June 11, 1915.

THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN.

1233

THE WORKING OF CONCILIATION BOARDS IN THE COAL TRADE,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SCOTLAND *

By Adam Kimmo, M.A.f

The necessity for finding a satisfactory method of
limiting or preventing strikes in the coal trade has early
forced itself upon the minds of interested parties,
because a strike in the coal trade probably produces
more widespread and serious loss than would be
experienced if any other industry were similarly
affected. This may account for the rapid growth of
methods of conciliation, although it may be due to the
rapid and efficient development of trade unionism.
Methods of conciliation have been earlier adopted in the
coal trade than in most of the other important industries
of the country, and these methods have gone further in
their endeavour to reach a settlement in all the questions
affecting a general rise or a general reduction in wages.

Conciliation Boards in the coal trade have been a
gradual evolution. They have developed in relation to
local necessities, and they have therefore local features.
Generally speaking, they do not attempt to deal with
individual collieries either in regard to the wage to be
paid to the individual workman, or in regard to any
particular circumstances applicable to individual
collieries.

These Conciliation Boards have not always been
successful, and strikes have taken place notwithstand-
ing their operation. Within certain limits, however,
they have performed an important service to the
industry and to the whole community. They have had
an educative influence upon the views held both by
employers and workmen. They have assisted in pro-
moting a better understanding .between them, and have
supplied a steadying effect upon the whole industry,
which has been beneficial. They have gradually
developed a better understanding and feeling in the
local associations or district committees, and have
helped to make these increasingly useful.

In Scotland the principle of compulsory arbitration
has been accepted since 1909. Previous to that time,
the reference to a neutral chairman was voluntary, and
subject to the consent of both parties. All Conciliation
Boards in the coal trade of th© United Kingdom, with
the exception of Forest of Dean, accept in some form
the principle of compulsory arbitration, but the decision
of the umpire or neutral chairman is generally kept
within certain limits, either defined by rules and regula-
tions which form part of the constitution of the Board
for the time being, or by some special agreement. In.
Scotland at present there is no agreement between the
parties defining either the limits of an application in
relation to wages or the methods by which the neutral
chairman shall decide the question submitted to him.

It is a feature of the procedure of all the Boards that
wages shall only be moved up or down at certain
intervals in relation to values of coal that have been
ascertained over the period so fixed. In most of the
districts the period is three months, but in Scotland
during recent years the ascertainment of figures has
been made month by month. Delay in procedure before
a decision is reached is on the whole advantageous to
both sides. It permits of full discussion on the ques-
tion at issue, it prevents hurried and ill-considered
judgment which might harass the industry," and it gives
time to determine whether the conditions of trade giving
rise to the application by either side are temporary and
may be expected to rapidly pass away, or whether they'
are due to economic causes likely to prevail for some
time.

The Scottish Board was established in 1900. It
developed out of the local associations. The cohesion
of the Board has come on both sides by a gradual
process. The authority of the Board has firmly estab-
lished itself only by degrees. The Board as at present
constituted represents every district in Scotland. Since
it was established there have been 28 alterations made
by it in general rates of wages. Eleven of these have
been made by voluntary agreement of the parties, and
17 by the decision of the neutral chairman. This
appears to be the result of national characteristics.
Questions of wages appear to be fought with greater
tenacity in the coal trade in Scotland than in any other
part of the United Kingdom. Like other Conciliation
Boards in the coal trade, the Scottish Board has worked
reasonably well within certain limits.

Conciliation Boards in any trade will secure success
in proportion to their ability to define by mutual agree-
ment the questions likely to arise for consideration, and
according to their ability to limit the area of discussion.
The more points that surround and affect the question
of wages at issue that have already been satisfactorily
disposed of by the agreement of parties, the less likeli-
hood there is of friction arising.

It is at this point that the importance of wages agree-
ments is realised. A necessary adjunct to the consti-
tution of every Conciliation Board is that the rules and
regulations of the Board shall either by themselves
define the questions that may come up for consideration
by the Board, the range of such questions, and the
facts and considerations which shall be taken into
account in arriving at a decision; or that side by side
with the rules and regulations of the Board there shall
be what is called.a wages agreement entered into, which
by mutual consent shall deal with and dispose of such
questions and considerations. These wages agreements
may be said to be a feature of all the Boards of Concilia-
tion in the coal trade. In Scotland, wages agreements
have existed from 1902 until 1912. In the latter year
the existing wages agreement was terminated, and since
then various unsuccessful efforts have been made to
form a new wages agreement.

* From a paper read before the Royal Philosophical
Society. ''	'

f Chairman of the Conciliation Board for the Coal Trade
of Scotland.

Every proper wrages agreement will attempt to estab-
lish some equitable correspondence between wages and
prices. In the coal trade the price of the commodity is
likely to be the main factor in determining the ‘wage to
be paid. Volume of trade, however, must also be taken
into account. This has led to the consideration of what
is called “ the state and prospects of trade.” "When the
Conciliation Board was established in Scotland in 1900,
it had no wages agreement, but .through the good offices
of Lord Ardwell, the first neutral chairman, such a
wages agreement was entered into.

There is no district of the United Kingdom where
wages and values of coal are brought into such a close
relationship as in Scotland. Such a close relationship
demonstrates that, provided the relationship between
wages and prices at the basis is equitably established,
the workmen receive a very large share of the prosperity
and therefore of the profits of the industry.

The storm centres of the wages question in the coal
trade are the minimum wage and the basis price. They
set forth fundamental differences in aim and policy on
the part of employers and workmen which it is feared
no Conciliation Board can really reconcile. The pre-
sence of these two recurring factors has increased the
tendency to centralise the wages question. They have
prevented Conciliation Boards supplying an effective
and reliable instrument for the final and permanent
solution of wages questions in the coal trade. It may
be suggested that any serious conflict of interest in
regard to these two main factors should be unnecessary
if the real interests of the parties are alone looked at,
and if there is a sincere desire shown only to reach the
ends of equitable dealing. It may even be argued that
the interests of parties are at bottom identical, namely,
that it is in the interest of the employer to pay a fair
wage, and in the interest of the workman to concede an
adequate profit. That merely pushes the whole difficulty
a stage further back, as you have still to determine what
a fair wage and what an adequate profit are. Within
every Conciliation Board at present the parties come
together as opposing forces.

The Conciliation Board in the long run assists the
workman more than it does the employer. It first of
all establishes his standing, it serves to consolidate his
forces, and it generally provides decisions which are
compromises much more in the interest of the workman
than the employer. They are always bringing the
workman nearer the goal that he has in view, and are
therefore constantly supplying him with .impulse to put
forward greater demands. There is no serious tendency
observed in the working of Conciliation Boards towards
concessions to the employer. The Conciliation Board is
used as a lever to raise the position of labour, and this
irrespective of the economic ability of the average
employer and the broad interests of the industry. The
history of the Conciliation Board .in Scotland exemplifies
these statements. What has happened is that each new
wages agreement that has been entered into has been
used to increase the wage at the bottom. Wages are
advanced, by means of the Board, above the minimum
wage in keeping with any increased value of coal that
is obtained in the market, but as soon as a reaction in
trade takes place, the workmen fix a point below which
wages shall not fall, irrespective of values, and this
point is always higher at the end of every wages agree-
ment or every period of prosperity than it was before.
The employer is practically always on the defensive,
and the workman practically always on the offensive.
The latter never allow the clock to be turned back. They
are unwilling to admit that any change has taken place
in the cost of production to operate against the
employer, and they argue that they are entitled to
receive the benefit of any advantage which the employer
may have obtained through the introduction of
mechanical and labour-saving devices. At the bottom
there is something so essentially different in the view-
point of the two sides of the Board under existing com-
mercial and industrial conditions, as to make it
extremely improbable that ultimate agreement will ever
be reached by means of the Conciliation Board.

It might be thought that the compulsory arbitration
clause which has been operative would prevent serious
trouble, but it has rather tended to increase the diffi-
culties of the situation. The view has been pressed by
the workmen’s representatives that the neutral chairman
was not entitled, in connection with any application
made for an alteration of wages under existing circum-
stances, to take into account new factors or conditions
that had intervened since the last wages agreement was
entered into, as any such decision would in effect estab-
lish a new basis price against the minimum wage for all
time, and would be using the neutral chairman to make
a new wages agreement for the parties which was not
the duty of the neutral chairman. The adoption of this
view has practically led to a reductio ad absurdum, as it
has meant that the parties, although having abandoned
the old agreement for the very purpose of discussing and
if possible adjusting new conditions, are being rigidly
held to an expired agreement, which cannot now be held
to be equitable in the altered circumstances. On the
general question of compulsory arbitration the workmen
have consistently refused to arbitrate upon the district
minimum wage in the sense that the arbitration will be
an open arbitration. They fear that to concede this
important principle would militate seriously against the
power which they are able to exercise through their
trade union. The employers, on their side, have not
seen their way to allow all questions which concern their
interests to be determined by compulsory arbitration.
They refuse to put it into the hands of the arbiter to
permanently fix the basis price; in other words, they

refuse to hand over their business to an arbiter that he
may determine both what wage they shall pay and what
profit they shall earn. ■	•	’

One of the chief difficulties is that trade unionism, as
far as we can judge of it in actual operation in the coal
trade, shows no inclination to concede a fair profit to the
industry; that is, a profit that will attract capital to it.
On the other hand, the workmen’s representatives
appear to accept as an absolute dictum the theory that
wages will ultimately rule prices, and that therefore no
injury can arise by frequent demands for increasing
wages. If the industry were self-contained, there might
be some ground for this view, but with foreign competi-
tion it is a delusion. Trades unionism, as it works in the
coal trade, is, in the long run, incompatible with the
proper working of a Conciliation Board. Temporary
difficulties may be overcome through the Board, but
fundamental differences are not overcome. In the coal
trade it is easy to observe an increasing tendency to set
up a common standard of wages and labour conditions
for every district, and to bring the strength of the
British Miners’ Federation to bear upon any
district where the standard of wage or other conditions
are unsatisfactory from the miners’ point of view. The
whole tendency, therefore, is to centralise every wages
question. The workman has his own objective, and he
never ceases to press towards it. He has his own view
regarding the value of money, and asserts that if he
adjusts with the employer wrhat he calls a fair return for
his money at the basis point, any additional return upon
capital ought to go to labour, while he refuses to, share
in the losses of the industry by insisting upon the fixing
of a minimum wage, irrespective of any fall in values of
coal.

A further fundamental view, which prevents any per-
manent reconciliation of interests, is the view that the
mines of the country ought not to be the property of the
private owner, but should be vested in and worked by
the State. The State ownership of mines would not
bring about the harmonious solution of questions of
wages unless the State, through its executive, agreed to
give the workmen the fixed minimum wage at which
they aimed, irrespective of the result. The workmen
argue that the State could afford to do this, and that the
cost to the country would not be greater than it is just
now, as a large sum of money would be saved annually
in respect of the administrative charges necessary for
the conduct of the industry and the profit earned. It is
even argued that the price of coal on an average would
not be so high as it is at present. The State, however,
would require to make the industry profitable to itself
by giving an adequate return upon the amount of money
which the State required to expend in purchasing the
mines of the country, and on an average the profit in
the whole coal trade for a complete cycle of trade, is at
present very small. The demands which would be
made by labour would be even greater than they are at
present, as no doubt the goal that would be aimed at
would be a minimum wage of 8s. per day, if not more,
for not more than eight hours’ work, from bank to bank,
and, under these conditions, the burden which would
be thrown upon the country would be much greater than
it could carry, as there would be this very serious posi-
tion involved, that the export of coal would doubtless
be very materially affected, and it is almost incon-
ceivable that the industries of the country that are
dependent upon cheap coal would long survive the
pressure of these new conditions. The demand which
is made by labour in favour of the State control of the
mines is advocated not so much from the point of view
of the efficient conduct of the mines, or for the benefit
of the consuming community, but much more to secure
for the workmen a much higher minimum wage and
better conditions of employment.

Government intervention in trade disputes in this
country has increased to a considerable extent since the
Conciliation Act of 1896 was passed, and particularly
during the last 10 years. There are many cases in
which such intervention may take place with advantage.
Compulsory arbitration, however, has not so far in this
country gone the length necessary to make the working
of Conciliation Boards completely satisfactory. The
sanction of compulsory arbitration is, after all, found
in the willingness of the parties to a dispute to accept it,
and in the loyalty of parties to carry it out when any
decision following upon it has been given. Compulsory
arbitration has prevailed for some time in the Colonies,
out a Compulsory Arbitration Act in the United
Kingdom appears to be a long way off. Moderating
influences may operate to reduce the difficulties between
capital and labour, but Conciliation Boards within them-
selves will not solve the fundamental, and therefore real
difficulties that exist. It is right, however, that they
should be used as far as they will go in the evolution .
of the industrial life of the people, and they are bound
to continue to fill an important place and exercise a
moderating and beneficial function.

Immingham Coal Exports. — The official return of the
quantities of coal exported from Immingham during the
week ending June 4 is as follows :—Foreign : To Boulogne,
550 tons; Dieppe, 2,482'; Harlingen, 821; Folding, 1,420;
Kallundborg, 1,728; Malmo, 1,060; Rotterdam, 2,771—total,
10,832 tons. Coastwise: To Ramsgate, 220 tons; as com-
pared with 20,752 tons foreign, and 5,095 tons coastwise in
the corresponding week of the previous year.

Chinese Labour for Donetz Coal Mines.—In connection
with the scarcity of labour brought about by the draft of
men from the South Russian collieries to the army, it is said
that the Council of the Congress of South Russian Mine
Owners has received a telegram from Karbin from a group
of contractors offering to deliver as many Chinese colliers at.
the Donetz Basin as may be required. The Chinese are
described as sober, intelligent, industrious, and work seven
full days per week; some of them are fit to be foremen. It
is said that the cost of conveyance and incidental expenses
are easily recovered owing to the low wages they require.