THE CONFEDERATE “RIVER DEFENSE” RAM “STONEWALL JACKSON.”
THE “ CAYUGA ” BREAKING THROUGH THE CONFEDERATE FLEET.
had volunteered for the service, and left nothing undone to overcome Farragut’s reluctance to give up what was then considered the post of danger, though it turned out to he less hazardous than the places in the rear.
The mortar-flotilla steamers under my command were directed to move up before the fleet weighed anchor, and to be ready to engage the water-batteries of Fort Jackson as the fleet passed. These batteries mounted some of the heaviest guns in the defenses, and were depended upon to do efficient work.
The commanders of vessels were informed of the change of plan, and instructed to follow in line according to the subjoined order of attack:
At 2 o’clock on the morning of April 24tli all of the Union vessels began to heave up their anchors. It was a still, clear night, and the click of the capstans, with the grating of the chain-cables as they passed through the hawse-holes, made a great noise, which we feared would serve as a warning to our enemies. This conjecture proved to be correct, for the Confederates were on the alert in both forts and steamers to meet the invaders. One fact only was in our favor, and that was the division of their forces under three different heads, which prevented unanimity of action. In every other respect the odds were against us.
Before Farragut ascended the river, the French admiral and Captain Preedy, of the English frigate Mersey, had both been up as far as the forts and had communicated with the military commanders. On their return, they gave discouraging accounts of the defenses, and pronounced it impossible for our fleet to pass them. This, of course, did not tend to cheer our sailors. There were some in the fleet who were doubtful of success, and there was not that confidence on our side that should have existed on such an occasion; but when it was seen that the river obstructions and rafts had been washed away by the currents, and that there appeared to be an open way up the river, every one became more hopeful.
The entire fleet did not get fully under way until half-past 2 A. M. The current was strong, and although the ships proceeded as rapidly as their steam-power would permit, our leading vessel, the Cayuga, did not get under fire until a quarter of 3 o’clock, when both Jackson and St. Philip opened on her at the same moment. Five steamers of the
result, conquer or to be conquered, drop anchor or keep under way, as in his opinion is best.
“ Unless the signal above mentioned is made, it will be understood that the first order of sailing will be formed after leaving Fort St. Philip, and we will proceed up the river in accordance with the original opinion expressed. The programme of the order of sailing accompanies this general order, and the commanders will hold themselves in readiness for the service as indicated. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, D. G. Farragut, Flag-Officer West Gulf Blockading Squadron.”
Farragut’s first plan was to lead the fleet with his flag-ship, the Hartford, to be closely followed by the Brooklyn, Richmond, Pensacola, and Mississippi, thinking it well to have his heavy vessels in the van, where they could immediately crush any naval force that might appear against them. This plan was a better one than that afterward adopted; but he was induced to change the order of his column by the senior commanders of the fleet, who represented to him that it was unwise for the com-mander-in-ehief to take the brunt of the battle. They finally obtained his reluctant consent to an arrangement by which Captain Bailey was to lead in the gun-boat Cayuga, commanded by Lieutenant N. B. Harrison,—a good selection, as it afterward proved, for these officers were gallant and competent men, well qualified for the position. Captain Bailey
move up the river, mutually aiding each other as it can be done to advantage.
“ When, in the opinion of the flag-officer,'the propitious time has arrived, the signal will be made to weigh and advance to the conflict. If, in his opinion, at the time of arriving at the respective positions of the different divisions of the fleet, wo have the advantage, he will make the signal for close action, No. 8, and abide the
“ It is of vital importance that the present fire of the enemy should be withdrawn from us, which you alone can do. This can be done in the manner suggested this morning under the cover of our guns, while your work on the boat can be carried on in safety and security. Our position is a critical one, dependent entirely on the powers of endurance of our casemates, many of which have been completely shattered, and are crumbling away by repeated shocks; and, therefore, I respectfully but earnestly again urge my suggestion of this morning on your notice. Our magazines arc also in danger.”
Fortunately for us, Commander Mitchell was not equal to the occasion, and the Louisiana remained tied up to the bank, where she could not obstruct the river, or throw the Union fleet into confusion while passing the forts.
While Farragut was making his preparations, the enemy left no means untried to drive the mortar-boats from their position. A couple of heavy guns in Fort St. Philip kept up !A continual fire on the head of the mortar column, and the Confederates used their mortars at intervals, but only succeeded in sinking one mortar-schooner and damaging a few others. A body of riflemen was once sent out against us from the forts, but it was met by a heavy fire and soon repulsed.
Two o’clock on the morning of the 24th instant was fixed upon as the time for the fleet to start, and Farragut had previously given the necessary orders to the commanders of vessels, instructing them to prepare their ships for action by sending down their light spars, painting their hulls mud-color, etc.; also to hang their chain-cables over the sides abreast the engines, as a protection against the enemy’s shot. He issued the following “General Order”:
“United States Flag-ship Hartford, Mississippi River,
“ April 20th, 1862.
“The flag-officer, having heard all the opinions expressed by the different comm antlers, is of the opinion that whatever is to be done will have to be done quickly, or we shall be again reduced to a blockading squadron, without the means of carrying on the bombardment, as we have nearly expended all the shells and fuses, and material for making cartridges. He has always entertained the same opinions which are expressed by Commander Porter; that is, there are three modes of attack, and the question is, which is the one to be adopted 1 His own opinion is that a combination of two should be made, viz.; the forts should be run, and when a force is once above the forts, to protect the troops, they should be landed at quarantine from the gulf side by bringing them through the bayou, and then our forces should
MORTAR-SCHOONERS ENGAGED AGAINST FORT JACKSON. Distance of leading schooner from the fort, 2850 yards. Duration of fire, six days. Total number of shells fired, 16,800.
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