1362

THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN.

December 27, 1918.

denied that such a letter or notice had been received, and
they also pointed out the difficulty of carrying on with
a depleted clerical staff. Aid. C. Markham, in allowing
the case to be withdrawn on payment of costs, said the
bench had the fullest sympathy with the company in view
of the depleted staff and the Government’s requirement
as to complicated returns.

Scotland.

A question which has arisen at the Aitken Pit, Kelty,
was reported on Saturday to the executive board of the
Fife, Kinross and Clackmannanshire Association. Owing
to a breakdown in the shaft a number of miners had to
wait several hours before they could be wound up, and
as the manager was unable on his own authority to con-
cede their demand for payment for the period of waiting,
the colliery was thrown idle on the following day. The
secretary was instructed to interview the miners.

Mr. James Curley, a native of Cambuslang, and for
some years manager to the Shettleston Collieries, Shettle-
ston, has obtained a position in the supervision of collieries
owned by the Equitable and other coal companies in the
Bengal coal fields.

OUTPUT AND VALUE OF FUEL IN 1917.

Mr. W. Walker, H.M. Acting Chief Inspector of
Mines, in his Annual Report (Part III.) for 1917, states
that the total value of the minerals raised during the
year amounted to £223,963,986, an increase of £9,929,462,
as compared with 1916.

The total output of coal was 248,499,240 tons, and
the value, £207,786,894, showing a decrease in the out-
put of 7,876.126 tons and an increase in the value of
£7,772,268 on the figures for 1916. The average price
of coal was 16s. 8’68d. per ton in 1917, as compared with
15s. 7’24d. in 1916.

The total production of coke amounted to 21,995,125
ions, the value being £30,680,447, as compared with
21.389,363 tons and £26,725,482 the previous year. The
production of briquettes was 1,746,048 tons, valued at
£2.472.701, against 1,854.573 tons and £2,421,913 in
1916.

The quantity of coal exported, exclusive of coke and
manufactured fuel and of coal shipped for the use of
steamers engaged in foreign trade, was 34,995,787 tons.
France received over 17| million tons, Italy our
4 million tons, Malta nearly 1|- million tons, Egjpt
over 1| million tons, Gibraltar nearly 11 million tons,
Russia over 1 million tons, and Norway over 1 million
tons. Adding the 3,504,722 tons exported in the form
of coke and manufactured fuel, and the 10,227,952 tons
shipped for the use of British and foreign steamers
ergaged in foreign trade, the total quantity of coal
which left the country was 48,728,461 tons, as against
55,001,113 tons in 1916.

The amount of coal remaining for home consumption
was 199,770,779 tons, or 4 725 tons per head of the
population; 40,981,757 tons were used in the manu-
facture of coke and briquettes, and 2,816,318 tons of
coal with 10,961,734 tons of coke (equal to 18,269,557
tons of coal) in the blast furnaces for the manufacture
of pig iron, as against 39,384,879 tons and 19,780,690*
tons respectively in the previous year.

* This figure represents the coal used and the equivalent
in coal, of coke used.

ACCIDENTS AND LABOUR IN MINES IN 1917.

In Part II. of the Annual General Report on Mines
and Quarries for the year ending December 31, 1917,
just issued, Mr. W. Walker, Acting Chief Inspector of
Mines, states that the total number of persons ordi-
narily employed at mines and at the quarries under the
Quarries Act in the United Kingdom and the Isle of
Man during 1917 was 1,085,471 (1,041,840 at mines and
43,631 at quarries), or a net increase of 19,757 persons
as compared with the preceding year (viz., an increase
of 24,322 at mines and a decrease of 4,565 at quarries).
Of the persons employed at mines, 823,986 worked
underground, and 217,854 above ground. Of the latter,
11,297 were females.

Theie were 1,408 separate fatal accidents in and about
mines and quarries, causing the loss of 1,451 lives, an
increase of 57 fatalities as compared with the previous
year. Of these accidents 1,355, causing the loss of
1.395 lives, happened at mines, and 53, causing the loss
of 56 lives, happened at quarries, or, expressed in terms
of the number of persons employed,the death-rate from
accidents per 1,060 persons at all mines was, under-
ground, 1’500 (or surface and underground 1’339) for
1917 as compared with 1’469 underground (or 1’313
surface and underground) for 1916. The death-rate per
million tons of mineral raised at mines under the Coal
Mines Act during 1917 was 5 27, as compared with the
average figure of 4’99 for the decennial period of
1907-16. The year was, happily, marked by the absence
of any great disaster.

During the year there were prosecutions of owners,
agents and managers by the Home Office under the Coal
Mines, Metalliferous Mines and Quarries Acts in 35
cases involving 243 charges, resulting in 190 convictions,
as against 18 cases involving 184 charges and 121 con-
victions in the previous year. Under the Factory and
Workshop Act, which applies to pit banks of metalliferous
mines and to quarries, there were three prosecutions.
Convictions were obtained in two cases, whilst in the
other case defendant was ordered to £5 5s. towards the
costs. The number of prosecutions of under-officials
and workmen for offences under the Coal Mines Act
and the Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act was 1,099
(1.112 for 1916), resulting in 1,030 convictions, 31 cases
withdrawn or not proven, and 38 eases dismissed.

Work in connection with the testing of explosives for
use in mines was carried on at the Home Office testing
station at Rotherham, and in connection with the testing
of safety lamps at the Home Office testing station at
Eskmeals.

The total number of horses and ponies used under-
ground was 64,895, of which 2,651 died and 2,825 were
ordered to be destroyed.

The aggregate horse-power of electric motors above
and below ground was 913,640 horse-power; and 1,739
electrical coal-cutters were in use at the end of the
year, together with 2,060 operated by compressed air.

The total consumption of explosives in mines and
quarries^ amounted to 31,737,651 tons, of which
26,382,252 tons were used in mines, 47,753,662 shots
being fired.

THE STANRIGG COLLIERY DISASTER:
HOME OFFICE ENQUIRY. .

[Special Report.]

On behalf of the Home Office, Mr. Wm. Walker,
Acting Chief Inspector of Mines, opened a public
enquiry in the Sheriff Court, Airdrie, on Wednesday,
December • 18, into the causes and circumstances
attending the recent disaster at Arbuckle Pit, Stan-
rigg Colliery, near Airdrie, Lanarkshire. Mr. Walker,
as Commissioner, presided over the enquiry, with Mr.
A. D. Lindsay, Procurator-Fiscal, Airdrie, as legal
assessor. Parties were represented as follows: Mr.
Jas. Bell, solicitor, Airdrie, for the owners (Messrs.
A. and L. McCracken) and the manager of the
colliery, Mr. G. Johnstone; Mr. R. McLaren, retired
mines inspector, as technical adviser for the owners
and manager; Mr. G. C. Macintyre and J. C. Allan
(of Messrs. Hay, Cassels and Frame, solicitors,
Hamilton), and D. Dickson, solicitor (of Messrs
Thomas ’Scanlan and Company, solicitors, Glasgow),
for the relatives of men who had lost their lives in
the disaster; Messrs. Straker and Whiteley for the
British Miners’ Federation; Mr. J. Mitchell, solicitor,
Airdrie, for the proprietors of the minerals; Messrs.
Wm. Stevenson and J. Black, the president and secre-
tary respectively of the Scottish Mine Managers’ Asso-
ciation, of which body Mr. G. Johnstone, manager at
Stanrigg Colliery, is a member; Messrs. J. Murdoch,
A. McAnulty and Wm. Kilpatrick (technical adviser)
for the Lanarkshire Miners’ Union.

Mr. George Johnstone, manager of Stanrigg Col-
liery, produced three plans : (1) general layout of the
mine; (2) a plan and section of Stanrigg No. 3 pit,
showing the Humph coal seam and its relation to the
subsidence of moss which occurred on July 9 last; and
(3) a vertical section from the surface to the pave-
ment showing and describing the thickness of the
strata. The thickness of the Humph seam varied from
2 ft. 10 in. to 3 ft., and the depth of the shaft to
that seam was 13 fathoms 4 ft. Two other seams—the
Virgin coal and the upper leaf of the Virgin coal—were
found at a depth of from 19 to 21 fathoms from the
surface.

At the date of the accident there were three shafts
at the colliery, No. 2 pit being the upcast, No. 3 the
downcast, while the air shaft was a downcast.
Ventilation was supplied by means of a forcing fan,
and the quantity of air passed per minute was 14,000
cu. ft. The total number of men employed under-
ground on July 9 was 77, and in addition some 10 or
11 men were engaged'on the surface. About half-past
10 o’clock on the morning of the disaster he was
informed by E. McCracken, one of the colliery firemen,
that the moss had broken into the Humph workings.
Witness thereupon ordered that steps wTere to be taken
to warn the men who were working in No. 2 pit.
Later, Wm. McCracken, another fireman, in ascend-
ing No. 2 pit, reported that he had met blackdamp,
and witness gave instructions to reverse the fan.
Witness telephoned to Coatbridge Mines Rescue
Station for the rescue brigade, and they were at the
colliery within 15 minutes. On the arrival of the
rescue brigade witness descended the pit. He enume-
rated different parts of the workings at which moss
was found. It was soon apparent, from the state of
matters underground, that additional volunteers
would be required for rescue work, because it was
necessary to post men all over the pit so as to give
warning of the approach of the moss.

Witness was down the pit until three o’clock in the
afternoon doing all he could to facilitate the work of
the rescue brigade. When he returned to the surface
he found that a pit had been started there, appa-
rently with the object of sinking down to the Humph
workings. It was, however, unsuccessful. Along with
some others he went to the point where a known bore
existed, and, since the surface had not subsided to any
great extent there, efforts were made to reopen the
bore. Because of the movement of the moss the tube
had been pushed out of the vertical, and the borehole
could not be reopened. Other bores were also tried,
but with unsuccessful results. Under the supervision
of the mines inspectors, efforts to get boreholes
through to the Humph coal were continued until the
morning of July 11. From these it was ascertained
that the level of the water w’as above the highest point
of the workings. It was therefore concluded that it
would be quite impossible for any of the men entombed
in the workings to be alive.

The Commissioner indicated that he proposed to
recall Mr. G. Johnstone at a later stage of the en-
quiry, when evidence had been given by the workmen
and officials employed at the colliery.

The other witnesses examined on Wednesday were
for the most part workmen and officials at the
colliery. They described the onrush of the moss as
making a noise like thunder, and explained that the
moss in appearance resembled “ cow dung.” There
was blackdamp in some of the workings. Eleven men
and eight boys were entombed in the pit, and on the
third day hope of rescuing them alive was abandoned.
Efforts were afterwards made to recover the bodies,
and evidence was given as to the various bores and
shafts that were made, by means of which five bodies
were ultimately recovered. A good deal of the
evidence turned on the question whether a series of
falls from the roof in the locality where the moss had
subsided had not given the officials and men warning
that the moss might eventually break in.

John McCabe, a drawer, of Longriggend, stated
that he met the inundating moss on one of the roads
leading from the Humph seam, and he ran to the pit
bottom. Four men went on to the cage there, but
he ran back about a quarter of a mile underground,

to their working places, and called on his mates to
escape, which they did.

Mr. R. McLaren, retired inspector of mines, stated
that he had reported this lad’s brave action to the
Carnegie Hero Fund trustees. The course Mr. McCabe
had taken was at the risk of his own life.

The Commissioner said that, with a view to giving
a lead to certain expert witnesses whom he proposed
to call on the following day, he would ask Mr. D. M.
Mowat to,give his evidence at this stage, as it would
give the experts time to concentrate their thoughts
on the line of evidence he had submitted.

Mr. David M. Mowat, general manager of the
Summerlee Iron Company Limited, president of the
Mining Institute of Scotland, and a vice-president of
the Institution of Mining Engineers, said that he had
had over 40 years’ experience of working coal, iron-
stone and fireclay in Scotland, and in connection with
the disaster at Stanrigg Colliery he had considered
what steps might be taken to prevent a recurrence
of such an accident. He had no particular knowledge
of what took place at Stanrigg, and his observations
were intended to be of general application. It was
generally believed that seams of stratified material,
including coal, ironstone, fireclay and shale, had
been deposited originally in a more or less horizontal
position. This was supported by the condition in
which they were found. These seams, however, had
not been permitted to remain as they were deposited,
but had been tilted up by earth movements. As a
consequence of this tilting up and of denudation, the
ends or outcrops of many seams became exposed at
the surface. It was generally near these outcrops that
danger of accident, such as occurred at Stanrigg, was
to be apprehended. In the vast majority of cases
no danger was to be feared in working a seam right
up to the outcrop, as the seam impinged against clay
or other stable material. Where the outcrop was over-
lain by wet moss or quicksand or like material, special
precautions should be taken to avoid or remove the
source of danger. These deposits of moss or quick-
sand were usually found in valleys hollowed out by
rivers or by ice. When a river was found flowing over
a rocky bed, there was no danger because there was
no difficulty in determining the exact distance from
the seam being worked to the hard river bed. When
a river flowed slowly through a broad flat valley, the
bed often consisted of gravel and sand, and these might
be present to a very considerable depth. A lake pre-
sented another problem. It was necessary to ascer-
tain the position of the bed of the lake by sounding
in order to determine its distance from the seam
which was being worked. Further, a shallow lake
or a flat valley might become filled with moss to such
an extent that the configuration of the lake or valley
entirely disappeared. In all these cases it became
necessary, before working seams in proximity to such
surroundings, to ascertain in some way or another
when danger might be anticipated. The conditions
existing were so varied that it was impossible to pre-
scribe any uniform method of ascertainment.
Generally speaking, it could best be done by boring,
either from the surface or from the seam. Afterwards,
when it had been ascertained where the bottom of
the moss and quicksand was, it became compara-
tively easy to decide how far the workings must be
kept back from such moss or quicksand, or how these
dangers might be rendered innocuous. In order to
discover where the stable surface existed, it was
usually necessary to put down a line of bores across
the valley of depression. The distance between these
bores and lines of bores would entirely depend on the
nature of the irregularities they disclosed. Where
they showed a slow and gradual descent to the lowest
point with a correspondingly slow and gradual ascent
on the other side, the bores and lines of bores might
be widely separated. On the other hand, if the stable
surface was found to vary abruptly, bores must be
put down at shorter intervals, as the object must
always be to obtain an accurate idea of the contour
of the stable surface underlying the danger. It was
the want of such knowledge which constituted the real
danger.

Answering a series of questions by the Commissioner
as to what precautionary measures might be adopted
in the future to avoid a recurrence of a disaster of
this nature, witness stated that he had framed a
regulation which he thought ought to be considered
by the Home Office. His suggestion was, that the
following regulation should, if thought advisable and
expedient, be included in the Coal Mines Regulation
Act: “Where the workings of a mine are approach-
ing the neighbourhood of any unseen danger, such
as moss, quicksand, etc., at such a depth as is likely
to make the working dangerous, it shall be the duty
of the owner, agent and manager to take such steps,
by boring and otherwise, as shall disclose the nature,
extent and degree of proximity of such danger, and
they shall thereafter take such precautions, by leaving
a sufficient barrier, or by draining the moss or quick-
sand, etc., as shall guard the persons employed in
the mine against danger from a sudden inrush of
water, moss, quicksand, etc., at such a rate as to
endanger the lives of those persons.”

In reply to further questions on this point, Mr.
Mowat said that if it became known that coal was
being worked within 50 ft. of moss, quicksand and
clay, the Home Office should be communicated with
and sanction obtained for continuing to work in that
area. If representatives of owners and workmen
interested were agreed as to the margin of safety, that
might be a satisfactory solution. In the event of a
disagreement, however, the Home Office should be
asked to intervene, and probably a conference between
experts from the Home Office and representatives of
the owners and workmen, as well as representatives
from surrounding collieries, could be arranged.

Witness, in answer to a question by Mr. Bell (for
the owners and manager), said he thought that due
care had been exercised by’the management in the
working of this colliery.

The enquiry was at this point adjourned. The re-
mainder of the report will appear in our next issue.