James River. General McCall, with a division of ten thousand Federáis, was at the cross-roads and about Frayser’s farm. My division, being in advance, was deployed in front of the enemy. I placed such of my batteries as I could find position for, and kept Hill’s troops in my rear. As I had twice as far to march as the other commanders, I considered it certain that Jackson and Huger would be in position when I was ready. After getting my troops in position I called upon General A. P. Hill to throw one of his brigades to cover my right and to hold the rest of his troops in readiness to give pursuit when the enemy had been dislodged. My line extended from near the Quaker road across the New Market road to the Federal right. The ground upon which I approached was much lower than that occupied by General McCall, and was greatly cut up by ravines and covered with heavy timber and tangled undergrowth. On account of these obstructions we were not disturbed while getting into position, except by the firing of a few shots that did no damage. Holmes got into position below me on the New Market road, and was afterward joined by Magruder, who had previously made an unsuccessful attack on the Federal rearguard at Savage’s Station.
By 11 o’clock our troops were in position, and we waited for the signal from Jackson and Huger. Everything was quiet on my part of the line, except occasional firing between my pickets and McCall’s. I was in momentary expectation of the signal. About half-past 2 o’clock artillery firing was heard on my left, evidently at the point near White Oak Swamp where Huger was to attack. I very naturally supposed this firing to be the expected signal, and ordered some of my batteries to reply, as a signal that I was ready to cooperate. While the order to open was going around to the batteries, President Davis and General Lee, with their staff and followers, were with me in a little open field near the rear of my right. We were in pleasant conversation, anticipating fruitful results from the fight, when our batteries opened. Instantly the Federal batteries responded most spitefully. It was impossible for the enemy to see us as we sat on our horses in the little field, surrounded by tall, heavy timber and thick undergrowth; yet a battery by chance had our range and exact distance, and poured upon us a terrific
lasted until some time after night, the Confederates made no progress. The next day the fight was renewed, and the position was hotly contested by the Federáis until 7 o’clock in the morning, when the advance of Jackson speedily caused the Federáis to abandon their position, thus ending the battle.
It is easy to see that the battle of the previous day would have been a quick and bloodless Confederate victory if Jackson could have reached his position at the time appointed. In my judgment the evacuation of Beaver Dam Creek was very unwise on the part of the Federal commanders. We had attacked at Beaver Dam, and had failed to make an impression at that point, losing several thousand men and officers. This demonstrated that the position was safe.
If the Federal commanders knew of Jackson’s approach on the 26th, they had ample time to reinforce Porter’s right before Friday morning (27th) with men and field defenses, to such extent as to make the remainder of the line to the right secure against assault. So that the Federáis in withdrawing not only abandoned a strong position,but gaveupthe morale of their success, and transferred it to our somewhat disheartened forces; for, next to Malvern Hill, the sacrifice at Beaver Dam was unequaled in demoralization during the entire summer.
From Beaver Dam we followed the Federáis closely, encountering them again under Porter beyond Powhite Creek, where the battle of Gaines’s Mill occurred. General A. P. Hill, being in advance, deployed his men and opened the attack without consulting me. A very severe battle followed. I came up with my reserve forces and was preparing to support Hill, who was suffering very severely, when I received an order from General Lee to make a demonstration against the Federal left, as the battle was not progressing to suit him. I threw in three brigades opposite the Federal left and engaged them in a severe skirmish with infantry and artillery. The battle then raged with great fierceness. General Jackson was again missing, and General Lee grew fearful of the result. Soon I received another message from General Lee, saying that unless I could do something the day seemed to be lost. I then determined to make the heaviest attack I could. The position in front of me was very strong. An open field led down to a difficult
THE UNION RETREAT FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY.
From a sketcli made on the field at the time.
The scene is near McClellan’s headquarters at Dr. Trent’s (arm, before day-light on Sunday, June 29th; the Sixth Corps (Franklin’s) is falling hack; the fires are from the burning of commissary stores and forage ;the artillery in position covers the approaches from the Cliickahominy, the artillerymen resting underneath the guns. The regiment in the middle-ground is the loth New York, who wore straw hats, and were, partly in consequence, such conspicuous targets for the enemy that in the Seven Days’ fighting they lost 228 men.
the neighborhood of Charles City cross-roads, and with that end in view planned a pursuit as follows: I was to march to a point below Frayser’s farm with General A. P. Hill. General Holmes was to take up position below me on the New Market or River road, to be in readiness to cooperate with me and to attack such Federals as would come within his reach. Jackson was to pursue closely the Federal rear, crossing at the Grapevine Bridge, and coming in on the north of the cross-roads. Huger was to attend to the Federal right flank, and take position on the Charles City road west of the cross-roads. Thus we were to envelop the Federal rear and make the destruction of that part of McClellan’s army sure. Toreach myposition south of the cross-roads, I had about sixteen miles to march. I marched 14 miles on the 29th, crossing over into the Darbytown road and moving down to its intersection, with the New Market road, where I camped for the night, about 3 miles southwest of Frayser’s farm. On the morning of the 30th I moved two miles nearer up and made preparation to intercept the Federals as they retreated toward
ravine a short distance beyond the Powhite Creek. From there the ground made a steep ascent, and was covered with trees and slashed timber and hastily made rifle-trenches. General Whiting came to me with two brigades of Jackson’s men and asked me to put him in. I told him I was just organizing an attack and would give him position. My column of attack then was R. H. Anderson’s and Pickett’s brigades, with Law’s and Hood’s of Whiting’s division. We attacked and defeated the Federals on their left, capturing many thousand stand of arms, fifty-two pieces of artillery, a large quantity of supplies, and many prisoners — among them General Reynolds, who afterward fell at Gettysburg. The Federals made some effort to reinforce and recover their lost ground, but failed, and during the afternoon and night withdrew their entire forces from that side of the Chickahominy, going in the direction of James River. On the 29th General Lee ascertained that McClellan was marching toward the James. He determined to make a vigorous move and strike the enemy a severe blow. He decided to intercept them in