SECTION OF THE ENCAMPMENT OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC NEAR WHITE HOUSE, VA.
Process reproduction of a photograph.
hundred thousand men were crowded together, yet almost absolute stillness reigned throughout the vast camp during the whole of this pleasant Sahbatli.” —From George T. Stevens’s “Three Years in the Sixth Corps.” The picture represents the space occupied by about one brigade.
“ We were now [middle of May] encamped on the old Custis place, at present owned by General Fitzhugh Lee [Gen. W. H. F. Lee] of the Rebel cavalry service. On every side of us were immense fields of wheat, which, but for the presence of armies, prom-ised an abundant harvest. ... It was marvelous that such quiet could exist where a
movement against General Banks seemed so general and connected as to show that the enemy could not intend a very desperate defense of Richmond; that he thought the time was near when I “ must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come hack to the defense of Washington.” I replied that all my information agreed that the mass of the enemy was still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it, and that the object of Jackson’s movement was probably to prevent reinforcements being sent to me. - . . The campaign had taken its present position in consequence of the assurance that I should be joined by McDowell’s corps. As it was now clear that I could not count with certainty upon that force, I had to do the best I could with the means at hand.
The first necessity was to establish secure communications between the two parts of the army, necessarily separated by the Chiekahominy. Richmond could be attacked only by troops on the right bank. As the expectation of the advance of McDowell was still held out, and that only by the land route, I could not yet transfer the base to the James, but was obliged to retain it on the Pamunkey, and therefore to keep on the left bank a force sufficient to protect our communications and cover the junctionof McDowell. Itwas still permissible to believe that sufficient attention would be paid to the simplest principle of war to push McDowell rapidly on Jackson’s heels, when he made his inevitable return march to join the main Confederate army and attack our right flank. The failure of McDowell to reach me at or before the critical moment was due to the orders he received from Washington. The bridges over the Chiekahominy first built were swept away by the floods, and it became necessary to construct others more solid and with long log approaches, a slow and difficult task, generally earned on by men working in the water and ■under fire.
The work was pushed as rapidly as possible, and on the 30th of May the corps of Heintzelman and Keyes were on the right bank of the Chiekahominy, the most advanced positions being somewhat strengthened by intrenchments; Sumner’s corps was on the left bank, some six miles above Bottom’s Bridge; Porter’s and Franklin’s corps were on the left bank opposite the enemy’s left. During the day and night of the 30th torrents of
north and northwest, still preserving our line of supply from White House. But with the force actually available such an attempt would expose the army to the loss of its communications and to destruction in detail; for we had an able and savage antagonist, prompt to take advantage of any error on our part. The country furnished no supplies, so that we could not afford a separation from our depots. All the information obtained showed that Richmond was intrenched, that the enemy occupied in force all the approaches from the east, that he intended to dispute every step of our advance, and that his army was numerically superior. Early on the 24th of May I received a telegram from the President, informing me that McDowell would certainly march on the 26th, suggesting that I should detach a force to the right to cut off the retreat of the Confederate force in front of Fredericksburg, and desiring me to march cautiously and safely. On the same day another despatch came, informing me that, in consequence of Stonewall Jackson’s advance down the Shenandoah, the movement of McDowell was suspended. Next day the President again telegraphed that the 85
ordinary stage is some forty feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of heavy forest-trees, and bordered by low marshy lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width. Within the limits above mentioned the firm ground, above high-water mark, seldom approaches the river on either bank, and in no place did the high ground come near the stream on both banks. It was subject to frequent, sudden and great variations in the volume of water, and a single violent storm of brief duration sufficed to cause an overflow of the bottom-lands for many days, rendering the river absolutely impassable without long and strong bridges. When we reached the river it was found that all the bridges, except that at Mechaniesville, had been destroyed. The right bank, opposite New, Mechaniesville, and Meadow bridges, was bordered by high bluffs, affording the enemy commanding positions for his batteries, enfilading the approaches, and preventing the rebuilding of important bridges. We were thus obliged to select other less exposed points for our crossings. Should McDowell effect the promised junction, we could turn the head-waters of the Chiekahominy, and attack Richmond from the
as a base, crossing the upper Chiekahominy.
The army was admirably placed for adopting either, and my decision was to take that of the James, operating on either bank as might prove advisable, but always preferring the southern. I had urgently asked for reinforcements to come by water, as they would thus be equally available for either line of operations. The destruction of the Merrimac on the 11th of May had opened the James River to us, and it was only after that date that it became available. My plan, however, was changed by orders from Washington. A telegram of the 18th from the Secretary of War informed me that McDowell would advance from Fredericksburg, and directed me to extend the right of the Army of the Potomac to the north of Richmond, in order to establish communication with him.
The same order required me to supply his troops from our depots at White House.
Herein lay the failure of the campaign, as it necessitated the division of the army by the Chiekahominy, and caused great delay in con-structingpraetieable bridges across that stream; while if I had been able to cross to the James, reinforcements would have reached me by water rapidly and safely, the army would have been united and in no danger of having its flank turned, or its line of supply interrupted, and the attack could have been much more rapidly pushed.
I now proceeded to do all in my power to insure success on the new line of operations thus imposed upon me. On the 20th of May our light troops reached the Chiekahominy at Bottom’s Bridge, which they found destroyed. I at once ordered Casey’s division to ford the stream and occupy the heights beyond, thus securing a lodgment on the right bank. Heintzelman was moved up in support of Keyes. By the 24th, Mechaniesville was carried, so that the enemy was now all together on the other side of the river. Sumner was near the railroad, on the left bank of the stream; Porter and Franklin were on the same bank near Mechaniesville.
It is now time to give a brief description of the Chiekahominy. This river rises some fifteen miles northwestward of Richmond, and unites with the James about forty miles below that city. Our operations were on the part between Meadow and Bottom’s bridges, covering the approaches to Richmond from the east. Here the river at its
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