MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN B. MAGRUDER, C. 8. A.
the next in placing six brigades on the Charles City road, where there was no enemy. .	.	.
It is not proposed to speculate here upon what might have happened on the second day, if General Longstreet had made any attempt to carry out the orders he received to renew the attack. But it may be well to emphasize the fact that if Long-street’s division had promptly moved on the Nine-mile road at daybreak, May 31st, and been put in close action on that side, whilst D. H. Hill's division attacked in front, — as Johnston certainly intended, — there would have been no occasion to make excuses for the failure of complete Confederate success in wiping out Keyes’s corps, early in the morning of May 31st, before it could have been reinforced by either Heintzelman or Sumner.
Note.—On the 15th of May, the Union gun-boats opened fire on the forts at Drewry’s Bluff, twelve miles below Richmond, and soon after Johnston’s army retired, opening the way for McClellan’s advance to within seven miles of Richmond, whose citizens believed at this time that the Confederate authorities would be compelled to evacuate the city. The archives were shipped to Columbia, S. C., the public treasure was kept on cars ready for transportation to a place of safety. Confidence was restored before the battle of Seven Pines. On May 25th and 26th, Lieutenant F. C. Davis, of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, with eleven men rode from Bottom’s Bridge, by way of White Oak Bridge and Charles City Court House, to the James River and communicated with the gun-boat fleet. After the battle of Seven Pines, General Lee determined to defend Richmond on the line then held by his army. This fact, in connection with the success of General Jackson in freeing the Shenandoah Valley of Union forces, restored the confidence of the people at Richmond. A large draft of soldiers from the ranks furnished a laboring force to build intrenchments, and slaves in the counties around Richmond were impressed for the work.
On the 18th of June, Brigadier-General Cnvier Grover’s brigade, of Hooker’s division, made a reconnois-sance between the Williamsburg road and the railroad, and found the Confederates in force behind earthworks. The divisions of Hooker and Kearny advanced on the 25th to a point called Oak Grove, abont four miles from Richmond, in front of Seven Pines. This was the nearest approach to Richmond during the investment by McClellan.
WOUNDED FROM THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES, IN THE STREETS OF RICHMOND.
several hours before nearly stripped the Chieka-hominy, between New Bridge and Mechaniesville, in order to send him reinforcements; and that the danger to Richmond, if any, was not then on the Williamsburg road, if it ever had been.
General Lee gave me no orders that day. The fact that Longstreet’s and D. H. Hill’s divisions were sent back to their former camps induces me to believe that this was in compliance with orders given by General Lee to General Longstreet— perhaps for the reason that on May 31st we had not fully succeeded in crushing one Federal corps isolated at Seven Pines, and on June 1st had lost all the ground beyond Seven Pines that we had gained the day previous.
I was completely prostrated on the 2d of June by an attack of paralysis, no symptom of which was manifested within eighteen hours after Lee relieved me of the command of the army. But for that misfortune, I would certainly have required all subordinates to report to me events that took place on the field in their respective commands whilst I was in control of the army.
The detailed reports of regimental and brigade commanders on both sides in this battle show many instances of close, persistent, and bloody fighting, such as have been seldom equaled by any troops on any field. Cases of temporary confusion and disorder occurred, but fair examination shows there was good reason for this. In reference to the general management, however, it may well be said that General McClellan committed a grave error in allowing Keyes’s corps to remain isolated for several days within easy striking distance of General Johnston’s army. The intention of the latter to throw Longstreet’s division against Keyes’s exposed and weak right flank was the best plan that could have been adopted. The first great blunder consisted in Longstreet’s taking his division from the Nine-mile road to the Williamsburg road, and
under these two attacks the Confederates gave way in great disorder. The center regiment, of Birney’s three, met with but little resistance until it struck a Confederate force in strong position on a wood road parallel to and three hundred to four hundred yards south of the railroad, in front of the left wing of French’s brigade. The two regiments of Howard’s brigade, in their forward movement, soon struck the same Confederates in the densely tangled wood. These three Federal regiments, after repeated efforts to dislodge the Confederates,— Pickett’s brigade,—were repulsed with severe losses, and resumed position in the lines from which they had advanced.
General Howard was wounded just as his two regiments were coming to close quarters with Pickett’s brigade. . . .
General Smith here refers to events in front of Long-street’s command on the Williamsburg road June 1st. His narrative proceeds with an account of his (Smith’s) efforts, as temporary commander of the army, to have Longstreet renew the attacks that day. He received from Longstreet two notes dated 10 A. m. and 10:30 a. m., respectively, stating that apparently he (Longstreet) was confronted by the entire Union army, and asking reinforcements. A third message, dated 1:30 p. m., read: “The next attack will be from Sumner’s division. I think that if we can whip it we shall be comparatively safe. ... I sincerely hope that we may succeed against them in their next effort. Oh, that I had ten thousand men more! ” General Smith concludes:
To complete this sketch of the battle of Seven Pines, it is essential to mention that when I received General Longstreet’s note, dated 1.30 P. M., June 1st, which ended with the exclamation, “Oh, that I had ten thousand men more!” General Lee had just taken command of the army. He seemed very much impressed by the state of affairs on the Williamsburg road, as depicted in G eneral Longstreet’s note. I assured him, however, that Longstreet was mistaken in supposing that the whole Federal army was opposed to him ; that I had
MAJOR-GENERAL ERASMUS D. KEYES, U. S. V.
the second line already crowded, continued to retreat ; but some of them, with nearly the whole of Naglee’s brigade, remained upon the field. The Confederates in the immediate front of Seven Pines were now pressing into the second abatis, and there seemed to be strong probability that they would soon break through it and carry the earthworks of Keyes’s second line. Thus, after more than two hours’ close and bloody fighting, Hill’s division unaided had captured the Federal first line of defense, and was closely pressing upon their second line. Hill then sent to Longstreet for another brigade. In a few minutes “ the magnificent brigade of R. H. Anderson ” came to Hill’s support. . . .
It has already been shown that on May 31st the Confederates struck Keyes’s corps, isolated at Seven Pines, with four brigades, and increased the attacking force to five brigades after Keyes had been reinforced by Heintzelman. June 1st, the Confederate attack was made against the left wing of French’s brigade, which, with one regiment of Howard’s brigade on its left, formed the front line of Richardson’s division. On the left of that division was Birney’s brigade of Kearny’s division. . . .
In this attack the regiment of Howard’s brigade on the extreme left of Richardson’s front line was broken, fell back behind the second line, and was not again in action. The regiment next to it on the right was forced back a short distance. The left of Richardson’s front line was so rudely shaken that all available means were used to strengthen it; a battery and Meagher’s brigade were put in to cover the gap, and Burns’s brigade, previously detached to cover the communications with the bridges, was recalled and hurriedly sent by General Sumner to Richardson’s assistance. . . .
It was about 8 A. M. when General Howard, with two regiments of his brigade, relieved the left wing of French’s brigade and took up the fighting. Just at that time the three regiments of Birney’s brigade south of the railroad, whose strong advanced guards had been slowly driven back, were rapidly thrown forward. The regiment next the railroad struck the flank of the Confederates just at the time Howard was advancing against their front; and