WHITE HOUSE, THE HOME OE GENERAL W. H. LEE, MCCLELLAN’S BASE OE SUPPLIES ON THE PAMUNKET.
From sketches made at the time.
this first step was accomplished. During the 28th Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin held essentially their old positions; the trains converged steadily to the White Oak Swamp and crossed as rapidly as possible, and during this day and the succeeding night Porter followed the movement of Keyes’s corps and took position to support it.
Early on the 28th, when Franklin’s corps wTas drawing in its right to take a more concentrated position, the enemy opened a sharp artillery fire and made at one point a spirited attack with two Georgia regiments, which were repulsed by the two regiments on picket.
Sumner’s and Heintzelman’s corps and Smith’s division of Franklin’s were now ordered to abandon their intrenchmeuts, so as to occupy, on the morning of the 29th, a new position in rear, shorter than the old and covering the crossing of the swamp. This new line could easily be held during the day, and these troops were ordered to remain there until dark, to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the trains, and then cross the swamp and occupy the positions about to be abandoned by Keyes’s and Porter’s corps. Meanwhile Slocum’s division had been ordered to Savage’s Station in reserve, and, during the morning, was ordered across the swamp to relieve Keyes’s corps. This was a critical day; for the crossing of the swamp by the trains must be accomplished before its close, and their protection against attack from Kiehmond must be assured, as well as communication with the gun-boats.
A sharp cavalry skirmish on the Quaker road indicated that the enemy was alive to our movement, and might at any moment strike in force to intercept the march to the James. The difficulty was not at all with the movement of the troops, but with the immense trains that were to be moved
RUINS OF THE WHITE HOUSE, WHICH WAS BURNED JUNE 28, DURING THE “ CHANGE OF BASE.”
virtually by a single road, and required the whole army for their protection. With the exception of the cavalry affair on the Quaker road, we were not troubled during this day south of the swamp, but there was severe fighting north of it. Sumner’s corps evacuated their works at daylight and fell back to Allen’s farm, nearly two miles west of Savage’s Station, Heintzelman being on their left. Here Sumner was furiously attacked three times, but each time drove the enemy back with much loss.
Soon afterward Franklin, having only one division with him, ascertained that the enemy had repaired some of the Chickaliominy bridges and
UNION MORTAR-BATTERY BEFORE YORKTOWN.
HEADQUARTERS OE BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN SEDGWICK, ON THE LEESBURG TURNPIKE,
NEAR WASHINGTON.
From a sketch made in January, 1862.
tion nearer the bridges, where the flanks would be more secure. This was skilfully effected early on the 27th, and it was decided that this corps should hold its position until night. All the corps commanders on the south side were on the 26th directed to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare in support of Porter on the next day. All of them thought the enemy so strong in their respective fronts as to require all tlieir force to hold their positions.
Shortly after noon on the 27th the attack commenced upon Porter’s corps, in its new position near Gaines’s Mill, and the contest continued all day with great vigor. . . .
[For accounts of the battle of Gaines’s Mill, as well as of others in the “ Seven Days’ ” series, see articles hy Generals Fitz-John Porter, James Longstreet, and D. H. Hill.]
I now bent all my energies to the transfer of the army to the James, fully realizing the very delicate nature of a flank march, with heavy trains, by a single road, in face of an active enemy, but confident that I had the army well in hand and that it would not fail me in the emergency. I thought that the enemy would not anticipate that movement, but would assume that all my eiforts would he directed to cover and regain the old depots; and the event proved the correctness of this supposition. It seemed certain that I could gain one or two days for the movement of the trains, while he remained uncertain as to my intentions; and that was all I required with such troops as those of the Army of the Potomac.
During the night of the 27th I assembled the corps commanders at headquarters, informed them of my intentions, and gave them their orders. Keyes’s corps was ordered to move at once, with its trains, across White Oak Swamp, and occupy positions on the farther side, to cover the passage of the remainder of the army. By noon of the 28th
moving to attack our right and rear, but I persisted in the operation intended for the 25th, partly to develop the strength of the enemy opposite our left and center, and with the design of attacking Old Tavern on the 26th, if Jackson’s advance was so much delayed that Porter’s corps would not be endangered.
Late in the afternoon of the 25th, Jackson’s advance was confirmed, and it was rendered probable that he would attack next day. All hope of the advance of McDowell’s corps in season to be of any service had disappeared; the dangerous position of the army had been faithfully held to the last moment. After deducting the garrisons in rear, the railroad guards, non-combatants, and extra-duty men, there were not more than 75,000 men for battle. The enemy, with a force larger than this, the strong defenses of Richmond close at hand in his rear, was free to strike on either flank. I decided then to carry into effect the long-considered plan of abandoning the Pamunkey and taking up the line of the James.
The necessary orders were given for the defense of the depots at the White House to the last moment and its final destruction and abandonment ; it was also ordered that all possible stores should be pushed to the front while communications were open.
The ground to the James had already been re-connoitered with reference to this movement.
During the night of the 26th Porter’s siege-guns and wagon-trains were brought over to the south side of the Chickaliominy. During the afternoon of that day his corps had been attacked in its position on Beaver Dam Creek, near Meehanicsville, and the enemy repulsed with heavy losses on their part. It was now clear that Jackson’s corps had taken little or no part in this attack, and that his blow would fall farther to the rear. I therefore ordered the Fifth Corps to fall back and take posi-
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