THE MAIN BATTLE-FIELD —VIEW OF THE CONFEDERATE POSITION FROM THE UNION LINE NEAR THE WEST HOUSE.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE W. MORELL, U. S. V.
and canister; while our infantry, withholding their fire until the enemy were within short range, scattered the remnants of their columns, sometimes following them up and capturing prisoners and colors.
As column after column advanced, only to meet the same disastrous repulse, the sight became one of the most interesting imaginable. The havoc made by the rapidly bursting shells from guns arranged so as to sweep any position far and near, and in any direction, was fearful to behold. Pressed to the extreme as they were, the courage of our men was fully tried. The safety of our army —the life of the Union —was felt to be at stake. In one case the brigades of Howe, Abercrombie, and Palmer, of Couch's division, under impulse, gallantly pushed after the retreating foe, captured colors, and advantageously advanced the right of the line, but at considerable loss and great risk. The brigades of Morell, cool, well-disciplined, and easily controlled, let the enemy return after each repulse, but permitted few to escape their fire. Colonel McQuade, on Morell’s left, with the 14th New York, against orders and at the risk of defeat and disaster, yielding to impulse, gallantly dashed forward and repulsed an attacking party. Assisted by Buchanan of Sykes’s division, Colonel Bice, with the 44th New York Volunteers, likewise drove a portion of the enemy from the field, taking a flag bearing the inscription “Seven Pines.” Colonel Hunt, directing the artillery, was twice dismounted by having his horse shot under him, but though constantly exposed continued his labors until after dark. General Couch, who was also dismounted in like manner, took advantage of every opportunity to make his opponents feel his blows.
It is not to be supposed that our men, though concealed by the irregularities of the ground, were not sufferers from the enemy’s fire. The fact is that before they exposed themselves by pursuing
General Sumner withdrew part of his corps to the slope of Malvern Hill, to the right of the Malvern house, which descended into the valley of Western Bun. Then, deeming it advisable to withdraw all our troops to that line, he ordered me to fall back to the Malvern house ; but I protested that such a movement would be disastrous, and declined to obey the order until I could confer with General McClellan, who had approved of the disposition of our troops. Fortunately Sumner did not insist upon my complying with the order, and, as we were soon vigorously attacked, he advanced his troops to a point where he was but little disturbed by the enemy, but from which he could quickly render aid in response to calls for help or where need for help was apparent.
The spasmodic, though sometimes formidable attacks of our antagonists, at different points along our whole front, up to about 4 o’clock, were presumably demonstrations or feelers, to ascertain our strength, preparatory to their engaging in more serious work. An ominous silence, similar to that which had preceded the attack in force along our whole line at Gaines’s Mill, now intervened, until, at about 5 : 30 o’clock; the enemy opened upon both Morell and Couch with artillery from nearly the whole of his front, and soon afterward pressed forward his columns of infantry, first on one and then on the other, or on both. As if moved by a reckless disregard of life, equal to that displayed at Gaines’s Mill, with a determination to capture our army, or destroy it by driving us into the river, regiment after regiment, and brigade after brigade, rushed at our batteries; but the artillery of both Morell and Couch mowed them down with shrapnel, grape,
About 10 a. M. the enemy’s skirmishers and artillery began feeling for us along our line; they kept up a desultory fire until about 12 o’clock, with no severe injury to our infantry, who were well masked, and who revealed but little of our strength or position by retaliatory firing or exposure.
Up to this time, and until nearly 1 o’clock, our infantry were resting upon their arms and waiting the moment, certain to come, when the column of the enemy rashly advancing would render it necessary to expose themselves. Our desire was to hold the enemy where our artillery would be most destructive, and to reserve our infantry ammunition for close quarters to repel the more determined assaults of our obstinate and untiring foe. Attacks by brigade were made upon Morell, both on his left front and on his right, and also upon Couch; but our artillery, admirably handled, without exception, was generally sufficient to repel all such efforts and to drive back the assailants in confusion, and with great loss.
While the enemy’s artillery was firing upon us
REPULSE OP THE CONFEDERATES ON THE SLOPE OP CREW’S HILL.
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McCall’s division of Pennsylvania Reserves, now under General Truman Seymour, arrived during the night and was posted just in front of the Malvern house, and was held in reserve, to be called upon for service only in ease of absolute necessity.
Early on Tuesday our lines were re-formed and slightly advanced to take full advantage of the formation of the ground, the artillery of the front line being re-posted in commanding positions, and placed under General Griffin’s command, but under Captain Weeden’s care, just behind the crest of the hill. The infantry was arranged between the artillery to protect andbeprotectedbyitsneighbors, and prepared to be thrown forward, if at any time advisable, so as not to interfere with the artillery fire.
The corps of Heintzelman and Sumner had arrived during the night and taken position in the order named to the right and rear of Couch’s division, protecting that flank effectively toward Western Run. They did not expect to be seriously engaged, but were ready to resist attack and to give assistance to the center and left, if circumstances should require it. At an early hour in the day Sumner kindly sent me Caldwell’s brigade, as he thought I might need help. This brigade I placed near Butterfield, who was directed to send it forward wherever it should be needed or called for. He sent it to Couch at an opportune moment early in the day.
General McClellan, accompanied by his staff, visited our lines at an early hour, and approved my measures and those of General Couch, or changed them where it was deemed advisable. Though he left me in charge of that part of the field occupied by Couch, I at no time undertook to control that general, or even indicated a desire to do so, but with full confidence in his ability, which was justified by the result of his action, left him free to act in accordance with his own judgment. I cooperated with him fully, however, having Morell’s batteries, under Weeden, posted so as to protect his front, and sending him help when I saw he needed it. The division of Couch, though it suffered severely in the battle of Fair Oaks, had seen less service and met with fewer losses in these “ Seven Days’ battles ” than any one of my three, and was prepared with full ranks to receive an attack, seeming impatient and eager for the fight, Its conduct soon confirmed this impression. Batteries of Hunt’s Artillery Reserve were sent to him when needed — and also Caldwell’s brigade, voluntarily sent to me early in the day by Sumner, and Sickles’s brigade, borrowed of Heintzelman for the purpose.
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