HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL HEINTZELMAN, COMMANDING THE THIRD ARMY CORPS AT HOWE’S SAW-MILL, BEFORE YORKTOWN.
From a sketch made at the time.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN E. WOOL, U. S. A.
not until the morning of the 7th that tho leading division — Franklin’s—disembarked near West Point and took up a suitable position to hold its own and cover the landing of reinforcements. This division was attacked not long after it landed, but easily repulsed the enemy.
Meanwhile the enemy’s rear-guard held the Williamsburg lines against our advance, except where Hancock broke through, until the night of the 5th, when they retired.
The army was now divided; a part at the mouth of the Pamunkey, a part at Williamsburg, and a part at Yorktown prepared to ascend the York Eiver. The problem was to reunite them without giving the enemy the opportunity of striking either fraction with his whole force. This was accomplished on the 10th, when all the divisions were in communication, and the movement of concentration continued as rapidly as circumstances permitted, so that on the 15th the headquarters and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and Smith reached Cumberland Landing; Couch and Casey being near New Kent Court House, Hooker and Kearny near Roper’s Church, and Bichardson and Sedgwick near Eltham. On the 15th and 16th, in the face of dreadful weather and terrible roads, the divisions of Franklin, Porter, and Smith were advanced to White House, and a depot established. On the 18th the Fifth and Sixth Corps were formed, so that the organization of the Army of the Potomac was now as follows : Second Corps, Sumner ■— Divisions, Sedgwick and Bichardson ; Third Corps, Heintzelman — Divisions, Kearny and Hooker ; Fourth Corps, Keyes — Divisions, Couch and Casey; Fifth Corps, F. J. Porter — Divisions, Morell and Sykes and the Eeserve Artillery ; Sixth Corps, Franklin — Divisions, Smith and Slocum.
The cavalry organization remained unchanged, and we were sadly deficient in that important arm, as many of the regiments belonging to the Army of the Potomac were among those which had been retained near Washington.
The question now arose as to the line of operations to be followed; that of the James on the one hand, and, on the other, the line from White House
of the 3d and 4th of May the enemy evacuated his positions, regarding them as untenable under the impending storm of heavy projectiles.
Meanwhile, on the 22d of April, Franklin’s division of McDowell’s corps had joined me by water, in consequence of my urgent calls for reinforcements.
The moment the evacuation of Yorktown was known, the order was given for the advance of all the disposable cavalry and horse batteries, supported by infantry divisions, and every possible effort was made to expedite the movement of a column by water upon West Point, to force the evacuation of the lines at Williamsburg, and, if possible, cut off a portion of the enemy’s force and trains.
The heavy storms which had prevailed recommenced on the afternoon of the 4th, and not only impeded the advance of troops by land, but delayed the movement by water so much that it was
tions. At all events, my personal experience in this kind of work was greater than that of any officer under my command; and after personal re-connoissances more appropriate to a lieutenant of engineers than to the commanding general, I could neither discover nor hear of any point where an assault promised any chance of success'. We were thus obliged to resort to siege operations in order to silence the enemy’s artillery fire, and open the way to an assault. All the batteries would have been ready to open fire on the 5th, or, at latest, on the morning of the 6th of May, and it wa s determined to assault at various points the moment the heavy batteries had performed their allotted task; the navy was prepared to participate in the attack as soon as the main batteries were silenced; the Galena, under that most gallant and able officer, John Bodgers, was to take part in the attack, and would undoubtedly have run the batteries at the earliest possible moment; but during the night
MAJOR-GEN. SAMUEL R. HEINTZELMAN, U. S. V.
the safety of Washington, and deprived of all control over the troops in that vicinity. Instead of one directing head controlling operations which should have been inseparable, the region from the Alleghanies to the sea was parceled out among four independent commanders.
On the 3d of April, at the very moment of all others when it was most necessary to push recruiting most vigorously, to make good the inevitable losses in battle and by disease, an order was issued from the War Department discontinuing all recruiting for the volunteers and breaking up all their recruiting stations. Instead of a regular and permanent system of recruiting, whether by voluntary enlistment or by draft, a spasmodic system of large drafts was thereafter resorted to, and, to a great extent, the system of forming new regiments. The results were wasteful and pernicious. There were enough, or nearly enough, organizations in the field, and these should have been constantly maintained at the full strength by a regular and constant influx of recruits, who, by association with their veteran comrades, would soon have become efficient. The new regiments required much time to become useful, and endured very heavy and unnecessary losses from disease and in battle owing to the inexperience of the officers and men. A course more in accordance with the best-established military principles and the uniform experience of war would have saved the country millions of treasure and thousands of valuable lives.
Then, on the 5th of April, I found myself with 53,000 men in hand, giving less than 42,000 for battle, after deducting extra-duty men and other non-combatants. In our front was an intrenched line, apparently too strong for assault, and which I had now no means of turning, either by land or water. I now learned that 85,000 would be the maximum force at my disposal, giving only some 67,000 for battle. Of the three divisions yet to join, Casey’s reached the front only on the i7th, Richardson’s on the 16th, and Hooker’s commenced arriving at Ship Point on the 10th. Whatever may have been said afterward, no one at the time —so far as my knowledge extended — thought an assault practicable without certain preliminary siege opera-