CAMP OP THE UNION ARMY NEAR WHITE HOUSE ON THE PAMUNKEY RIVER, MCCLELLAN’S BASE OP OPERATIONS AGAINST RICHMOND.
Although the result of this "bloody battle was a complete victory on our part, it was necessary, for the reasons already given, to continue the movement to Harrison's, whither the trains had been pushed during the night of the 30th of June and the day of the 1st of July. Immediately after the final repulse the orders were given for the withdrawal of the army. The movement was covered by Keyes’s corps. So complete was the enemy’s discomfiture, and so excellent the conduct of the rearguard, that the last of the trains reached Harrison’s after dark on the 3d, without loss and unmolested by the enemy.
This movement was now successfully accomplished, and the Army of the Potomac was at last in a position on its true line of operations, with its trains intact, no guns lost save those taken in battle, when the artillerists had proved their heroism and devotion by standing to their guns until the enemy’s infantry were in the midst of them.
During the “ Seven Days” the Army of the Potomac consisted of 143 regiments of infantry, 55 batteries, and less than 8 regiments of cavalry, all told. The opposing Confederate army consisted of 187 regiments of infantry, 79 batteries, and 14 regiments of cavalry. The losses of the two armies from June 25 th to July 2d were :
Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total.
Confederate Army.....2,823...13,703 — 3,323.... 19,719
Army of the Potomac.. .1,734. 8,062... .6,053... .15,849
The Confederate losses in killed and wounded alone were greater than the total losses of the Army of the Potomac in killed, wounded, and missing.
No praise can be too great for the officers and men who passed through these seven days of battle, enduring fatigue without a murmur, successfully meeting and repelling every attack made upon them, always in the right place at the right time, and emerging from the fiery ordeal a compact army of veterans, equal to any task that brave and disciplined men can be called upon to undertake. They needed now only a few days of well-earned repose, a renewal of ammunition and supplies, and reinforcements to fill the gaps made in their ranks by so many desperate encounters, to be prepared to advance again, with entire confidence, to meet their worthy antagonists in other battles. It was, however, decided by the authorities at Washington, against my earnest remonstrances, to abandon the position on the James, and the campaign. The Army of the Potomac was accordingly withdrawn, and it was not until two years later that it again found itself under its last commander at substantially the same point on the bank of the James. It was as evident in 1862 as in 1865 that there was the true defense of Washington, and that it was on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union was to be decided.
midnight Sumner’s and Heintzelman’s corps and McCall’s division withdrew from the positions they had so gallantly held, and commenced their march to Malvern, which they reached unmolested soon after daybreak. Just after the rear of the trains reached Malvern, about 4 p. M., the enemy attacked Porter’s corps, but were promptly shaken off.
Thus, on the morning of July 1st, the army was concentrated at Malvern, with the trains at Hax-all’s in rear. The supplies which had been sent from White House on the 18th were at hand in the James.
After consultation with Commodore Rodgers, I decided that Harrison’s Landing was a better position for the resting-place of the army, because the channel passed so close to City Point as to enable the enemy to prevent the passage of transports if we remained at Malvern. It was, however, necessary to accept battle where we were, in order to give ample time for the trains to reach Harrison’s, as well as give the enemy a blow that would check his farther pursuit. . . .
remained for the troops to hold their ground until nightfall, and then continue the march to the positions selected near Malvern Hill.
The fighting on this day (June 30th) was very severe, and extended along the whole line. It first broke out between 12 and 1, on General Franklin’s command, in the shape of a fierce artillery fire, which was kept up through the day and inflicted serious losses. The enemy’s infantry made several attempts to cross near the old bridge and below, but was in every ease thrown back. Franklin held his position until after dark, and during the night fell back to Malvern. At half-past 2 Slocum’s left was attacked in vain on the Charles City road. At about 3 McCall was attacked, and, after 5 o’clock, under the pressure of heavy masses, he was forced back; but Hooker came up from the left, and Sedgwick from the rear, and the two together not only stopped the enemy, but drove Mm off the field.
At about 4 p. M. heavy attacks commenced on Kearny’s left, and three ineffectual assaults were made. The firing continued until after dark. About
was advancing on Savage’s Station, whereupon he posted his division at that point and informed Sumner, who moved his corps to the same place, arriving a little after noon.
About 4 p. M. Sumner and Franklin—three divisions in all—were sharply attacked, mainly by the "Williamsburg road; the fighting continued until between 8 and 9 p. m., the enemy being at all times thoroughly repulsed, and finally driven from the field.
Meanwhile, through a misunderstanding of his orders, and being convinced that the troops of Sumner and Franklin at Savage’s Station were ample for the purpose in view, Heintzelman withdrew his troops during the afternoon, crossed the swamp at Brackett’s Ford, and reached the Charles City road with the rear of his column at 10 P. M.
Slocum reached the position of Keyes’s corps early in the afternoon, and, as soon as the latter was thus relieved, it was ordered forward to the James, near Malvern Hill, which it reached, with all its artillery and trains, early on the 30th. Porter was ordered to follow this movement and prolong the line of Keyes’s corps to our right. The trains were pushed on in rear of these corps and massed under cover of the gun-boats as fast as they reached the James, at Haxail’s plantation. As soon as the fighting ceased with the final repulse of the enemy, Sumner and Franklin were ordered to cross the swamp; this was effected during the night, the rear-guard crossing and destroying the bridge at 5 A. M. on the 30th. All the troops and trains were now between the swamp and the James, and the first critical episode of the movement was successfully accomplished.
The various corps were next pushed forward to establish connection with Keyes and Porter, and hold the different roads by which the enemy could advance from Richmond and strike our line of march. I determined to hold the positions now taken until the trains had all reached a place of safety, and then concentrate the army near the James, where it could enjoy a brief rest after the fatiguing battles and marches through which it was passing, and then renew the advance on Richmond.
General Franklin, with Smith’s division of his own corps, Richardson’s of the Second, andNaglee’s brigade, was charged with the defense of the "White Oak Swamp crossing. Slocum held the ground thence to the Charles City road; Kearny from that road to the Long Bridge road; McCall on his left; Hooker thence to the Quaker road; Sedgwick at Nelson’s farm, in rear of McCall and Kearny. The Fifth Corps was at Malvern Hill, the Fourth at Turkey Bridge. The trains moved on during this day, and at 4 p. m. the last reached Malvern Hill and kept on to Haxail’s, so that the most difficult part of the task was accomplished, and it only
VIEW FROM UNION MORTAR-BATTERY No. 4, LOOKING TOWARD YORKTOWN.
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