MAJOR-GENERAL EARL YAN DORN, C. 8. A. In chief command of the Confederate forces at Pea Ridge. (From a photograph.)
course of action demanded by the unforeseen impediment on the road, he passed several miles farther to the northeast, and after gaining the Springfield road, he shifted the whole of Price’s forces around to the southeast (toward the Huntsville road), consuming again much valuable time. In fact, instead of commencing his attack by the left at daylight on the 7th, as he expected to do, he did not commence it earnestly before 2 p. M., and instead of gaining the desirable position on the heights and fields which my divisions occupied the next day, he made his attack in Cross Timber Hollow, where our inferior forces had the advantage of defense and of concealing their weakness in the woods, ravines, and gullies of that wilderness. Price’s troops fought very bravely, but so did ours. . . . Price’s 6500 men with 38 guns could not overwhelm about 4500 with 23 guns (including the reinforcements from the First and Second Divisions). . . .
The death of McCulloch was not only fatal to his troops, but also a most serious blow to Van Dorn. Until 2 o’clock on the 7th, the latter had confidently expected to hear of successful action against our left wing; but he received no answer to the despatch he had sent, and began to push forward his own wing. He succeeded, and when night fell made his headquarters at Elkhorn Tavern, where Carr and Major Weston of our army had been in the morning. But here he stopped. He says that by some misunderstanding the troops in the advance were called back (as they were at Shiloh); the true reason for their withdrawal, however, seems to have been their satisfaction with what they had done, and the assurance of completing the work in the morning.
farm, as he confidently expected, he only met a rear-guard of 600 men, which he could not gobble up during nearly 6 hours of iti march' of 6 miles; he was also surprised to find, on his détour around our left flank and rear, that the road was at different places so blocked up, that instead of arriving in our rear, on the road to Springfield, with the divisions of Price at daylight of the 7th, he did not reach that point before 10 o’clock in the morning, by which delay Price’s and McCulloch’s forces became separated and could not assist each other at the decisive moment, while we gained time to make our preparations for the reception of both. Finally, on the 8th, Yan Dorn was greatly “ surprised to find himself suddenly confronted by a new, unexpected force,” attacked in flank and rear, and compelled to retreat. On the other hand, Curtis was “surprised ״ by the sudden turn things had taken, and much disappointed because the enemy did not make the attack against our front, a position not only very strong by nature, presenting a chain of high hills, but also strengthened by intrenehments and abatis, the access to it being also protected and impeded by a deep creek running along our line of defense. He would have been much more “surprised” had it not been for the discovery, by our scouting parties, of the enemy’s flanking movement.
In a strategical and tactical point of view, the battle of Pea Ridge forms a counterpart to the battle of Wilson’s Creek. In the latter battle we were the outflanking party, approaching the camp of McCulloch and Price by a night march, completely surprising and attacking their forces in the morning, but making our attack in front and rear, without being able to communicate with and assist each other. My own brigade of 1118 men, which had gained the enemy’s rear, was beaten first, and then the forces of General Lyon, 4282 men, after a heroic resistance were compelled to leave the field. The enemy held the “interior lines,” and could throw readily his forces from one point to the other. At Pea Ridge the same advantage was with our army, although the enemy had better facilities of communication between his left and right wing, by the road leading from Bentonville to Elkhorn Tavern, than we had had at Wilson’s Creek. There we had had to meet substantially the same troops we encountered at Pea Ridge, with the exception of the Indian Brigade under Pike.
From the result of the battles of Wilson’s Creek and Pea Ridge, it will be seen that the manceuver of outflanking and “ marching into the enemy’s rear” is not always successful. It was not so at Wilson’s Creek, when we had approached, unobserved, within cannon-shot of the enemy’s lines ; however, we were only 5400 against about 11,000, while at Pea Ridge the enemy had 16,202 men in action against our 10,500. In a manceuver of that kind, the venture of a smaller army to surprise and “bag” an enemy whose forces are concentrated, and who holds the “interior lines” or “inside track,” will always be great, unless the enemy’s troops are inferior in quality, or otherwise at a disadvantage.
The movement of Van Dorn during the night of the 6th was bold, well conceived, and would probably have been more successful if it had not been pushed too far out. If Van Dorn had formed his line with the left of Price’s forces resting on the heights, west of Elkhorn Tavern, and McCulloch’s immediately on its right, he would have gained three or four hours’ time, and could have swept down upon us before 8 o’clock in the morning, when no preparations had been made to receive him; his two wings (Price’s and McCulloch’s) would not have been separated from each other by an interval of several miles, and his communications between Bentonville and his position would have been protected. Instead of following this 47
MAJOR-GENERAL STERLING PRICE, C. S. A.
Commanding tlie Missouri State Guard at Pea Ridge. (From a photograph.)
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
BY FRANZ SIGEL, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V. General commanding tlie First and Second Divisions at Pea Ridge.
ating national importance; it did not “break the backbone of the Rebellion,” but it virtually cleared the Southwest of the enemy, gave peace to the people of Missouri, at least for the next two years, and made it possible for our veterans to reinforce the armies under Buell, Rosecrans, Grant, and Sherman. It was a battle of all kinds of surprises and accidents, of good fighting and good manoeuv-ering. Van Dorn was evidently “surprised” when he found that his plan to take St. Louis, and to carry the war into Illinois in April, 1862, was anticipated by our unexpected appearance; he was badly “surprised” when on the 6th of March, instead of “gobbling up ” my two divisions at McKissick’s
THE battle of Pea Ridge (or Elkhorn Tavern, as the Confederates named it) was fought on the 7th and 8th of March, 1862, one month before the battle of Shiloh. It was the first clear and decisive victory gained by the North in a pitched battle west of the Mississippi River, and until Price’s invasion of 1864, the last effort of the South to carry the war into the State of Missouri, except by abortive raids. . . .
The battle of Pea Ridge was the first respite gained by the almost incessant activity and the unflinching courage of our little army, — the Army of the Southwest. It was not a “great” battle, like that of Gettysburg or Chattanooga; it was not of such preponder-