UNION TROOPS BUILDING THE CORDUROY APPROACHES TO GRAPEVINE BRIDGE.
It was mainly by this bridge that the Union troops were withdrawn the niglit after the battle of Gaines’s Mill.
McCLELLAN’S CHANGE OF BASE AND MALVERN HILL.
BY DANIEL H. HILL, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. 8. A.
Commander of a Division at Malvern Hill.
and there found another hospital camp, with about five hundred sick in it. Truly, the Chickahominy swamps were fatal to the Federal forces. A high bluff was on our side of the little stream called White Oak, and a large uncultivated field on the other side. In this field could be seen a battery of artillery, supported by a brigade of infantry— artillerists and infantry lying down and apparently asleep. Under cover of Thomas T. Munford’s 2d Virginia cavalry, thirty-one field-pieces were placed upon the bluff, and were ordered to open fire as soon
RUNNING AMMUNITION TRAINS INTO THE CHICKAHOMINY.
road to the Long Bridge road to intercept the retreat to the James River. . . .
In pursuance of General Lee’s plan, Huger was directed (on the 29th) to take the Charles City road to strike the retreating column below White Oak Swamp. Holmes was to take possession of Malvern Hill, and Magruder to follow the line of retreat, as soon as the works were abandoned.
The abandonment became known about sunrise on Sunday morning, but Grapevine Bridge was not completed till sunset. Jack-son then crossed his corps at that point, my division leading. We bivouacked that night near Savage’s Station, where Mc-Laws’s division had had a severe fight a few hours before. Just at dawn on Monday, the 30th, we were in motion, when I discovered what appeared to be a line of battle drawn up at the station, but which proved to be a line of sick and of hospital attendants, 2500 in number. About half a mile from the station we saw what seemed to be an entire regiment of Federáis cold in death, and learned that a Vermont regiment [the 5th] had been in the desperate charge upon the division of McLaws, and had suffered great loss [killed, 31; wounded, 143]. . . .
We reached White Oak Swamp about noon,
FIVE of the six Confederate divisions north of the Chickahominy at the close of the battle of Gaines’s Mill remained in bivouac all the next day (June 28th), it being deemed too hazardous to force the passage of the river. Ewell was sent with his division to Despatch Station on the York River Railroad. He found the station and the railroad-bridge burnt. J. E. B. Stuart, who followed the retreating Federal cavalry to White House on the Pamunkey, found ruins of stations and stores all along the line. These things proved that General McClellan did not intend to retreat by the short line of the York River Railroad; but it was possible he might take the Williamsburg road. General Lee, therefore, kept his troops on the north side of the river, that he might be ready to move on the Federal flank, should that route be attempted. New Bridge was repaired on Saturday (the 28th), and our troops were then ready to move in either direction. The burnings and explosions in the Federal camp Saturday afternoon and night showed that General McClellan had determined to abandon his strong fortifications around Richmond. Ewell, who was watching him at Bottom’s Bridge, and the cavalry, holding the crossings lower down, both reported that there was no attempt at the Williamsburg route. Longstreet and A. P. Hill were sent across the river at New Bridge early on Sunday morning to move down the Darbytown
united and in order, but were compelled to leave behind two guns, the horses of which had been killed. The troops on the left and center retired, some hastily, but not in confusion, often turning back to repulse and pursue the advancing enemy. All soon rallied in rear of the Adams house behind Sykes and the brigades of French and Meagher sent to our aid, and who now, with hearty cheers, greeted our battalions as they retired and reformed. We lost in all twenty-two cannon; some of these broke down while we were withdrawing, and some ran off the bridges at night while we were crossing to the south bank of the Chickahominy. . . .
This loss of guns, General Porter states, was due to an ill-timed charge by Cooke’s cavalry.
At night I was called to General McClellan’s headquarters, where the chiefs of corps, or their representatives, were gathered. The commanding general, after hearing full reports, was of the opinion that the final result would be disastrous if we undertook longer to hold the north bank of the river with my command in the condition in which it was left by a hard fight and the loss of rest for two nights. In this opinion all concurred; and I was then instructed to withdraw to the south bank and destroy the bridges after me. The plans to move to the James River were then explained, together with the necessity for the movement, and the orders were given for their execution.
My command was safely withdrawn to the south bank of the river, and the bridges were destroyed soon after sunrise on the 28th. . . .
115