May 23, 1913.

THE COLLIER? GUARDIAN.

1059

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the face fault for some time past, the first occurring in
August 1906, at the face, right up against the fault in

old 37’s stall. This fire was dug out. A second fire
occurred not far away from the first, viz., at the top side
off the crossgate out of 33’s level on the fault side,
where some timber had been left (see fig. 2). A third
fire occurred at old 121’s stall, still against the fault,
and at a point which is marked A on the plan (fig. 2). The
existence of this fire was first discovered on November- 20,
1911, and when scouring roads were driven to it it was
found that the fire had backed from the fault for a

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seen a “ flash over- the pack ” about 20 to 30 yards away
from where Springthorpe had seen the fire before. But
on making an investigation, neither the under-manager
nor the deputy could find any trace of the fire. Mr.
Bridges, however, stated that although he could not
find it, “ there must have been some fire ” in April.
Eventually the road and gateway leading to it were
stated to have been stowed up. The temperature at the
spot where the fire had been seen by Saunders was
according to Springthorpe between 94 degs. and 98 degs.
Eahr. at the time when Saunders made his statement.
This spot was just about four yards from the airway
side.

A good system of air sampling and analysis was in
operation at the colliery, and the state of the mine air
in various parts of the openings to the area affected by
the fire or incipient fire for some time prior to the
explosion is given in a table accompanying the report.
From this it appears that the atmosphere at 121’s old
gate had been depleted of nearly one-quarter of its
oxygen, containing only 15’8 per cent., and showing
also 2 per cent, of carbon dioxide, clearly indicating
considerable heating in the vicinity.

The first indication of the fire reported was on Friday
evening, and during the whole of the week-end the
management were engaged in combating this fire. The
meaning of the expression “ gob stink in 121 old gate ”
needs some explanation. During the operations attendant
on the extinguishing of the previously-recorded fires in
this district, old 125’s had been stowed up, having acted
as a “ smoke-hole ” or vent for the air carrying smoke
into the return airway to the 33 level. Old 121’s then

ventilation was passing along the face of 64’s and coming
out past the end of 7’s until the pack was put on and
that the pack “ could be finished, I think, on Monday
afternoon.” The face of 64’s was, however, being
worked on Monday, and the south district workbook
points to men being engaged in building a pack in 64’s
on Monday night. There must have been an air road
connecting the face of 64’s and 7’s. On fig. 2 is shown
by dotted lines the position of the stopping in 7’s gate
supposed by the management to have been erected, but
shown at the enquiry not to have been put in. So far
as can be determined, no notice of the indications of
heating was sent by the manager to Mr. Pickering.
“ It is quite clear to me,” says Mr. Redmayne,” “ that
the place was dangerous, but it was necessary, in the
interests of safety, that the stoppings should be put in
with all possible despatch; care, however, should have
been taken to see that the ‘ intake ’ to the fire area was
stopped off before the ‘ return ’ side, and no persons
other than those engaged in putting in the stoppings
should have been allowed to work in the district until
the area in question had been completely isolated.”

As to the atmospheric conditions prevailing at the
time of fire a short time precedent to the explosion, the
automatic chart of the barometric pressure on July 8
shows a steady rise from 29'74in. to 29'90 in., and for
July 9 a continued rise from 29'90 to 30 00 inches.

Conclusions.

The report proceeds to give a narrative of the
occurrence of the two explosions, of the sealing off
operations and the recovery work. Mr. Redmayne’s
conclusions on the^vanous’points are'given’below :—

6 T M PAGE.

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Fig. 5.—Iron Doors Inserted in Stopping during Process of Recovery.

became the new smoke - hole. It was in this road,
therefore, that the smell of “ gob stink ” would naturally
be first detected.

Mr. Redmayne here states that the plans submitted
by the management at the enquiry, purporting to show
what roads had been stowed and the position of the
' stoppings in the neighbourhood of the fire were
inaccurate, though he satisfied himself the particulars
! shown were in accordance with the instructions given
j by Mr. Chambers, but he does not think these instruc-
tions had been carried out in the order and manner
' intended by Mr. Chambers. Mr. Redmayne is of opinion
that the directions given by Mr. Chambers were proper
■ and such as would have prevented the disaster that
' took place on Tuesday morning had they been carried
out in the order in which he intended them to be carried
1 out.

Reproduction of the illustrated notes in Cusworth’s note-,	m___• ______a- „ a.____.. ™ tvt__

book, descriptive of the position of bodies, tubs, lamps, &c.,	^ ie position, accoi ding to Spungthoipe, on Monday

after the first and before the second explosion.	I afternoon when he left the pit, was as follows:—The

stopping in old 125’s was completed. A pack stopping
distance of eight yards into the goaf (gob). On j had been put in 121’s old gate, and outbye side of it a
January 20, 1912, a small explosion of gas occurred brick stopping had been commenced but was not
at this fire, slightly burning four men who were engaged completed, and a stopping had been built in old 7’s.

in working at the face.

The deputy, Springthorpe, said he saw fire on
February 2, which “ broke out over the top of the
bars that had been set to scour forward towards the
fault ” This was about two yards back from the fault, '
and it was the top coal which caught fire which “ had
probably been packed in when the coal had been got
out.” It was only a very small fire, and Springthorpe
soon put it out. The chargeman at this spot (Saunders,'
killed in the explosion) stated on April 10 that he had

According to him the only men working at stoppings
in the district were those at 121’s old gate and those at
new 7’s who were engaged in strengthening a pack
stopping. No stopping had been put in on the left-
hand side of new 7’s up against the fault. He said, “ it
was quite solid on the fault side,” but the Chief
Inspector is very doubtful as to this being so. He said
also that the right-hand of 7’s stall was “ gob packed,”
so that an explosion could find no vent along the face
there. In answer to Mr. Smillie, he said some of the

The First Explosion.

From a consideration of the evidence of the witnesses
who appeared before me, I have arrived at the conclusion
that the first explosion originated above 64’s gate, most
probably in the neighbourhood of the face of 7’s gate, and
travelled in two directions. One was along the face to 121’s
gate displaying very little force but great heat; it split at
121’s and passed partly down 121’s crossgate, developing
force and partly along the face to 12’s gate. The explosion
passing down 121’s bifurcated at the bottom of 12’s gate,
part continuing to sweep along the crossgate and part
entering 12’s gate (a man had been blown over a water tub
inbye in 12’s gate). On reaching 14 level the explosive
blast seems to have developed its greatest violence—
possibly owing to accumulations of coaldust on the landing
or perhaps to obtaining a sufficiency of air to render the
mixture of gas and dust more explosive—and to have
expended itself on the level further outbye, about where
19 crossgate joins 14 level. There was no evidence of
burning by the first explosion for any distance beyond the
end of 19’s crossgate ; but there was evidence of force up
to the end of 14’s level, as the tubs at the outbye end of this
level were blown on to the plane.

The other direction pursued by the explosion—from near
the point of origin—was down the 64’s gate (two bodies were
blown into the side in 64’s crossgate), and force and flame
continued along 19’s landing and to 19’s crossgate (some
50 yards below the level it upset two tubs, blowing one on
top of the other, and pressing them tight against the roof.
These tubs were put on to the rails again after the first
explosion. It blew the separation door open, but did not
damage it, and burnt two men there, viz., Mulrooney and
Boycott) ; I do not think, however, that the flame reached
the end of the 19’s Crossgate, but that the explosion died
out along that road. I think it died out for want of fuel to