Northern Virginia, with which it had united, came opposite my right front from the direction of Old Cold Harbor and deployed, connecting with A. P. Hill’s on the left and extending to our right beyond McOehee’s. The advance column of these troops came a little earlier than those under Longstreet and A. P. Hill, but were more cautious and for some hours not so aggressive. Believing that they were passing on down the river to intercept our communications, and thinking that I might strike them to good advantage while in motion, I asked permission to follow, intending to attack with Sykes's division and Emory of Cooke's cavalry, leaving Morell and McCall to hold the other lines in check. Information, however, soon poured in, convincing me that this force was larger than any I could use against them, and that still larger forces were forming to attack our left and center. This compelled me to keep my troops united and under cover, and also again to ask aid from the south bank of the Cliickahominy. My first message to General McClellan was not delivered, as already stated; my second one was responded to by the speedy arrival of Slocum.
Soon after 2 p. m., A. P. Hill’s force, between us and New Cold Harbor, again began to show an aggressive disposition, independent of its own troops on its flanks, by advancing from under cover of the woods, in lines well formed and extending, as the contest progressed, from in front of Martin’s battery to Morell’s left. Dashing across the intervening plains, floundering in the swamps, and struggling against the tangled brushwood, brigade after brigade seemed almost to melt away before the concentrated fire of our artillery and infantry; yet others pressed on, followed by supports as dashing and as brave as their predecessors, despite their heavy losses and the disheartening effect of having to clamber over many of their
Believing my forces too small to defend successfully this long line, I asked General Barnard, when he left me, to represent to General McClellan the necessity of reinforcements to thicken and to fill vacant spaces in my front line. . . . While withdrawing from Beaver Dam, I had seen, to my delight, General H.W. Slocum’s division of Franklin’s corps crossing the river to my assistance. McClellan had promised to send it, and I needed it; it was one of the best divisions of the army. . . . But to our disappointment, through some misunderstanding, the division was almost immediately recalled to Franklin. In response, however, to a later call, it returned at a time when it was greatly needed, and rendered invaluable services. . . .
The Confederates, under Longstreet and A. P. Hill, following us from Meehaniesville, moved cautiously by the roads leading by Dr. Gaines’s house to New Cold Harbor, and by 2 p. m. had formed lines of battle behind the crest of the hills east of Powhite Creek. These lines were parallel to ours, and extended from the valley of the Chickahominy through New Cold Harbor around Morell’s front, so as nearly to reach Warren’s brigade—the left of Sykes’s division. At Gaines’s Mill, Colonel Thomas Cass’s gallant 9th Massachusetts Volunteers of Griffin’s brigade obstinately resisted A. P. Hill’s crossing, and were so successful in delaying his advance, after crossing, as to compel him to employ large bodies to force the regiment back to the main line. This brought on a contest which extended to Morell’s center and over Martin’s front — on his right — and lasted from 12 : 30 to near 2 o’clock—Cass and his immediate supports falling back south of the swamps. This persistent and prolonged resistance gave to this battle one of its well-known names.
Another column of the enemy, D. II. Hill’s, from Beaver Dam Creek, and Jackson’s column, from
ES AT ELLEESON’S MILL, li made at the time.
underbrush, which afforded concealment and protection to our troops and artillery. . . . Before sunrise of the 27th the troops were withdrawn from Beaver Dam Creek and sent to their new position east of Powhite Creek, destroying the bridges across it after them. . . .
Our new line of battle was well selected and strong, though long and requiring either more troops to man it than I had, or too great a thinning of my line by the use of the reserves. The east bank of the creek, from the valley of the Chickahominy to its swampy sources, was elevated, sloping, and timbered. The bed of the stream was nearly dry, and its west bank gave excellent protection to the first line of infantry posted under it to receive the enemy descending the cleared field sloping to it. The swampy grounds along the sources of the creek were open to our view in front for hundreds of yards, and were swept by the fire of infantry and artillery. The roads from Gaines’s Mill and Old Cold Harbor, along which the enemy were compelled to advance; were swept by artillery posted on commanding ground.
Along the ground thus formed and close to its border were posted the divisions of Morell and Sykes,—the latter on the right. . . . McCall’s division formed a second line, near the artillery in reserve, in rear of Morell, and immediately behind the woods on the left. Eeynolds, the first to leave Beaver Dam Creek, had gone to Barker’s Mill to cover the approaches from Cold Harbor and Despatch Station to Grapevine Bridge; but, hearing the battle raging on our left, and having no enemy in his front, while Emory, of Cooke’s cavalry, with artillery, was near at hand to do the duty assigned to him, he hastened to join McCall, arriving opportunely in rear of Griffin’s left. . . .
THE UNION DEFEN From a ske
reaching the borders of the stream, but only to be repulsed with terrible slaughter, which warned them not to attempt a renewal of the fight. Little depressions in the ground shielded many from our fire, until, when night came on, they all fell back beyond the range of our guns. . . .
General McClellan had joined me on the battlefield at an early hour in the afternoon. While we discussed plans for the immediate future, numerous and unvarying accounts from our outposts and scouts toward the Pamunkey warned us of the danger impending on the arrival of Jackson, and necessitated a decision as to which side of the Chickahominy should be held in force. He left me late at night, about 1 a. m. (June 27th), with the expectation of receiving information on his arrival at his own headquarters from the tenor of which he would be enabled to decide whether I should hold my present position or withdraw to a well-selected and more advantageous one east of Gaines’s Mill, where I could protect the bridges across the Chickahominy, over which I must retire if compelled to leave the left bank. He left General Barnard, of the Engineers, with me, to point out the new line of battle in case he should decide to withdraw me from Beaver Dam Creek. The orders to withdraw reached me about 3 o’clock A. M., and were executed as rapidly as possible.
The position selected for the new stand was east of Powhite Creek, about six miles from Beaver Dam Creek. The line of battle was semicircular, the extremities being in the valley of the Chickahominy, while the intermediate portion occupied the high grounds along the bank of a creek and curved around past McGehee’s to Elder Swamp. Part of the front was covered by the ravine of the creek. The east bank was lined with trees and
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