February 25, 1916.

THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN

361

THE SUPPLY OF COAL IN FRANCE.

Reference has already been made in the Colliery
Guardian to the Bills introduced into the’ French Parlia-
ment relating to the sale and distribution and the
taxation of coal, and to the report of the Commission
appointed to examine both these projects. The Com-
mission submitted proposals of their own, embodied
in a Bill. This Bill, with two slight modifica-
tions, referred to later on, passed through the
French Parliament in December, as stated in our
issue of December 31, 1915 (p. 1356). We are now in
a position to deal at somewhat greater length with the
subject, which, in view of the extent to which our ally
has now to depend upon this country for its coal
supplies, and the similarity of the problems that have
assailed both countries, is full of interest to those
engaged in the British coal trade.-	i

It is explained in the prelude to the report that the
question of apportioning the greatly diminished supplies
of fuel in France amongst the various classes of con-
sumers—the small buyer, the Army, the railways, public
services, munition factories, etc.—had become greatly
complicated, not only by the increase in the price of
French coals, but also by the presence on the market of
a similar product which, coming from two distinct
sources, was selling, at the same hour, at a wide differ-
ence in price.

The Needs of the Country.

Before the outbreak of war, the consumption of coal in
France amounted to about 60,677,000 tons, and for a
third of this sum tribute had to be paid to the foreign e.r.
The war has brought a sensible decline in the consump-
tion as a whole, the paralysis of industries and the
occupation by the enemy of the industrial regions in the
North having reduced the needs of the country to about
40,000,000 tons, but at the same time the sources of
supply, both national and external, have been con-
stricted. Labour has to some extent been restored to
the collieries remaining in operation, and the country
owes a deep debt to the miners, whose patriotism and
disinterestedness have led them to avoid all pretext for
industrial conflict, and io assure the realisation of a
maximum output. But the national production has still
remained below that obtained before the outbreak of
war; the tonnage raised in August 1915 being 1,675,000
tons, corresponding to an annual production of
20,000,000 tons, instead of 41,000,000 tons. Added to
the difficulties arising from this defection of home
supplies, is the loss of two of the three sources of supply
from abroad. This has been partially met by the excep-
tional efforts of Great Britain, who raised her imports to
20,000,000 tons in 1915, as against only 10,000,000 tons
in 1912; but the net result of the figures is such as to
cause extreme inquietude. It is true that as a conse-
quence of the measures adopted there has not been any
acute shortage of fuel, but, owing to the high increase
in the cost of British coal, the question of price has
raised difficulties requiring the most careful adjustment.

The Price of British Coal.

In making this statement it -is necessary to point out
that the price of British coal as delivered to the French
consumer can be divided into several compartments,
•viz. : (a) the pit head price; (b) freight, including cost
of loading and discharge; (c) insurance; (d) rate of
exhange; (e) certain other charges (surestaries) which
demand some explanation. An increase is shown under
each of the above heads.

(a)	On this point it is only necessary to recall that
the pit-head price of coals suitable for the French market
rose during 1915 to a point nearly 100 per cent, in
advance of the prices ruling in 1914. The Price of Coal
(Limitation) Act has to an appreciable extent reacted
upon the export trade, but the price still remains con-
siderably in excess of that previously obtained.

(b)	It is, however, in the rise of freights that the
main cause of the increase is to be found, for the rate
of freight has risen to five or six times that charged
prior to the war; formerly the freight from Cardiff to St.
Nazaire ranged about 5 fr.; it is now quoted (at the date
of the report) at 28 to 30 fr. The freight to Marseilles,
which in July 1914 was about 7 fr., is now nothing less
than 55 fr. The extraordinary fluctuations in freight,
moreover, have greatly aggravated the trouble by encour-
aging speculation.

(c)	The cost of insurance comprises two elements,
those applying to the risks of navigation, and those
arising from the risks of war. The former has not
increased to a marked degree, but the latter is a new
factor, representing about one per cent, of the total
value of the goods insured.

(d)	The rate of exchange has also been against the
French consumer, constituting on a coal valued at 22s.
an increase of not less than 6 fr. per ton.

(e)	The last source- of expense concerns the cost of
demurrage, owing to the impossibility of discharging
within the “ free ” days allowed by the terms of the
contract. This has been caused by the inadequacy of
berths, the shortage of rolling stock at the ports, and
it is stated, that from this cause alone at certain ports
the price of the coal has been increased by 10, 12 and
even 15 fr. per ton.

To indicate the nature of the factors sfet forth above,
the following estimate is quoted from the evidence
tendered by M. Aicard, reference being made to a coal

selling at 66 fr. at St. Nazaire :—

Price f.o.b. (22s. 4- exchange	10 per cent.)... 30-80

Wharfage dues ............................  0-20

Insurance ................................. 0-40

Commission (English	agency) .............. 0-20

Freight .................................. 28-00

Customs, etc............................... 1-40

Unloading charges ......................... 1-00

General expenses .......................... 1'50

Commission (sales agent) .................. 0-50

Profit .................................... 1'50

Total ............................. 65-50

M. Aicard further dissects the coal referred to as
follows :—■

2 per cent, of stone of no value

45	„	small at 22*50 fr.

10	„	coal 15/30 mm. at 7 fr.

or 57 per cent,
at 29*50 fr.

The remaining 43 per cent., value 65 fr. — 29*50 fr. =
35*50 fr. The price per ton of this last coal is then
fixed.

33*50 x 100 co

----------= oj ir.

43

Profits of French Mine Owners.

The Commission, whilst commending the moderation
displayed by the French mine owners, point out that
the main causes of the high cost of British coals as set
forth above, have been those to which the native pro-
duction has not had to submit, and that the price of
French coal has also undergone a sensible increase. In
the Pas-de-Calais basin, the price per ton rose from
18/20 fr. to 28/34 fr., and from 25/34-fr. to 40/45 ft.,
according to quality. In the Loire there have been rises
in the price of small coals of from 4| to 5 fr. In Sadne-
e;-Loire, the price of Blanzy coals rose from 29/32 fr.
to 35/39 fr. In other words, no French colliery has
maintained its prices’at the peace level. Moreover, the
Commission do not regard these rises as being justified
by the conditions, for there has been no increase in the
cost of labour, and the increases in the cost of timber,
etc., have no arithmetical correspondence with the rise
in price. On the other hand, the accounts of the com-
panies show that larger sums have been distributed in
the shape of dividend.

The Dualism of Prices.

Nevertheless, the main trouble has arisen from the
disparity in the markets for British and French coals.
The consumer situated at a great distance from the
French coal fields has still had a substantial interest
in obtaining his supplies from them, and this has led to
an abuse of transport facilities of serious consequence
to the country. It has not been unusual to see coals
from the Loire emigrate into Loire-Inferieure, and the
•stocks of English coal, imported at St. Nazaire, carried
to the industrial districts of the Centre. This sort of
thing has been a direct stimulus to speculation of the
worst character. , “In the midst of an admirable
national spirit of probity, one has seen arise, in the
fog of a troubled horizon, the shameless silhouette of
middlemen, of traffickers without scruple, against whom
the legislation in force has too often proved inadequate
or supine.’’ Merchants have never been free from evil
temptations. As soon as the coal leaves the locus of the
mine, it loses its guarantee of origin, and can be sold
with impunity on the same basis as British coal.

Some Municipal Schemes.

To remedy this state of affairs, several measures have
been taken, by the communes, by Parliament, and by
the Government. None of these efforts have been com-
pletely successful.

In Paris, the municipal authorities in July of last year
raised a loan of 40 million francs for the purpose of
establishing a “ precautionary ” stock of coal, but this
municipal hoard did not cover more than a sixth of the
total requirements of the capital, and did not prevent
very excessive prices being charged for coal. Two other
towns adopted measures of a somewhat similar char-
acter. The Mayor of Lyons, M. Herriot, proposed that
French collieries should be permitted to furnish supplies
to consumers on the understanding that the latter had
contracted for an equivalent supply of British coals. The
Mayor of Limoges inaugurated a plan on the same lines.
He obtained from the Minister of Public Works an under-
taking to deliver to the municipality all the coal neces-
sary for domestic consumption, this to consist half of
English coal, furnished by the State Railways, and half
of French coal drawn from the Decazeville, Aubin, and
Cransac collieries. An agreement was also come to
between the coal merchants and the municipality trans-
ferring contracts to the latter. The price fixed was the
average of the prices of British and French coals, to this
being added the average of cost of transport and duty.
On this basis the municipality have been able to deliver
coal to the merchants at 54*50 fr. per ton in wagons at
Limoges railway station, it being understood that the
maximum retail price shall be 65 fr. per ton.

This arrangement came into force on October 1, and
has worked very satisfactorily. The Commission con-
sider, however, that such schemes are incapable of
general application, although they believe that the
principle of averaging the prices of British and French
coals appears to have great advantages. But beyond
this, there are elements untouched by either the Lyons
or Limoges schemes, which demand attention, notably
the suppression of wasteful transport and the supply to
consumers of coal from the sources nearest to them. It
is obvious that the schemes referred to must even con-
duce to waste of effort in these directions. Conse-
quently, the solution seems to lie rather in the
co-ordination of the entire supply of imported and native
coals, for the purpose of establishing a mean uniform
price. This plan, which is that finally adopted 'by the
Commission and sanctioned by Parliament, will, it is
believed, remove the objection under the previous indis-
criminate system, that the highest prices tended to
regulate the market.

Increasing the Output.

The report, however, alludes to other palliatives that
have been tried. Apart from legislative measures of an
artificial nature, the public powers have endeavoured
to find a solution in natural and direct methods. Two
such measures have suggested themselves, viz. .*—(a)
The augmentation of the native output, that is the
product selling at the lowest price; and (5) efforts to
co-ordinate the market for British coals and bring them
to a position of commercial equality with the French
supplies.

The first of these tasks was placed in the hands of

the Commission of Mines, and the report cites at length
the measures taken in connection with the Dalbiez Act
and otherwise to facilitate the return of territorials to
the mines and the reservation to the industry of men
otherwise liable to military service. The result, it is
believed, would have been appreciably to increase the
supply of labour and the productive capacity of the
mines, but serious obstacles have been continuously
imposed by the military authorities, and these measures
of amelioration consequently have remained for a great
part in abeyance. The Commission of Mines were able
to state as the result of enquiries in August that
the output of coal during June-July could be augmented
at the annual rate of 1,000,000 tons in the Midi,
2,100,000 tons in the Centre, and 2,200,000 tons in the
Nord; or a total of 5,300,000 tons for the whole country,
providing that means were found to increase the number
of workmen by 18,400 (3,900 in the Midi, 4,500 in the
Centre, and 10,000 in the Nord). This supply could
have been assured had the “-instruction” of June 20,
1910, been enforced at the date of mobilisation, and all
miners in the territorial army and its reserve as well as
the auxiliaries of the different classes of the reserve, and
a certain proportion of the men in the general army
reserve, been exempted from military service.

As a result of representations since made, it is hoped
that this result will ultimately be attained, but it can
only bring about a partial solution of the difficulties that
have arisen in France.

Military Requisitions.

Efforts made by the Government on the second of the
lines indicated above have principally aimed at moderat-
ing the price of British coals by : (1) dealing with the
enforcement of military requisitions and the application
of the law of March 27, 1906; (2) negotiations with the
British Government; (3) improvement of machinery at
the ports; (4) improvement of railway transport
facilities; (5) the direct importation by the State rail-
ways. It may be stated at the outset that these efforts
have only been moderately successful. The steps taken
under each heading, however, may be briefly outlined.

(1)	The law of March 27, 1906, empowered the
Minister of War not only to attach all existing supplies
of fuel, but to occupy the mines themselves, with the
object, during the necessary period, of devoting their
entire production to the needs of the Army, At the
date of mobilisation these powers were exerted, and
have been exercised without intermission ever since,
with varying effect, in accordance with the demands of
the military situation. In August, September, and
October, these requisitions accounted for one-tenth of
the total output of the country unoccupied by the enemy.
Further than this, however, the military authorities have
usurped the right of deciding the priority of delivery
in the execution of contracts. This has given a great
advantage to certain large buyers, in the direction both
of assuring a continuous supply of fuel and of obtaining
the latter at the lowest price, but it has certainly reacted
greatly to the disadvantage of the general public, and it
is feared that this favour of selection has not always been
fairly and equitably displayed.

Dealing with the Transport Problem.

(2)	The negotiations with the British Government are
already familiar. When it was decided in August of last
year to prohibit the export of British coal and coke, M.
Leon, Director, of Mines, was immediately despatched to
London, and he obtained the assurance that the needs of
France would be satisfied as in the past, and that our
ally could count upon receiving all the coal necessary.
M. Leon has remained in England as the permanent
representative of French interests. . The results, it is
stated, have been entirely satisfactory, and it is believed
that the Price of Coal (Limitation) Act, although operat-
ing directly only in the case of coals sold for home
consumption, has helped to modify the price of coals
exported to France.

(3)	Considerable improvements have been carried out
at the chief ports, notably at Rouen, Havre, St. Nazaire,
Nantes, La Rochelle, Rochefort, Dieppe, Caen,
Bordeaux, Marseilles, and Dunkirk. These works have
not been unattended by difficulties, as they have been
executed with the double purpose of facilitating the
handling of coal and of other commodities, such as
cereals, the daily import of which in June-August,
amounted to nearly 17,000 tons per day. The net result
is that the coal-handling capacity of the ports, which
was 36,792 tons per day in December 1914, had been
increased to 61,224 tons in August 1915. The capacity
of Rouen alone has been raised from 14,646 tons to
20,873 tons in September. The tonnage handled has
risen in the same period as follows :—December,
1,140,543 (tons; January, 1,339,840 tons; February,
1,381,301 tons; March, 1,634,780 tons; April, 1,536,212
tons; May, 1,666,572 tons; June, 1,769,402 tons; July,
1,861,808 tons; August, 1,897,942 tons; September,
1,870,396 tons.

(4)	The efforts to reduce the transport crisis to
simplicity have been attended by exceptional difficulties.
Before the war the number of goods wagons available,
in round figures, was 340,000. Of these about 50,000
were detained in Germany at the outbreak of war, but
on the other hand, France retained about 9,000 Belgian
trucks, leaving a net loss of 40,000 wagons. In order
to maintain a .traffic representing from 120 to 140 per
cent, of their traffic in time of peace would entail the
employment of from 100,000 to 120,000 additional
wagons. Taking a unit of 50,000 wagons, the deduction
for transport of troops, etc., is from 2,500 to 3,000
wagons, and if the average “ rotation ” of a wagon be
taken as five days, this is converted into a total of 10,000
wagons; the transport of war materials, notably artillery
and explosives, absorbs a daily total of at least 3,500
wagons; preferential transports for war establishments,
etc., represent a further daily total of 3,000 wagons.
Thus from 3,000 to 3,500 wagons are left for general
trading purposes, as against 8,500 to 9,000 wagons in the
corresponding period of the year 1913. In addition, the