it was necessary to get possession of this in advance of the Federals, in order to have that vantage-ground for a flank movement, at the same time that we forced our way by footpaths over the mountain heights at Thoroughfare Gap. During the night I sent Wilcox with
VIEW FROM THE HENRY HILL DURING THE ATTACK UPON JACKSON, ABOUT FOUR O’CLOCK, AUGUST 30th.
From a sketch made at the time.
three brigades through that pass, while Hood was climbing over the mountain at Thoroughfare by a trail. We had no trouble in getting over, and our apprehensions were relieved at the early dawn of the 29th by finding that Ricketts had given up the east side of the gap and was many hours in advance of us, moving in the direction of Manassas Junction. His force, instead of marching around Jackson, could have been thrown against his right and rear. If Ricketts had made this move, and the forces in front had cooperated with him, such an attack, well handled, might have given us serious trouble before I reached the field.
As we found the pass open at early dawn, and a clean road in front, we marched leisurely to unite our forces on Manassas plains. Before reaching Gainesville we heard the artillery combat in front, and our men involuntarily quickened their steps. Our communications with Jackson were quite regular, and as he had not expressed a wish that we should hurry, our troops were allowed to take their natural swing under the inspiration of impending battle. As we approached the field the fire seemed to become more spirited, and gave additional impulse to our movements. . . .
Passing through Gainesville we filed off to the left down the turnpike, and soon came in sight of the troops held at bay by Jackson. Our line of march brought us in on the left and rear of the Federals. . . .
The two great armies were now face to face upon the memorable field of 1861; both in good defensible positions, and both anxious to find a point for an entering wedge into the stronghold of the adversary. It appeared easy for us, except for the unknown quantity at Manassas Junction, to overleap the Federal left and strike a decisive blow. This force at the Junction was a thorn in our side which could not be ignored. General Lee was quite disappointed by my report against immediate attack along the turnpike, and insisted that by throwing some of the brigades beyond the Federal left their position would be broken up, and a favorable field gained. While talking the matter over, General Stuart reported the advance
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN—VIEW FROM THE UNION LINES.
The picture shows the artillery duel and deployment of troops before the main attack toward the right, in the middle distance. (From a sketch made at the time.)
vance. This, with information Pope already had, caused him to withdraw to a very strong position behind the Rappahannock River, and there, instead of at Culpeper Court House, where the attack was first meant to be made, General Lee found him. I approached the Rappahannock at Kelly’s Ford, and Jackson approached higher up at Beverly Ford, near the Orange and. Alexandria Railroad bridge.
We reached the river on the morning of the 21st, without serious opposition, and found Pope in an almost unassailable position, with heavy reinforcements summoned to his aid. General Lee’s intention was to force a passage and make the attack before Pope could concentrate. We hoped to be able to interpose, and to strike Pope before McClellan’s reinforcements could reach him. We knew at that time that McClellan was withdrawing from Westover. . . .
Pending our movements southwest of the Rappahannock, General Stuart had been making an effort to go around Pope’s army, but, fearing to remain on the Washington side of the river in the face of such floods as had come, recrossed with some important despatches he had captured by a charge upon Pope’s headquarters train. This correspondence confirmed the information we already had, that the Federal army on the James under McClellan and the Federal troops in the Kanawha Valley under Cox had been ordered to reinforce Pope. Upon receipt of that information, General Lee was more anxious than ever to cross at once. Pope, however, was on the alert, and Lee found he could not attack him to advantage in his stronghold behind the Rappahannock. Lee therefore decided to change his whole plan, and was gratified, on looking at the map, to find a very comfortable way of turning Pope out of his position. It was by moving Jackson off to our left, and far to the rear of the Federal army, while I remained in front with thirty thousand men to engage him in case he should offer to fight.
On the 25th Jackson crossed the Rappahannock at Hinson’s Mill, four miles above Waterloo Bridge, and that night encamped at Salem. The next day
he passed through Thoroughfare Gap and moved on by Gainesville, and when sunset came he was many miles in the rear of Pope’s army, and between it and Washington. This daring move must have staggered the Federal commander. . . . On the afternoon of the 26th, Pope’s army broke away from its strong position to meet Jackson’s daring and unexpected move. General Lee decided that I should follow at once, and asked whether I would prefer to force a passage of the river, now rapidly falling, or take the route by which Jackson had gone. From the crossing along the route to War-renton were numerous strongly defensive positions where a small force could have detained me an uncertain length of time. I therefore decided to take Jackson’s route, and on the 26th I started. On the 28th, just before night, I arrived at Thoroughfare Gap. As we approached, a report was made to me that the pass was unoccupied, and we
VIEW OF JACKSON’S POSITION AS SEEN FROM GROVETON CORNERS.
The farthest ridge is the line of the unfinished railway. Jackson’s center occupied the ground in the right of the picture. There, on elevated open ground, the front of a deep cut, stands the Union monument. (From a photograph taken in 1884.)
128