576

THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN.

March 23, 1917.

sample gave : Moisture, 2-6 per cent.; volatile eombus-
■tible matter, 27-0; fixed carbon, 43’8; ash, 26-6; and
ratio of fixed carbon to volatile combustible matter,
1-81 per cent.

At the top of No. 2 cross cut, and. on the west side,
sample showed evidence of heat, and grains rounded.
Inside counter of No. 5 cross cut a piece of under-
clothing was found on the top of the eave of coal. The
sample of cloth showed signs of burning and dust cinder-
ing in the fibre; also colours on the particles showed heat
effects. The analysis of. this dust showed: Moisture,
1'8 per cent.; volatile combustible matter, 30’8; fixed
carbon, 53-2; ash, 14-2; ratio of fixed carbon to volatile
combustible matter, 1-73.

The dust off the first body found in the counter level,
inside No. 5 west cross cut (Bowley’s), showed distinct
signs of cindering and coking, but the sample was too
small for complete analysis. The analyst reported 16’5
per cent, of ash, and that the sample was partly coked.

The microscope showed that the dust collected from

Fig. 2.—Sitter's Damaged Lamp.

From Upper West Counter Level face.

the top of the timber at the bottom of No. 5 cross cut
was very fine, and had very little evidence of heat and
cindering. No analysis of this was made.

Sample of dust off the third prop from the slope showed
fine dust and some cindering. The analysis gave :
Moisture, 2'0 per cent.; volatile combustible matter,
28’0; fixed carbon, 46-5; ash, 23’5; and the ratio of
fixed carbon to volatile combustible matter, 1’66.

Under the microscope, a sample of dust from the roof
lagging at the entrance to the lower counter level off the
slope showed cindering in the rounded particles of dust,
but not much adherence. The analysis of this sample
gave: Moisture, 3-1 per cent.; volatile combustible
matter, 24-2; fixed carbon, 53-1; ash, 19’6; and the ratio
of fixed carbon to volatile combustible matter, 2’20; and
the specimen was partly coked.

Between the top of the slope and the downcast shaft,
a sample of dust was collected off a post 2 in. by 4in.,
inside No. 2 cross cut of the west level, which showed
distinct signs of cindering under the microscope: The
analyst reported this as : Moisture. 2'4 per cent.; vola-
tile combustible matter, 19-3; fixed carbon"; 52'2; ash,
26’1; and ratio of fixed carbon to volatile combustible
matter, 2-70. This was a very important sample, as
there was no evidence of any such heat in the west
counter level, and therefore it must have come along
the level.

Flame, or highly-heated air, reached the entry to the
tunnel to the downeast, as two men were burned at that
point, one of whom unexpectedly survived, but could
give no information.

This mine was wet on the top sides and floor, all the
way down the slope, and all along the west level, the
air was practically saturated with moisture, and in the
west counter there were pools of water, though the peri-
meter of the road did not appear to be so wet as in the
level and slope.

The Residual Heat Question.

Now, the question is, whether, in view of these con-
ditions, it is in any way possible for there to have been
sufficient “ residual ” heat from an explosion in the
upper counter level to ignite in the slope a supposed
volume of unconsumed firedamp originating from the
west counter? If so, then the value of water as an
arrester of an explosion, or as a preventive, is proved to
be most fallacious. Not only so, but it is evident that,
although coal dust played some small part in the exten-
sion of the explosion, yet if there had been no firedamp
present, such an explosion would have been impossible.

It is scarcely worth while calling attention to the fact
that the theorised explosion from delayed combustion
had not a single point to support it. If the origin had
been in the west counter, the main effect would have
been demonstrated along the west counter, where the
gas could escape most freely, and where the cooling
effects would have had the least influence.

The principal demonstrations of force were, however,
■in the dip slope, its No. 1 counter, and nt the end of
and in the tunnel from the downcast shaft. The prin-
cipal heat effects were manifested at the same points,
and on No. 2 west cross cut, and at the top of No. 4
cross cut, on the west side. The dustiest part of the
mine at the time of the explosion was probably in the

west counter level, where the men w’ere dragging a
piece of timber after hauling it up No. 5 cross cut.

The height at the end of the west counter level was
insufficient to produce force enough to damage Suter’s
safety lamp, as shown in fig. 3. The Chief Inspector
acknowledged that the injury to the lamp was caused by
a piece of wood to which brattice cloth was attached;
and as there was no board and brattice overhead, it is
clear that these were propelled by a horizontal and not
a vertical force. He, however, went on to assume that
the flame of the lamp had survived the sledge-hammer
force to which it had been exposed and that it was the
flame which broke the glass and ignited the firedamp
brought down in very great volume by a fall of roof.
That the force and flame which killed the three men,
Bewley, Vitter, and Suter, was instantaneous is demon-
strated by the fact that Vitter had not had time to loose
his hold of the rope he was using to carry the stick of
timber, one of his feet being under the timber. None of
these men had survived long enough to show’ signs of
carbon monoxide poisoning, a fact which also indicates
the instantaneous character of their death, and that there
was no time to break the lamp glass by flame within the
glass.

Preliminary Explosion.

The map of the mine (fig. 1) shows that, inside of
No. 5 cross cut, something else had occurred which has
not previously been referred to n these notes, viz., that
a shot had been fired in the top end of No. 6 cross cut,
and had ignited both firedamp and dust. This explo-
sion did no material damage inbye of No. 6, but outbye
of that point to No. 5 cross cut it knocked down most
part of the wooden brattice.

From the positions of the men in this part of the mine
it was evident that the explosion in No. 6 cross cut had
preceded the main explosion by a few .seconds only; but
in what way it may have affected the initiation of the
main explosion was not discovered. The writer has no
doubt whatever in stating that the final explosion origi-
nated at the point in No. 1 counter level of the dip slope
section, where a miner was preparing charges of powder
for use at the face of the level, and probably from an
accident to a detonator. (See body No. 9, fig. 1.)

Probable Cause of the Accident.

On reference to the map of the mine, it will be seen
that the point where No. 9’s body was found was the
centre of force in the dip section, and this is proved by
the fact that he had not moved from the position where
he was at work, the situation and condition of his safety
lamp, the injuries to his body, the fact that he was close
to his store of explosives, and also that he had two shot-
holes in the face of the counter heading ready for charg-
ing. Both bones of his right leg were broken, left arm
broken near the wrist, lower jaw fractured, and false
teeth blown out, punctured wound in right side into the
lungs, and also in the neck, badly burned over face and
entire body, hands badly burned, and thighs
scorched. This is the only case of a man
being burned so low down in the whole mine.
Explosives were bn the ground close to the
body. The writer considered that these facts
point to the probability that the man was
doling something with a detonator, or that a
piece of rock fell on a detonator close in front
of him. The injuries also point very
directly to the supposition that the deto-
nator was in his left hand, and that he was
kneeling on his left knee. No other body in
the dip section was so severely burned and
injured. The safety lamp is also proof of a
very severe air force close at hand, which
bent over the inside gauzes, as shown in
fig. 2, whilst the shield itself was only very
slightly punctured.

The force was inbye from this point, and
forced a prop through the end of the empty
car standing at the face of the level. It also
knocked down the brattice, and made the
cave on the top of which the body of No. 9’s
mate was found, slightly burned on hands,
face, and shoulder. Down the dip, the first
man to meet the flame and force was the
rope rider, whose broken lamp was found
near the end of the signal wire, and his body
partly under the loaded car. He was badly
burned on his face, hands, thighs, and inside
his mouth; both his eyes and mouth were
wide open. Lower down the dip slope two
men were at work at the face; neither of
them were much burned, one on the legs,
and the other on his hands. Both ran up
the slope some distance, and died of gas
poisoning (CO). From this point, and to the
top of the slope, the whole of the brattice was

knocked down, and much of it piled up in small pieces
over and around the hauling winch. Unfortunately, the
No. 9 body was buried before the -writer had realised the
importance of the wounds; but he feels sure that some
part of a detonating cap would have been discovered in
the man's lungs.

Why a detonator should have been exploded in this
way is not easily explainable, but the man may have
been startled by the explosion in No. 6 cross cut, and
thus have done .something which he otherwise would not
have done. That there was gas in the face of the lower
counter level was shown by the condition of the gauzes
of the lamp found hanging at the face, and also by the
fact that there was a blower of gas out of the floor near
the face of the dip slope.

The only other point where an ignition of gas could be
suggested was the dip rider’s broken lamp; but the posi-
tion of his body was proof that the force came towards
him, and not from his position.

It will be seen, therefore, that the direction of the
force exerted did not originate in the west counter level
inside of No, 5 cross cut, and that the heavy fell of roof

coal in that part of the upper counter was an after effect
of the explosion, as likewise the other falls in the same
counter level outbye of No. 5 cross cut.

With these facts in view, it will be realised that there
was no possibility of the main explosion in the dip slope
having been caused by residual heat from an explosion
■in the west counter; for if it had been so, then there
were three distinct explosions : the first, in No. 6 cross
cut; the second, in the west upper counter; and the
third, in the dip slope. The writer confidently asserts
that, in the circumstances related above, such an occur-
rence as the third explosion, resulting, as suggested by
the Chief Inspector of Mines, from residual heat, was
an absolute impossibility in such a wet or damp class
of coal mine, and that the real explosions were : first,
in the face of No. 6 cross cut, from a Monobel shot which
ignited gas and dust; and almost simultaneously and
secondly, in the lower counter of the dip slope, where
No. 9’s body was found.

One of the main contributing causes of this disaster
was that the mine was rendered practically airless on the
west side whilst the single air separation door at the end
of the tunnel from the downcast was open, for some
time, whilst a mule and two men twice passed through
it with a car of long timber.

CONTROL OF CHARTERING.

In a letter to the Central Executive Committee of
Great Britain for the Supply of Coal to France and
Italy, the Board of Trade drew attention to the following
regulations affecting the chartering of vessels :—

(1)	Control of Chartering of Steamers under 1,000 Tons.—
A regulation made under the Defence of the Realm Acts on
January 10, laid it down that permission had to be obtained
before any non-British steamer over 1,000 tons was char-
tered, either for voyage or for time. A new regulation under
the Defence of the Realm Act has now been made extending
this provision to all steamers. The effect of this is that the
chartering of non-British steamers under 1,000 tons is under
exactly the same control as the chartering of non-British
steamers above 1,000 tons.

(2)	Limitation Rates of Freight.—As there has been some
misunderstanding, the Shipping Controller and the Board of
Trade would like it to be understood that there is no inten-
tion of reverting to the old system of unrestricted competi-
tion. All chartering of neutral steamers will be under the
control of the Inter-Allied Chartering Executive, which will
determine from time to time what rates have to be paid in
order to obtain the services of neutrals. The Inter-Allied
Chartering Executive will not be limited by the printed
schedule rates of freight, but will decide what rates have to
be paid according to the state of the markets.

The schedules will, however, remain the basis, and will
be varied by the Inter-Allied Executive from time to time
by percentages higher or lower according to the state of
the market. These percentages will, of course, be applic-

Illi

Fig. 3.—Crewe’s (No. 9’s) Lamp.

Showing injury to shield, and gauze bent over base ring (+) by
air pressure.

able to all the districts, so that there shall be no competition
between districts.

(3)	Rates for British Ships.—As there has been some mis-
understanding on this question also, the Shipping Con-
troller wishes it to be clearly understood that the rates for
British, French, and Italian ships engaged in the coal trade
are those laid down in the printed schedules of voyage rates
with the corresponding rates fixed by the Central Executive
Committee for time charters, and if these rates are departed
from, it will be necessary to consider the question of requisi-
tioning. It is requested that the local committees will report
at once to the Shipping Controller any cases which come to
their notice.

All Allied ships are to be chartered through the local com-
mittees, and only ships having a permit from the local
committee will be loaded.

(4)	Allocation.—It ha-s been decided that the French and
Italian Governments will take the sole responsibility of
deciding the particular services for which particular ships are
to be employed, and will determine the priority in which
orders are to be executed. The local committees will allo-
cate the steamers in accordance with the wishes of the
French and Italian authorities,