MAJOR-GENERAL GUST A VUS W. SMITH, C. S. A.
MANASSAS TO SEVEN PINES.
BY JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, GENERAL, C. S. A.
Confederate commander at Manassas; also commander on tlie Peninsula until tlie close of the first day’s battle at Seven Pines.
also had a detachment of cavalry observing McDowell’s corps, reported that it had returned to Fredericksburg. As my object was to bring on the inevitable battle before McClellan should receive an addition of 40,000 men to his forces, this intelligence made me return to my first design — that of attacking McClellan’s left wing on the Williamsburg road as soon as, by advancing, it had sufficiently increased its distance from his right, north of the Chickahominy.
The morning of the 30th, armed reeonnoissances were made under General D. H. Hill’s direction — on the Charles City road by Brigadier-General Bodes, and on the Williamsburg road by Brigadier-General Garland. The latter found Federal outposts five miles from Richmond — or two miles west of Seven Pines — in such strength as indicated that a corps was near. On receiving this information from General Hill, I informed Mm that he would lead an attack on the enemy next morning. Orders were given for the concentration of twenty-two of our twenty-eight brigades against McClellan’s left wing, about two-fifths of his army. Our six other brigades were guarding the river from New Bridge to Meadow Bridge, on our extreme left. Longstreet and Huger were directed to conduct their divisions to D. H. Hill’s position on the Williamsburg road, and G. W. Smith to march with his to the junction of the Nine-mile road with the New Bridge road, where Magruder was with four brigades.
Longstreet, as ranking officer of the troops on the Williamsburg road, was instructed verbally to form D. H. Hill’s division as first line, and his own as second, across the road at right angles, and to advance in that order to attack the enemy ; while Huger’s division should march by the right flank along the Charles City road, to fall upon the enemy’s flank when our troops were engaged with 90
... On the 23d of May, Keyes’s Federal corps crossed to the south side of the Chickahominy, and a detachment attacked Hatton’s Confederate brigade, which was in observation near Savage’s Station. The detachment was driven back, and Hatton’s object having been accomplished (to learn whether the enemy had crossed the stream), he was recalled. I was advised to hold that position with the army, but preferred to let the enemy advance, which would increase the interval between his left and the right, which was beyond the Chickahominy. McDowell’s corps of 40,000 men was then at Fredericksburg, observed by a division under Brigadier-General J. B. Anderson; and a large Confederate brigade, under Brigadier-General Branch, was at Gordonsville.
On the 24th our cavalry was driven across the Chickahominy, principally at Mechaniesville. This extension of the right wing of the enemy to the west made me apprehend that the two detachments (Anderson and Branch) above mentioned might be cut off. They were therefore ordered to fall back to the Chickahominy. Near Hanover Court House the brigade was attacked by Porter’s corps and driven off, escaping with a loss of 66 killed, and 177 wounded, as General Branch reported. A division was formed of Anderson’s and Branch’s troops, to the command of which Major-General A. P. Hill was assigned.
That evening General Anderson sent word that his scouts left near Fredericksburg reported that McDowell’s troops were marching southward. As the object of this march was evidently the junction of this corps with the main army, I determined to attack McClellan before McDowell could join him; and the major-generals were desired to hold their troops ready to move. But at night, when those officers were with me to receive instructions for the expected battle, General J. E. B. Stuart, who
MAJOR-GENERAL BENJAMIN HUGER, C. S. A.
MAJOR-GENERAL DAVID B. BIRNEY, U. 8.V.
him in front. Federal earthworks and abatis that might be found were to be turned. G. W. Smith was to protect the troops under Longstreet from attack by those of the Federal right wing across the Chickahominy; and, if such transfer should not be threatened, he was to fall upon the enemy on the Williamsburg road. Those troops were formed in four lines, each being a division. Casey’s was a mile west of Seven Pines, with a line of skirmishers a half mile in advance ; Couch’s was at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks — the two forming Keyes’s corps. Kearny’s division was near Savage’s Station, and Hooker’s two miles west of Bottom’s Bridge — the two forming Heintzelman’s corps.
Longstreet’s command of the right was to end when the troops approached Seven Pines and I should be present to direct the movements, after which each major-general would command his own division. The rain began to fall violently in the afternoon of the 30th, and continued all night. In the morning the little streams near our camps were so much swollen as to make it probable that the Chickahominy was overflowing its banks and cutting the communication between the wings of
MAJOR-GENERAL OLIVER O. HOWARD, U. 8. A.
Facsimile reproduction ol a photograph taken before the Battle of Seven Pines, on the second day of which General Howard lost liis right arm.
gaged to teach it. Another wrote to his mother : “ We have got them hemmed in on every side, and the only reason they don’t run is because they can’t.” We had at last corduroyed every road and bridged every creek ; our guns and mortars were in position ; Battery No. 1 had actually opened on tlie enemy’s works, Saturday, May 3d, 1862, and it was expected that our whole line would open on them in the morning. About 2 o’clock of Saturday night, or rather of Sunday morning, while on guard duty, I observed a bright illumination, as if a fire had broken out within the enemy’s lines. Several guns were fired from their works during the early morning hours, but soon after daylight of May 4th it was reported that they had abandoned their works in our front, and we very quickly found tlie report to be true. As soon as I was relieved from guard duty, I went over on “French leave” to view our enemy’s fortifications. They were prodigiously strong. A few tumble-down tents and houses and seventy pieces of heavy ordnance had been abandoned as the price of the enemy’s safe retreat.
As soon as it was known that the Confederates had abandoned the works at Yorktown, the commanding general sent the cavalry and horse artillery under Stoneman in pursuit to harass the retreating column. . . .