self. A conference resulted in the selection of the 26th as the day on which we should move against the Federal position at Beaver Dam. General Jackson was ordered down from the Yalley. General A. P. Hill was to pass the Chiekahominy with part of his division, and hold the rest in readiness to cross at Meadow Bridge, following Jackson’s swoop along the dividing ridge "between the Pamunkey and the Chicka-hominy. D. H. Hill and I were ordered to be in position on the Mechaniesville pike early on the 26th, ready to cross the river at Mechaniesville Bridge as soon as it was cleared by the advance of Jackson and A. P. Hill.
Thus matters stood when the morning of the 26th arrived. The weather was clear, and the roads were in fine condition. Everything seemed favorable to the move. But the morning passed and we received no tidings from Jackson. As noon approached, General Hill, who was to move behind Jackson, grew impatient at the delay and begged permission to hurry him up by a fusillade. General Lee consented, and General Hill opened his batteries on Mechaniesville, driving the Federáis off. When D. H. Hill and I crossed at the Mechaniesville Bridge we found A. P. Hill severely engaged, trying to drive the Federáis from their strong position behind Beaver Dam Creek. Without Jackson to turn the Federal right, the battle could not be ours. Although the contest
BUSH’S LANCEBS— THE SIXTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALBY.
From a sketch made in 1862.
“THE SEVEN DAYS,” INCLUDING FRAYSER’S FARM.
FRAl'SER’S FARM-HOUSE, FROM THE QUAKER OR CHURCH ROAD, LOOKING SOUTH.
From a photograph taken in 1885.
This house was used as General Sumner’s headquarters am as a hospital during the battle. The fighting took place iron half to three-quarters of a mile to the right, or west ward. Th׳ National Cemetery is shown in the middle distance.
reconnoitering force of cavalry, made a forced rec-onnoissance, passing above and around the Federal forces, reerossing the Chiekahominy below them, and returning safe to Confederate headquarters. He made a favorable report of the situation and the practicability of the proposed plan. On the 23d of June General Jackson was summoned to General Lee’s headquarters, and was there met by General A. P. Hill, General D. H. Hill, and my-
THE CONFEDERATE SIDE.
succession in the move, and be ready to attack the Federáis as soon as they were thrown from their position. After hearing me, General Lee sent General J. E. B. Stuart on his famous ride around McClellan. The dashing horseman, with a strong
AY
PENNSYLVANIA RESERVES.
GENEBAL HEINTZELMAN’S HEADQUABTERS AT NELSON’S HOUSE, JUNE 30.
From a sketch made at the time.
BY JAMES LONGSTBEET, LIEUTENANT-GENEBAL, C. S. A. Commander of a division of Lee’s army during “ The Seven Days’ Battles.”
THEN General Joseph E. Johnston was wounded at the battle of Seven Pines, and General Lee assumed his new duties as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia,
General Stonewall Jackson was in the Shenandoah Valley, and the rest of the Confederate troops were east and north of Richmond in front of General George B. McClellan’s army, then encamped about the Chiekahominy River, 100,000 strong, and preparing for a regular siege of the Confederate capital. The situation required prompt and successful action by General Lee. Very early in June he called about him, on the noted Nine-mile road near Richmond, all his commanders, and asked each in turn his opinion of the military situation. I had my own views, but did not express them, believing that if they were important it was equally important that they should be unfolded privately to the commanding general. The next day I called on General Lee, and suggested my plan for driving the Federal forces away from the Chiekahominy. McClellan had a small force at Mechaniesville, and farther back, at Beaver Dam Creek, a considerable portion of his army in a stronghold that was simply unassailable from the front. The hanks of Beaver Dam Creek were so steep as to be impassable except on bridges. I proposed an echelon movement, and suggested that Jackson be called down from the Valley, and passed to the rear of the Federal right, in order to turn the position behind Beaver Dam, while the rest of the Confederate forces who were to engage in the attack could cross the Chiekahominy at points suitable for the
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