BURNING HORSES, AND BURYING THE DEAD, AT THE TWIN HOUSES NEAR CASEY’S REDOUBT, AFTER THE SECOND DAY’S FIGHT.
where this infantry had disappeared commenced firing upon the head of the Confederate column. A regiment sent against it was received with a volley of musketry, as well as canister, and recoiled. The leading brigade, commanded by Colonel Law, then advanced, and so much strength was developed by the enemy that General Smith׳brough t his other brigades into action on the left of Law’s. An obstinate (!on-test began, and was maintained on equal terms, although we engaged superior numbers on ground of their own choosing.
I had passed the railroad a few hundred yards with Hood’s brigade when the firing commenced, and stopped to see it terminated. But being confident that the enemy opposing us were those whose camp I had just seen, and therefore only a brigade, I did not doubt that General Smith was more than strong-enough to cope with them. Therefore, General Hood was directed to go on in such a direction as to connect his right with Longstreet’s left and take his antagonists in flank. The direction of that firing was then nearly southwest from Pair Oaks. It was then about 5 o’clock.
In that position my intercourse with Longstreet was maintained through staff-officers, who were assisted by General Stuart of the cavalry, which was then unemployed; their reports were all of steady progress.
At Pair Oaks, however, no advantage was gained on either side, and the contest was continued with unflagging courage. It was near half-past 6 o’clock before I admitted to myself that Smith was engaged, not with a brigade, as I had obstinately thought, but with more than a division; but I thought that it would be injudicious to engage Magruder’s division, our only reserve, so late in the day.
The firing was then violent at Seven Pines, and within a half hour the three Federal divisions were broken and driven from their position in confusion. It was then evident, however, from the obstinacy of our adversaries at Pair Oaks, that the battle would not be decided that day. I said so to the staff-officers near me, and told them that each regiment must sleep where it might be standing when the firing ceased for the night, to be ready to renew it at dawn next morning.
About half-past 7 o’clock I received a musket-shot in the shoulder, and was unhorsed soon after by a heavy fragment of shell which struck my
ketry was not heard at my position on the Nine-mile road, from the unfavorable condition of the air; and I supposed for some time that we were hearing only an artillery duel. But a staff-officer was sent to ascertain the facts. He returned at 4 o’clock with intelligence that our infantry as well as artillery had been engaged an hour, and all were pressing on vigorously. As no approach of troops from beyond the Chickahominy had been discovered, I hoped that the enemy’s bridges were impassable, and therefore desired General Smith to move toward Seven Pines, to be ready to cooperate with our right. He moved promptly along the Nine-mile road, and his leading regiment soon became engaged with the Federal skirmishers and their reserves, and in a few minutes drove them off.
On my way to Longstreet’s left, to combine the action of the two bodies of troops, I passed the head of General Smith’s column near Pair Oaks, and saw the camps of about a brigade in the angle between the Nine-mile road and the York River Railroad, and the rear of a column of infantry moving in quick time from that point toward the Chickahominy by the road to the Grapevine ford. A few minutes after this, a battery near the point
Keyes’s corps (Casey’s and Couch’s divisions) was united at Seven Pines and reinforced by Kearny’s division, coming from Savage’s Station. But the three divisions were so vigorously attacked by Hill that they were broken and driven from their intrenehments, the greater part along the Williamsburg road to the intrenched line west of Savage’s Station. Two brigades of their left, however•, fled to White Oak Swamp.
General Hill pursued the enemy a mile; then, night being near, he re-formed his troops, facing toward the Federals. Longstreet’s and Huger’s divisions, coming up, were formed between Hill’s line and Pair Oaks.
For some cause the disposition on the Charles City road was modified. Two of General Huger’s brigades were ordered to advance along that road, with three of Longstreet’s under Brigadier-General Wilcox. After following that road some miles, General Wilcox received orders to conduct his troops to the Williamsburg road. On entering it, he was ordered to the front, and two of his regiments joined Hill’s troops near and approaching Seven Pines.
"When the action just described began, the mus-
the Federal Army. Being confident that Longstreet and D. H. Hill, with then-forces united, would be successful in the earlier part of the action against adversaries formed in several lines, with wide intervals between them, I left the immediate control on the Williamsburg road to them, under general instructions, and placed myself on the ’ left, where I could soonest learn of the approach of Federal reinforcements from their right. For this scouts were sent forward to discover all movements that might be made by the enemy.
The condition of the ground and little streams delayed the troops in marching ; yet those of Smith,
Longstreet, and Hill were in position quite early enough.
But the soldiers from Norfolk, who had seen garrison service only, were unnecessarily stopped in their march by a swollen rivulet. This unexpected delay led to interchange of messages for several hours between General Longstreet and myself,
I urging Longstreet to begin the fight, he replying. But, near 2 o’clock, that officer was requested to go forward to the attack ; the hands of my watch marked 3 o’clock at the report of the first field-piece. The Federal advance line — a long line of skirmishers, supported by several regiments — was encountered at 3 o’clock. The greatly superior numbers of the Confederates soon drove them back to the main position of Casey’s division. It occupied a line of rifle-pits, strengthened by a redoubt and abatis. Here the resistance was very obstinate ; for the Federals, commanded by an officer of skill and tried courage, fought as soldiers generally do under good leaders ; and time and vigorous efforts of superior numbers were required to drive them from their ground. But the resolution of Garland’s and G. B. Anderson’s brigades, that pressed forward on our left through an open field, under a destructive fire; the admirable service of Carter’s and Bondurant’s batteries, and a skilfully combined attack upon the Federal left, under General Hill’s direction, by Rodes’s brigade in front and that of Rains in flank, were at last successful, and the enemy abandoned their intrench-ments. Just then reinforcements from Couch’s division came up, and an effort was made to recover the position. But it was to no purpose ; for two regiments of R. IT. Anderson’s brigade reinforced Hill’s troops, and the Federals were driven back to Seven Pines.
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